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CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
B.Aniu

I. THE
RIOR TO SEPTEMBER

C

atmat

PROBLEM

1, 1948, the suggestion that a change of

venue might give rise to problems in the conflict of laws would
have been an almost complete absurdity. Provisions for changing the place of trial within a state have long been familiar;I but since
a single law is in force throughout the state, a transfer from one county
to another can hardly raise questions as to jurisdiction 2 or as to the
applicable law. In the federal courts, on the other hand, we haveemphatically, since the decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' in
1938-a single judicial system administering, in addition to a body of
national law, the laws of all our several states. Until 1948, however,
there was almost no occasion for associating conflict-of-laws problems
with changes in the place of trial, because, generally speaking, change
of venue was a phenomenon unknown to federal civil procedure.' The
1 Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
' See Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 62 (1930).
'The problem in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), 325 U.S. 77 (1945), though
arising out of a statute in terms providing for "change of venue," in fact involved more,
since the statute authorized transfer from a court having no jurisdiction of the subject
matter to a competent court. See generally Farlow, Change of Venue and Effect of
Transfer in City Courts in Illinois, 41 Ill.
L. Rev. 105 (1946).
3304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'Brown v. Heinen, 61 F. Supp. 563 (D. Minn., 1945); Spies v. Chicago & E. I. R.
Co., 32 Fed. 713 (S.D. N.Y., 1887); Billings Utility Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 40
F. Supp. 309 (D. Mont., 1941).
When the District of Columbia consisted of two counties, there was provision for the
"removal" of cases from one to the other. Act of June 24, 1812, § 8, 2 Stat. 755, 757.
The Act of March 3, 1821, 3 Stat. 643, and the Act of February 28, 1839, 5 Stat. 322
[both repealed, 36 Stat. 1168 (1911)], provided for change of venue in the event of disqualification of district and circuit court judges, respectively. Both acts dealt expressly
with the effect of transfer. The earlier one specified that the transferee court should take
cognizance of the case "in the like manner as if such suit or action had been originally
commenced in that court, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly;
and the jurisdiction of such circuit court shall extend to all such cases so removed, as
were cognisable in the district court from which the same was removed." The language of
the later act was substantially the same, except that it omitted the final reference to the
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place of trial of civil actions was governed by statute. If the venue
was improperly laid, the consequence was dismissal upon timely and
sufficient objection.' If it was properly laid, the action proceeded to
trial and judgment in the court in which it was filed without further
reference to the appropriateness of the forum, except in rare instances
in which considerations more or less related to the place of trial restrained the exercise of jurisdiction.' Under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, which burst into full bloom shortly before the revision of
the Judicial Code was enacted in 1948, the class of cases in which a
district court might decline to exercise its jurisdiction was greatly enlarged; 7 but still no problems were presented of the sort suggested here,
because that doctrine led to the dismissal of the action, not to its transfer.
jurisdiction of the transferee court, substituting a provision for process for the execution
of the judgment.
Since 1887 there has been provision for transfer, with the consent of the parties, from
one division to another in the same district. 24 Stat. 425 (1887) ; 34 Stat. 206 (1906), 36
Stat. 1103 (1911), 39 Stat. 851 (1916), 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(b)
(1950). Prior to 1948, in the absence of consent, there could be no transfer even to another division within the district. Lavietes v. Ferro Stamping & Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 561
(E.D. Mich., 1937); Williamson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 30 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. S.C.,
1939); Duval v. Bathrick, 31 F. Supp. 510 (D. Minn., 1940). Contra: Sanders v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 33 F. 2d 512 (W.D. La., 1929).
Section 304 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), as
amended, 21 U.S.C.A. § 334 (Supp., 1953), provides for transfer to another district of
certain libes for condemnation, and specifies that "the court to which such case was
removed shall have the powers . . . which the court from which removal was made
would have had . . . if such case had not been removed." 21 U.S.C.A. § 334 (f) (2)
(Supp., 1953).
A provision for the transfer of corporate reorganization proceedings [52 Stat. 885, as
amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 518 (1946)] was superseded in 1952 by comprehensive provisions
for transfer of bankruptcy cases. 66 Stat. 424, 430, 11 U.S.C.A. § 55 (1952). Consult
In re Lustron Corp., 184 F. 2d 789 (C.A. 2d, 1950); In re Marine Aircraft Corp., 118 F.
Supp. 844 (S.D. N.Y., 1954).
Admiralty Rule 54 [28 U.S.C.A. following § 2073 (1952)] provides for change of venue
in limited liability proceedings, and there are similar provisions in the Suits in Admiralty
Act [41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 742 (1944)] and the Public Vessels Act [43 Stat.
1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C.A. § 782 (1944)]. The construction of the transfer provision of the
Suits in Admiralty Act, and its operation with respect to the statute of limitations, were
involved in Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. United States, 19 F. 2d 761 (CA. 2d, 1927).
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for change of venue of
criminal cases on motion of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.A. following § 3771 (1952).
'Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 363 (1926).
'E.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (internal affairs of foreign
corporations); Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (lack of remedy
appropriate to foreign right).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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On September 1, 1948, the Revision of the Judicial Code became
effective. Section 1404(a) provided:
Change of Venue. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.8

The novelty of the provision, coupled with the history which had
brought it forth, gave rise to numerous problems. One of the most
important, and one of the most interesting, is reflected not at all in the
legislative history of the section; it has arisen only sporadically in the
cases which have been decided; and it has not yet been systematically
analyzed in the law reviews. That problem arises from the fact that
the device of change of venue-a device borrowed from the unitary
judicial system, administering a single body of law-has been introduced into a system which administers many different bodies of lawand does so, moreover, on a peculiarly geographical basis: a federal
district court applies the law of a particular state not because of
choice-of-law rules of its own, but because it sits within a state, whose
laws (including conflict-of-laws rules) 9 it is bound to follow. It applies
state law primarily when the rights and duties at issue are created by
state as distinguished from federal law; but it sometimes applies state
law even when the issues before it arise out of federally created rights. 10
Certainly, for most purposes the federal courts may be regarded as an
a62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1952). Subsection (b) of the same section broadened existing provisions for transfer between divisions within a district, and
subsection (c)authorized trial anywhere within a division. Section 1406(a) provides:
"The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division
or district shall [dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,] transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought," the language in brackets having
been inserted in 1949 [63 Stat. 101 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a) (1950)].
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. 2d 754 (CA. 1st, 1940).
0
' "Apart from penal enactments, Congress has usually left limitation of time for
commencing actions under national legislation to judicial implications. As to actions at
law, the silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to
adopt the local law of limitation." Homberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
Presumably, at least in practice, this means the law of the state in which the court sits,
despite the contrary dictum in Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 466 (1947). See generally, Federal Statutes without Limitation Provisions, 53 Col. L. Rev. 68 (1953); Blume
and George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 937 (1951). In other
instances also, state law has been given persuasive or binding effect where there is an
unanswered question as to some "remedial detail" of a federal cause of action. Here,
again, the law applied is that of the state in which the court sits, though the possibility
is not foreclosed that when the occasion arises federal conceptions of conffict of laws
may lead to a different choice. Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S.
343 (1939). See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Col. L. Rev.
489, 509 (1954).
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integrated judicial system, exercising the judicial power of the United
States on a potentially nationwide basis; but a district court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of its diversity jurisdiction has
been characterized, authoritatively if somewhat figuratively, as "for
that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State. . . ,"'In short,
the law to be applied in the federal courts depends, in important classes
of cases, on the place of trial. That circumstance produced results
which did not escape criticism when the place of trial was determined
solely by the limitations upon service of process, the statutory venue
provisions, and the election of the plaintiff. 2 What results are to be expected when the place of trial, properly selected by the plaintiff in
terms of the reach of process and the statutory venue, is subject to
change by the court "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice"?
The problem may be posed concretely by stating the facts of Headrick v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.'--thus far, the
leading case. J. T. Headrick, a citizen of Missouri, was injured in
California while he was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by
the railway, a Kansas corporation. His Missouri attorney entered into
settlement negotiations which continued until after action was barred
by the California statute of limitations. Thereafter he was advised that
the railway would rely on the bar of the statute as a defense, and
negotiations were discontinued. Headrick thereupon filed his action in
a state court in New Mexico, where the railway was amenable to
process and where action was not barred. The defendant removed to
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico on
the ground of diversity of citizenship, and there moved for dismissal
on grounds of forum non conveniens, or, in the alternative, for transfer
to the Northern District of California pursuant to Section 1404(a). In
almost every respect the case was of the type for which the transfer
provision was enacted: 4 the forum chosen was not the home forum of
' Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
'E.g., Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Ill.
L. Rev. 493 (1942),
reprinted in Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, c. 5 (1942); 2
Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, c. XXVI
(1953) ; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J. 267, 285 et seq. (1946); Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the
Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1946).
"182

F. 2d 305 (C.A. 10th, 1950).

"As to one respect a doubt may be suggested, though it cannot be pursued here.
There are grounds for suggesting that the section should not be applied to cases removed
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either party; the substantive law to be applied would in all probability
be that of California; the witnesses, other than the plaintiff, were residents of California; the defendant alleged that the injury was caused
by the negligence of a bus company which was amenable to process in
California but not in New Mexico; the Northern District of California
was one in which the action "might have been brought," since the defendant was amenable to process there, and venue there would have
been in accordance with the statutes. But what of the statute of limitations? If the case is transferred to a district court in California, will
the California statute of limitations be applied to bar the action? And,
if so, will the transfer be "in the interest of justice" as well as for the
convenience of parties and witnesses?
It may be well to make explicit the legal conditions which make
such a problem possible. Under well-settled rules of conflict of laws,
the state court in New Mexico, while applying the "substantive" law
of California, would reject the California statute of limitations and
apply its own, on the ground that the limitation of actions is a matter
of "procedure" governed by the law of the forum. 5 Under equally
settled rules governing the law to be applied by federal courts in diversity cases, the district court sitting in New Mexico would also reject
the California statute in favor of that of New Mexico, because the
district court must follow the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in
which it sits. 1 6 If, in distinguishing between "substance" and "procedure" for the purpose of determining how much of the law of a sister
state they will apply, the state courts were guided by a passion for
uniformity of result comparable to that which the Supreme Court has
exhibited where the objective is uniformity as between the courts of a
given state and the federal courts sitting therein, the problem would
not exist, at least in this particular form. Then New Mexico would
apply California's statute of limitations as well as its "substantive"
law, and the result, so far as time limitations are concerned, would be
the same whether the action were brought in California or in New
Mexico, in a federal court or a court of the state. The absence of such
from state courts. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908,
934-35 (1947). But cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); White v. Thompson, 80
F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ill., 1948); Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. N.Y., 1953);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F. 2d 378 (C.A. 7th, 1954).
'Rest., Conflict of Laws § 604 (1934).
' See, in addition to the cases cited in note 9 supra, Ragan v. Merchants Tfr. &
Whse. Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
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a passion for uniformity from state to state, however, is a fact; and
clear notice has been given that it is not the business of the federal
courts to attempt reform within the limited sphere of their competence.
The ideal of uniformity from state to state has been subordinated to
that of uniformity as between the two systems of courts within the
17
state .
The first question, then, must be: If the action is transferred, will
the district court in California apply the California statute to bar the
action? The initial response to that question is likely to be based upon
one of two lines of approach. Each approach is readily suggested by
existing formulations of doctrine; each is fairly simple, direct, and
general; and each leads to a different result.
Of the two, the approach which is, perhaps, likely to present itself
first is that which is suggested by cases in which the Supreme Court
has applied and expounded the Erie doctrine. Those cases emphasize
that the law to be applied is that of the state in which the court sits.
They reiterate the underlying purpose of achieving uniformity of result
as between the two systems of courts within the state, irrespective of
the result in another state. The apparent conclusion, of course, is that
the transferee court must apply the law of the state in which it sits:
the district court in California will apply the California statute of
limitations, and the action will be barred. This was the view that was
uppermost in the mind of Judge Irving R. Kaufman, of the Southern
District of New York, when he said:
Hence we see the anomalous situation, as in the Headrick case, that a federal
court sitting in California in an action by a Missouri plaintiff against a Kansas
corporation on a California tort is asked to apply the New Mexico statute of
limitations. This was a diversity of citizenship case, and in such a case the federal
court is required to follow the public policy of the state in which it sits. If it is
against the public policy of California to entertain such an action, what is the
federal court of California to do?- 8
17"Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state,
upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue
local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal court to
thwart such: local policies by enforcing an independent 'general law' of conflict of laws."
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
'Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under § 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10
F.R.D. 595, 601 (1951).
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This was also the view of the district court in the Headrick case. 9 It
was the result assumed by Mr. Justice Jackson when, dissenting from
a decision which required a district court to adhere to the state conflict-of-laws rule applying the forum's statute of limitations to a foreign
tort action, he argued:
Another very practical consideration indicates the unworkability of a doctrine
for federal courts that the place of trial is the sole factor which determines the
law of the case. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a) authorizes certain transfers of any civil
action from state to state for the convenience of witnesses or of parties, or in the
interests of justice. The purpose was to adopt for federal courts the principles of
forum non convemiens. . . . Are we then to understand that parties may get a
change of law as a bonus for a change of venue? ...

20

The other approach proceeds in part upon established conceptions

of the effect of change of venue, and in part upon a different interpretation of the policy underlying the Erie doctrine. The conceptions
referred to are, in the main, those concerning the effect of change of
venue within a unitary system of courts applying a single body of
law,"' for there is virtually no precedent in Anglo-American judicial
history for change of venue from a court bound to apply one body of
law to one bound to apply a different body of law.22 The interpretation
'In two recent cases, Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York has
taken a somewhat similar position. In each case the parties took conflicting positions as
to the effect of transfer upon the relevant period of limitation. Without resolving the
question, Judge Weinfeld transferred one case on condition that the parties stipulate
"that the statute of limitations which the District Court of New York would apply were
the action to remain here, shall be applied in the Louisiana district court." Frechoux v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1953). In the other case, the moving
party not consenting to such an arrangement, transfer was denied. Curry v. States
Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. N.Y., 1954). The latter decision especially is indicative of a belief that there is at least a substantial possibility that the transferee court
must apply the law of the state in which it sits. Compare the action of the Court of
Appeals in the Headrick case, discussed infra.
'Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953).
' The general tenor of the state cases is to the effect that the transferee court has
"precisely the same jurisdiction that would have obtained in the court from which the
venue is changed. . .

."

Hazen v. Webb, 65 Kan. 38, 45, 68 Pac. 1096, 1098 (1902), and

that the transfer "will not deprive any party of a legal right." Hall v. Castleberry, 283
S.W. 581 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926). See generally 56 Am. Jur., Venue § 78 (1947); 67 C.J.,
Venue §356 (1934).
' The cases which arose under federal statutes making limited provision for change
of venue are not particularly helpful. Of the enactments cited in note 4 supra, three
dealt specifically with the effect of transfer, each in a different way. According to the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, proceedings after transfer are to be conducted as if there
had been no transfer; according to the acts of 1821 and 1839, they were to be conducted as if the action had originally been filed in the transferee court, though the former
act specified that the transferee court should have all the powers of the court of original
filing. In United States v. Council of Keokuk, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 514 (1867), a bondholder's
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of the Erie doctrine which is dominant here is that which emphasizes
the purpose to eliminate the advantage which the accident of diversity
of citizenship may give to one of the parties by enabling him to achieve
a result in the federal court which could not have been achieved in
action against an Iowa municipality had been transferred from the Circuit Court for
the District of Iowa to that for the Northern District of Illinois because of interest on
the part of the judges, and, after judgment, the bondholders applied to the transferee
court for a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to pay the amount die. The
Process Act of 1828 (4 Stat. 278) required that the "forms and modes of proceeding" at
common law in the federal courts should be "the same in each of the said states, respectively, as are now used in the highest court, of original and general jurisdiction of the
same. .. ." Apropos of the availability of mandamus in the circuit court in Illinois, the
Court used language which is likely to be much quoted in discussions of the effect of
transfer under Section 1404(a): "Transferred, as the cause had been, from the Circuit
Court for the District of Iowa, it is quite clear that the power of the court to which it
was transferred was exactly the same in respect to the controversy as belonged to the tribunal where it was commenced." 6 Wall. 514, 516 (1867). It proceeded to note that mandamus was the appropriate remedy under Iowa law, and that by virtue of the Process
Act it was also the appropriate remedy in the circuit court in Illinois; then it passed to
the principal question in the case, which related to the effect of an injunction issued by
an Iowa state court. The possible significance of the quoted language for the problems
raised by Section 1404(a) is qualified by the following circumstances:
(1) The Court buttressed its reference to Iowa law by noting the appropriateness of
such a reference in a case involving the obligations of an Iowa municipal corporation,
thus suggesting a reasoned choice of law as distinguished from a mechanical deduction
from the "nature" of a change of venue.
(2) The Court made no reference to the Act of 1839, which, by its provision that proceedings after transfer should be conducted as if the action had been filed originally in
the transferee court, might have pointed to a different rationale.
(3) There was no indication of any difference between the law of Iowa and that of
Illinois respecting the appropriateness of the writ. The fact is that the procedure employed was equally appropriate in Illinois. City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 485, 488
(1861). Nothing, therefore, hinged on the determination that Iowa law rather than Illinois law governed.
(4) Obviously, a question of choice between the law of two states on a matter of procedure in the federal courts in 1867 had none of the implications that are involved when
the choice relates to matters which are "substantive" in the context of the Erie doctrine.
In Supervisors v. Rogers, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1868), the Court, while noting that under
the Act of 1839 the case is to be treated as if filed originally in the transferee court, approved the employment by that court of a procedure authorized by a statute of the state
of original filing. No explanation was offered for the non sequitur. The facts were substantially identical with those of the Keokuk case of the year before (which was not
cited), with the addition that, upon failure of the local government officials to comply
with the mandate, the bondholders applied to the circuit court in Illinois for a writ directing the United States marshal for Iowa to levy and collect the tax, which was granted
in reliance on an Iowa statute empowering thd court, in cases of contumacy, to order the
doing of the act by a court appointee. The use of this procedure was approved.
In Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 How. (U.S.) 264 (1857), an action of trespass to try title
was transferred, under the Act of 1821, from a district court in Texas to the circuit court
in Louisiana. The courts experienced no difficulties resulting from the transfer. Any embarrassment resulting from the "local" character of the action was presumably obviated
by the express terms of that act, giving the transferee court all the powers of the court
of original filing.
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the state court. It was within Headrick's power to institute his action
in the state court in New Mexico, and that court could not transfer it
to California, where it would be barred. Hence if the case is removed
and then transferred pursuant to federal power, and a different law
applied, the difference in result stems directly from the accident of
diversity. This view was also considered by Judge Kaufman:
Then again view the problem in the light of these facts: The plaintiff in the
Headrick case brought his action in the New Mexico state courts. The defendant
was doing business in New Mexico. Perhaps the forum non conveniens doctrine
of New Mexico would not permit the dismissal of plaintiff's action. It evidently
did not seem fair to the Court of Appeals that the action should be removed on
diversity grounds to the federal courts and then transferred to a forum where the
action would be dismissed if nothing were said to prevent such a result. Perhaps,
23
as was said before, such an action would be violative of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.

Thus Judge Kaufman stated a dilemma: If the district court in California were to apply the New Mexico statute, that might be a violation
of the Erie doctrine; yet if it were to apply the California statute, that
might also violate the Erie doctrine. The dilemma appears clearly
when the action taken by the district judge in New Mexico is considered. Because he believed that the Erie doctrine would require application of the California statute of limitations after transfer, and
therefore that transfer would be futile, he dismissed the action on the
ground of forum non conveniens, thereby depriving the plaintiff of the
right to maintain an action which, in all probability, he could have
maintained in the New Mexico state court.
The second approach was the one taken by the court of appeals in
the Headrick case. That court was able to quote Judge Learned Hand
[addressing himself to a different question under Section 1404(a)] to
the effect that "when an-action is transferred, it remains what it was;
all further proceedings in it are merely referred to another tribunal.... .4,

The court continued:

Neither car a Federal Court in a diversity case take away that which a state
has given. Upon removal to the Federal Court in New Mexico, the case would
remain a New Mexico case controlled by the law and policy of that state, and if
Sec. 1404(a) is applicable and a transfer to the California court is ordered for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, there is no
3Op. cit. supra note 18, at 601.
Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F. 2d 866, 868 (C.A. 2d,
1950). His point was only that transfer as distinguished from dismissal is not a final disposition.
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logical reason why it should not remain a New Mexico case still controlled by the
25
law and policy of that state.

The court bolstered its decision by noting that the district judge could
not have been sure that transfer would have been futile, since he did
not know whether the defendant would plead the California statute,
and by hinting that in moving for transfer the defendant might have
estopped itself to plead the statute.2"
There are faults in both approaches which require that each be
examined in detail. It should be observed at once, however, that while
the first approach leads directly to its conclusion, the second does not
necessarily lead to the application of the law of the state in which the
action is filed. While the conception of a transfer from one state to
another as being no different from a transfer from one county to
another does, indeed, lead to the conclusion that transfer should not
work any change in the applicable law, a more discriminating application of the second view of the Erie doctrine leads to a modification of
that conclusion. Up to now, the argument has proceeded on the basis
that the New Mexico state court had no power to transfer to California.
It might, however, have dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.
In that case, the order of the district judge dismissing Headrick's action would have produced a result squarely in line with the requirements of the Erie doctrine as interpreted by the court of appeals; and
the mandate of the court of appeals would have produced a disparity
of result in conflict with that court's own interpretation of the Erie
doctrine. Hence a third approach, which may be only a necessary modification of the second, emerges. This approach was suggested by Judge
Kaufman, in the passage quoted above, when he noted that nonrecognition of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by New Mexico might
be a necessary ingredient of the argument that the district court in
California should apply the New Mexico statute. It was explicitly advocated by a critic of the decision of the court of appeals in the
Headrick case:
[Tihe court did not make the analysis which Erie requires. It failed to ascertain

whether or not New Mexico state courts have a doctrine of forum non conveniens
'Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 182 F. 2d 305, 309-10 (C.A. 10th, 1950).
'The court in Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N.M., 1949), took
the same view in transferring a federal cause of action subject to state statutes of limitation, but insured the correctness of the result by treating as a solemn waiver or estoppel
the defendant's promise, made in open court, that it would not rely on the transferee
state's statute.
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which might have been applied to dismiss Headrick's suit. Whether the substantive
law of the original or transferee forum applies in diversity cases turns on this
27
determination.

Thus, upon preliminary consideration, it appears that there are
three possible answers to the question concerning the law to be applied
after transfer:
(1) The transferee court will apply the law of the state in which it
sits, just as if the action had been originally filed in that court;
(2) The transferee court will apply the law of the state in which
the action was originally filed, just as if it were a federal court sitting
in that state, but without regard to the state law on forum non
conveniens;
(3) The transferee court will apply the law of the transferee state
if the action was subject to dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens under the law of the state in which it was originally filed,
but will apply the law of the state of filing if it was not thus subject to
dismissal.
The problem is a complex one. It will not yield to simple and general attempts at solution. It involves the meaning of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the role and the source of that doctrine in the
federal courts, the relation between that doctrine and Section 1404(a),
the meaning of the Erie doctrine, the nature of the federal judicial
system, and the effect of the Constitution as requiring uniformity of
decision from state to state. If a clear answer is found as to the law
applicable upon transfer, the solution is still not complete. For the
transfer is to be made only "in the interest of justice,"2 s and the second
component of the problem remains: Given a change in the applicable
law as a result of transfer, would the transfer be in the interest of
justice?
The process of reasoning by which an adequate solution is to be
reached cannot be anything but complex and controversial. Adequate
analysis must raise fundamental questions concerning the function of
the national judicial establishment in the adjudication of state-created
rights, and a too fervent adherence to doctrines which have hitherto
been orthodox will impede the attainment of a satisfactory solution.
The solution itself, however, must be simple, workable, and just.
' Section 1404(a) and Transfers of Substantive Law, 60 Yale L.J. 537, 538-39 (1951).
"The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary
for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so." Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.C.A. §1404(a) (1950).
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The device of discretionary change in the place of trial, for convenience and in the interest of justice, is in itself a modest, uncomplicated,

and natural adjunct of a judicial system, calculated, in an unspectacular way, to reduce the cost and promote the fairness of trial. In
England, the device operates in just that fashion; appeals are rare,
and reversals nonexistent. 29 By contrast, the functioning of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal courts prior to the enactment of Section 1404(a) was notoriously complex and uncertain,"° and
the delay and expense resulting from litigation over the place of trial
in the five years since that section was enacted are appalling.3 1 If
either the complexities of the federal system, or doctrinal attitudes
toward that system, result in the end in "turning a simple practical
problem into a complicated mystery 3 2 then we would be better off
without a provision for change of venue. The abuses of statutory
venue, substantial as they were, will appear trivial as compared with
the delay, expense, and capricious frustration of rights which will result
if a sound and workable solution is not found.

II.

SECTION

1404(a)

AND THE DOCTRINE OF

Forum Non Conveniens
There is no doubt at all about the origins of Section 1404(a). The
official notes of the Reviser state that it was "drafted in accordance
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens," and the Supreme Court
has accepted that statement as "obviously authoritative." 8 On March
"See Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 45-46 (1930), and Rules of the Supreme Court, 0. 36, r. 1 and
r. 10, Annual Practice 585, 586, 596 (1952).
"See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 930 (1947).
"See Kaufman, op. cit. supra note 18 at 595. In one case, involving Section 1406(a),
the place of trial was debated five times, each time before a different federal court, and
in the end the Supreme Court divided equally on the question: Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Schlumberger Corp., 92 F. Supp. 16 (S.D. Calif., 1950) (action transferred
to District of Delaware); Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Harrison, 185 F. 2d 457
(C.A. 9th, 1950) (mandamus refused); Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Schlumberger Corp., 98 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del., 1951) (remand refused); Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Leahy, 193 F. 2d 302 (C.A. 3d, 1951) (mandamus refused), aff'd by
equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 861 (1952). Precise statistics are not available, but the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts states that the number of cases originating in the district courts by transfer from another district, exclusive of food and drug
and admiralty cases, was 173 in 1952 and 226 in 1953. These figures, of course, give no
hint as to the number of applications denied. Letter dated April 6, 1954, from: Will Shafroth, Esq., Chief of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, in the University
of Chicago Law Library.
"Foster, op. cit. supra note 29, at 41.
"United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 81 (1949).
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7, 1945, Professor James William Moore, special consultant to the
revision staff, had written a memorandum to the Reviser stating that
recognition should be given to the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
and specifically suggesting that provision should be made for the
transfer to a convenient forum of cases brought under the generous
venue provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 34 This
memorandum led to the inclusion of Section 1404(a) in the Second
Draft of the Code, which was considered and adopted at a meeting of
the Advisory Committee and its consultants May 28-30, 1945. The
section appeared unchanged in all subsequent drafts, and in the final
enactment three years later.
The term forum non conveniens, a creature of Scottish law, became
current in this country after 1929, when it was publicized by Mr. Paxton Blair. 5 In the years that intervened before the enactment of the
Revision of the Judicial Code there was extensive comment on the doctrine, generally favorable to the Blair thesis. 6 There is thus available
a comprehensive literature on the history and purpose of the doctrine,
and on the constitutional questions associated with it, which makes it
wholly unnecessary to discuss those matters here. There are, however,
certain aspects of the doctrine in the federal courts, and its relation to
Section 1404(a), which need emphasis for the purposes of the problem under discussion, or which have been neglected in the literature.
The doctrine came into its own in the federal courts only with the
Supreme Court's decision of the Gulf Oiil case on March 10, 1947two years after Section 1404(a) was conceived, and a little more than
a year before it was given legislative birth. We shall shortly have
occasion to inquire rather closely into the status of the doctrine in the
federal courts prior to the Gulf case. At this point, however, it is
sufficient to make this noncontroversial observation concerning the
'Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 68-69 (1949); Moore, Commentary on the U.S.
Judicial Code 206 (1949),
'Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L.
Rev. 1 (1929). This article, which urged wider dissemination of the doctrine and increased use of the plea, was frankly "directed toward the possibility of relieving calendar
congestion by partially diverting at its source the flood of litigation by which our [New
York] courts are being overwhelmed ... ." Ibid.

'Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1930); Foster, Place
of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
41 (1930); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill.
L. Rev. 867 (1935); Barrett, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1947).
'

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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situation as it existed in the spring of 1945, when the decision to propose Section 1404(a) was made: While the discretionary power of a
district court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction was recognized in
certain circumstances, some of which touched upon convenience of the
place of trial, there was no explicit recognition of a general power to
dismiss an action, brought in conformity with an applicable statutory
venue provision, on the ground that the forum was inconvenient; and
the specific evil at which the proposed provision for transfer was expressly aimed-the trial of personal injury cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act in oppressively inappropriate forums-was
expressly held to be one which the courts were without power to cor38

rect.

Section 1404(a), therefore, was plainly not conceived as a legislative
codification of principles then followed in practice by the federal
courts; on the contrary, it expressly purported to be a reform measure,
designed to bring about a desired change in the law. The intention
was expressed with sufficient clarity, both in the text of the section
and in the note accompanying it, that the Supreme Court held by a
vote of seven to two that the section effected, among other things, the
precise change in the law suggested by the Reviser's note.39 The section was not limited to Federal Employers' Liability Act cases, of
course; the point is that it was designed to introduce the principle of
forum non conveniens generally into federal civil procedure. But it was
a moderate proposal. Taking advantage of the fact that the federal
district courts belong to a single judicial system, its authors substituted
transfer for dismissal, which was the frequently harsh consequence of
the successful plea of forum non conveniens. Thus drafted, the section,
conceived in accordance with a rather novel and somewhat alien doctrine with a Scottish-Latin name, took on a strangely familiar appearance: it was indistinguishable, on the surface, from many a state
statute authorizing change of venue. Naturally, then, and perhaps significantly, it was entitled, "Change of Venue."
More than three years were to elapse, as we know, before the section
was enacted by Congress. In that period other forces continued to
' Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883 (C.A. 2d, 1946), rev'd 330 U.S. 501 (1947);
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
315 U.S. 698 (1942) ; Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.CA. § 1404(a) (1950); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1949);
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 385 (1953).
'Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 337
U.S. 75 (1949).
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press for similar changes in the law. The Jennings Bill, an unsuccessful proposal to narrow the venue provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, was under consideration in Congress while the proposed
revision of the Code was pending. 40 The reform movement went forward in the courts as well. The Supreme Court had been sharply divided in its decisions establishing the absolute character of the plaintiff's venue privilege under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
commentators had made a strong case for the general principle of discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of the inappropriateness of the forum. Forces which, I think, may be called liberal
(because they were seeking to improve procedure by gaining acceptance
of a practical, equitable doctrine, potentially capable of eliminating,
without injustice, unfair advantage derived from technical arrangements) were pressing upon and within the Court for reform. Then, in
March 1947, the Court decided the Gulf case, and the battle was won,
after a fashion-more than a year before the fate of the legislative
provision was settled. The victory was not a perfect one. It was broad
in scope, but it left untouched the specific problem of the Federal Employers' Liability Act cases, which undoubtedly constituted the most
pressing evil. It was, as we shall see, a less moderate and liberal reform than that proposed to Congress in Section 1404(a). And the
decision contained an analytical flaw which one might happily forget,
now that the basic issue has been settled by act of Congress, if it were
not for the fact that the majority opinion has assumed peculiar significance for the interpretation of Section 1404(a).41 The acknowledgment of forum non conveniens as a source of the section invites the
drawing of inferences as to the law applicable after transfer, based
upon the premises and the effect of that doctrine. It is necessary, therefore, to understand as precisely as possible the status of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens in the federal courts; and, to that end, the
Gulf case must be placed in proper perspective in the sequence of legislative and judicial developments; any substantial fault in its reasoning
"0See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 63 et seq. (1949).
a The section "was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
•.

Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.C.A. S 1404(a) (1950). As the leading exposition

.'

of that doctrine by the Supreme Court, the Gulf case is frequently consulted as an
authoritative statement of the legislative intent. Wiren v. Laws, 194 F. 2d 873, 875 (App.
D.C., 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329, 330 (C.A. 2d, 1950); Nicol v.
Koscinski, 188 F. 2d 537 (CA. 6th, 1951); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949,
952, 953 (CA. 2d, 1950). But cf. Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.
2d 360, 362 (CA. 4th, 1949); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Southern Bus Lines, 172 F. 2d 946
(CA. 5th, 1949); All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F. 2d 1010 (CA. 3d, 1952).
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must be recognized; and the practical considerations which may have
motivated (and may justify) it must be sought. The proper administration of the present law may depend in good measure on a careful winnowing of the reasoning which produced the result.
The Gulf Oil Corporation, through a local distributor, was making
a contract delivery of gasoline on the premises of a public warehouse
in Lynchburg, Virginia, owned by Gilbert, when an explosion occurred,
resulting in a fire which destroyed the warehouse and its contents.
Gilbert's New York insurers caused suit to be filed in his name for an
amount in excess of $365,000, invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Venue was proper under the Neirbo case,42 the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, having appointed agents to accept service of process
in both Virginia and New York. The district court dismissed on the
plea of forum non conveniens, invoking the law of New York.13 The
court of appeals reversed, holding, without dissent, that New York
law was inapplicable, and, with Judge Augustus Hand dissenting, that
discretionary power to dismiss such cases did not exist in the federal
courts. 44 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed by a vote of five to four,
holding, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, that dismissal was justified by the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and leaving open the
question whether New York law applied.
The problem of appropriateness of the place of trial, from the standpoint of the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice, and perhaps also from the standpoint of a proper apportionment of judicial responsibilities, exists on two distinct levels. It exists,
first, on the interstate and international level; for, prima facie, an
action may be filed anywhere in the world, not excepting the island of
Tobago. It exists, second, on the intrastate level (using the term "state"
in the conflict-of-laws sense) :41 given the appropriateness of trial somewhere within the state, which of its counties or districts is the appropriate place of trial? Taking the two levels together, the problem is
universal and pervasive. It urgently demands that the attention of
'Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291 (S.D. N.Y., 1945).
" Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883 (C.A. 2d, 1946). Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's
interpretation of the Court of Appeals decision, 330 U.S. 501, 503 (1947). The Court of
Appeals had previously regarded New York law as relevant to the question whether a
district court should dismiss an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Weiss v. Routh, 149 F. 2d 193 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
"Rest., Conflict of Laws § 2 (1934).
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lawmakers be directed to an appraisal of the conflicting interests involved, so that there may be as complete and certain a solution as possible; for hardship and injustice are inevitable if a plaintiff may maintain his action wherever he chooses, or if he cannot identify the places
where it is appropriate for him to sue.
Complete and authoritative solution of the problem on the interstate
and international level is impossible. A partial solution exists in the
concept of jurisdiction, which, insofar as it is recognized as a principle
of domestic or international law, or is comprehended in the due process
clauses of our Constitution, limits the plaintiff's choice of the place of
trial by excluding, in a crude and formalistic way, places in which trial
tends to be egregiously oppressive to the defendant.46 In many cases,
however, maintenance of the action in the place chosen by the plaintiff would be inconvenient, vexatious, or oppressive to the defendant
even though "jurisdiction" exists according to the conventionalized
concepts of fairness, power, and due process which have been developed under that rubric. It was for such cases that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens was developed. The doctrine is that a court may,
on such terms as are just, decline to adjudicate a case even though the
formal requirements of "jurisdiction" are complied with, if the place
of trial chosen by the plaintiff gives him an unfair advantage, or tends
to vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, or to make a full and fair
hearing unreasonably difficult, or to impose an unwarranted burden on
the court. A defensive weapon, it has its offensive counterpart in the
power of a court of equity to enjoin a person subject to its jurisdiction
from prosecuting an action abroad in similar circumstances. Like the
concept of jurisdiction, it is judge-made law. It tends to restore to the
idea of jurisdiction some realistic considerations relating to the reasonableness of opportunity to be heard which were squeezed out as that
idea took shape under the pressure of formalism and power concepts.
It restores them, however, not in terms of power and jurisdiction, but
of discretion. Thus a further limitation is placed upon the plaintiff's
choice of forum.
The solution of the problem on the interstate and international level
is far from complete. The principles of jurisdiction and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens operate in a negative fashion only. They tend to
"Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (K.B., 1808); Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B.
155 (1870); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See Foster, Place of Trial in Civil
Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1239 (1930); Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41 (1930).
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apprise the plaintiff of the fact that if he sues in a particular court, that
court will refuse to entertain his action for want of jurisdiction; or
that, if the court does give him a judgment, it will not be recognized
elsewhere; or that the court will decline to entertain his action for
reasons of convenience. They do not tell him where he may safely sue.
To be sure, he may, by studying the factors which are considered by
courts in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, or by canvassing the states to find one which does not recognize the doctrine,
make a shrewd guess as to a place in which his complaint will be heard;
but he does so on his own responsibility, and perhaps at his peril.
There is no one to tell him where he can go and be secure against the
painful consequences of dismissal. This is so because of the existence
of a power vacuum. There is no supreme law-making authority, legislative or judicial, which can authoritatively announce which of the states
having jurisdiction is the appropriate forum for trial. Necessarily,
therefore, the solution is partial; it relieves against hardship but leaves
uncertainty; it tends to solve the defendant's problems but leaves those
of the plaintiff unsolved; it is negative, and not positive.
On the intrastate level, the situation is different. Partial solutions,
with their one-sidedness and uncertainty, are not to be tolerated if they
can be avoided; and here the power exists to avoid them. There is a
supreme law-making authority, which treats the problem of place of
trial by the enactment of venue statutes. Given the assumption that
trial somewhere within the state is appropriate, the legislature addresses itself to the question of the districts or counties which, in various
types of cases, are appropriate, and which are inappropriate. Within
the limits of its competence, the legislature forms its judgment on the
basis of a consideration of the competing interests and of the factors
bearing on convenience in various classes of cases. The result is a complete, if not a wholly satisfactory, solution. An authoritative determination has been made, not only that certain places of trial are not appropriate, but that certain others are. The solution is positive as well as
negative. It gives the plaintiff relief from uncertainty as well as the
defendant relief from hardship. It leaves no room for discretionary
judicial dismissal of actions on grounds of the inconvenience of the
place of trial; the discretion has been exercised by the legislature. The
legislative determination may leave much to be desired, since it is based
on assumptions regarding broad classes of cases; judicial discretion, at
the price of uncertainty, provides a nicer adjustment of place of trial
to the facts of a particular case. For this reason, the legislature may,
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and frequently does, leave a measure of discretion to the court notwithstanding the judgments expressed in the venue statute. It can do
this at a relatively minor cost in terms of uncertainty: it has, and it
exercises, the power to provide the moderate corrective of transfer to
another county or district. It provides not for discretionary dismissal,
but for change of venue.
The device of change of venue is available only on the intrastate
level; it is not available in the solution of the problem at the interstate
or international level, which is the problem to which the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is addressed. This, again, is because of the
defect of power which distinguishes the interstate situation. No court
has power to transfer a case to a court of another sovereign. The problems with which the doctrine of forum non conveniens deals cannot be
solved by transfer,or change of venue.
The distinction between the problem at the interstate level and that
at the intrastate level is basic to an analysis of the Gulf case. The distinction has been obscured both in the cases and in the commentaries
by ambiguous use of the term "venue. ' '4 7 It would be presumptuous to
maintain that the term can, in good usage, be applied only to the one
level and not to the other. Doubtless it has come to mean, in modem
times, simply "place of trial," so that there can be no objection, merely
from the standpoint of usage, to applying it to a choice between state
and state, or nation and nation. But it has come more especially to
mean the place of trial as specified by statutes dealing comprehensively with that subject within a state. In the discussion that follows,
therefore, a distinction will be made between the terms "place of trial,"
used with reference to the problem generally, and "statutory venue,"
used with reference to the problem at the intrastate level.
Now, either this analysis is dead wrong, or there is something amiss
in the Supreme Court's decision of the Gulf case. Mr. Justice Jackson
began his opinion by rejecting the plaintiff's contention that dismissal
was improper because the venue statutes of the United States pointed
to the Southern District of New York as a proper forum. "Indeed," he
said, "the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there
is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.

'48

This sentence says:

"See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947);
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947); Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 (1941).

"330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
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(1) If the court is without jurisdiction, the question of discretionary
dismissal because of inconvenience of the place of trial will not be
reached;
(2) If the action has been brought in a forum which is inappropriate
by the terms of a venue statute, the question of discretionary dismissal because of inconvenience of the place of trial will not be reached;
(3) It is only when the court has jurisdiction, and when the forum
is not declared inappropriate by an applicable venue statute, that the
question of discretionary dismissal on the ground that the forum is inconvenient arises.
Each one of these statements is unimpeachable. But the sentence,
read as an argument in support of the decision, says more. The third
statement is compound; it says:
(A) Even though the court has jurisdiction, and even though the
forum is not declared inappropriate by an applicable venue statute, the
action may be dismissed at the court's discretion if it ought to be tried
in a foreign tribunal-i.e., if trial is not appropriate in any district or
county of the state (nation) in which it was filed;
(B) Even though the court has jurisdiction, and even though the
action is appropriately triable in the state (nation) in which it was
filed, as distinguished from a foreign state, and even though the forum
is declared by an applicable venue statute to be among the appropriate
counties or districts within the state for the trial of such a case, the
action still may be dismissed, at the discretion of the court, if it appears that it can more appropriately be tried in another county or
district within the state.
The first of these propositions states the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, applied at the interstate level, and is perfectly sound. The
second states quite a different matter. It asserts the applicability of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens at the intrastate level-a level
at which the doctrine is an unnecessary, inefficient, and harsh device
for dealing with the problem of place of trial. By compounding a sentence declarative of both these propositions, Mr. Justice Jackson
assumed the answer to the question which was before the Court.
The circumstance which makes this fault possible, and which impedes its exposition, is that it may be said with respect to both (A)
and (B) that the "venue" is proper-i.e., there is no nonconformity to
statutory venue provisions. It is easy to show that in situation (A) the
place of trial may be improper even though there is conformity to the
apparent direction of the venue statute; and it may seem to follow for
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the situation in (B) that the place of trial may be improper notwithstanding conformity to statutory venue provisions. To escape the
seduction of this non sequitur, it is necessary to appreciate the fact
that statutory venue provisions are not addressed to, do not deal with,
and have no relevance to the problem of place of trial on the interstate
level. This is true because no legislature has the power to determine
affirmatively and authoritatively the appropriate place of trial as between state and state, nation and nation; and a venue statute is an
affirmative as well as a negative answer to the problem of place of trial.
A legislature may, indeed, enact into law the principle of forum non
conveniens for the case which should be tried in a foreign tribunal,
instead of leaving that matter to the courts; but, in so doing, it is not
enacting a venue statute of the sort with which we are familiar, or with
which the Court was concerned in the Gulf case. A venue statute should
be understood as saying, in effect: Assuming that the courts of this
state have jurisdiction of the case, and that trial somewhere in this
state, as distinguished from a foreign state, is appropriate, this statute
designates the counties or districts, among those within this state, which
are the appropriate places for trial.
Consider, for example, the leading case of Collard v. Beach,49 in
which the New York Supreme Court dismissed, on forum non conveniens grounds, an action between residents of Connecticut for a tort
which occurred in Connecticut. There was then in force in New York
a venue statute providing that, "If neither of the parties [at the time
the action was commenced] resided in the state, [the action] may be
tried, in any county, which the plaintiff designates, for that purpose, in
the title of the complaint. '50 In a sense, then, the "venue" was properly
laid, "in conformity with" the statute. But it is plain that the statute
did not purport to declare that, of all possible places in the world, the
New York county of the plaintiff's choice was the appropriate place of
trial. All it did was to designate the county in New York which was
appropriate for the trial of such actions between nonresidentsas might
be appropriately brought in the state of New York. Such a venue
statute is simply irrelevant to the question of the appropriateness of
the place of trial on the interstate level. It will not do to reason from
the fact that the venue statute does not prevent dismissal on that level
to the conclusion that it does not prevent dismissal on the intrastate
'81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't, 1903), 87 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't,

1904).
'N.Y.

Code Civ. Proc. (1902)

§984. Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1942) § 182.
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level. On the interstate level the venue statute is inapplicable; on the
intrastate level it gives the legislature's answer to the question as to
the appropriate place for trial.
The question in the Gulf case arose, in the conflict-of-laws sense,
on the intrastate (intranational) level. There was no possible question
about the appropriateness of trial somewhere within the system of
United States district courts. The only question was: Which district?
The legislative body having power to provide a complete solution to
the problem in those terms-Congress-had provided the comprehensive answer.5 But Mr. Justice Jackson, having persuaded himself that
no statutory venue provision need foreclose the use of judicial discretion to determine the appropriateness of the place of trial (except
where Congress, by enacting a special venue statute for a specific cause
of action, demonstrates unmistakably that it is in fact providing the
positive solution which is the distinguishing characteristic of venue
statutes) , was unperturbed. He proceeded to treat the problem, from
that point on, as merely one of whether a federal court is disabled, on
constitutional principles possibly peculiar to our federal judicial system, to exercise a power which courts in general possess-to decline to
'The

relevant venue statute was Section 112 of the old Title 28 [24 Stat. 552 (1887),

25 Stat. 43 (1888)], providing that "where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact
that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Since a corporation was
a resident only of the state of its incorporation, the gloss of the Neirbo case [308 U.S.
165 (1939)1 was needed to complete the justification of the venue. That circumstance,
however, does not distinguish the case from one in which the venue statute expressly
refers to the forum as appropriate. If anything, it should be more difficult for a defendant to procure dismissal from a district in which it has "consented" to be sued than
from one merely designated by a venue statute.
' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947). Frankfurter, J., dissenting in the
Kepner case, had said: "If the privilege afforded a plaintiff to bring suit under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act in one place rather than in another is to be regarded
as an absolute command to the federal courts to take jurisdiction regardless of any considerations of justice or fairness, why is not the same effect to be given the comparable
general venue provisions of Sec. 51 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 112? Nothing in
the language or the history of the venue provision of the Act differentiates it from the
numerous other provisions of the judicial Code. Is the settled doctrine of forum non
conveniens to be deemed impliedly repealed by every such venue provision?" Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 (1941). Two features of this statement disturb
me: (1) its confusion of the problem of place of trial on the interstate level with that
on the intrastate level; and (2) its quite remarkable suggestion that forum non, conveniens, as an instrument for dealing with the problem of place of trial on the intranational level, where that problem is dealt with by the venue statutes, was "settled
doctrine" in the federal courts in 1941. But with respect to the precise point he was
making, surely Mr. justice Frankfurter was right-at least as a purely analytical matter.
There is no logical reason for inferring that Congress has affirmatively determined the
propriety of the place of trial in a special venue statute, and that it has not done so in
a general venue statute.
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exercise jurisdiction for good cause, whether the cause relates to the
convenience of the place of trial or to some unrelated matter. That
such a crippling disability does not exist might well have been conceded
by the plaintiff. Still, there had been a good deal of talk in the cases
about constitutional obligation to exercise jurisdiction conferred; 53 so
Mr. Justice Jackson aimed his blows at this somewhat shadowy obstacle-with inevitably telling effect. He invoked (1) cases in which
federal courts (in admiralty) had applied the doctrine of forum non
conveniens on the international level; (2) cases in which the Supreme
Court had held that a state may or even must apply the doctrine of
forum non conveniens on the interstate level; (3) cases in which the
Supreme Court had held that a federal court may, or must, decline to
exercise jurisdiction for some cause unrelated to the locality of trial,
such as deference to a state system of administrative regulation, or the
lack of an appropriate remedy; (4) cases in which federal courts (in
equity) had declined to intervene in the internal affairs of foreign
corporations; and (5) cases in which state or foreign courts have exercised the power to dismiss because of inappropriateness of the place of
trial in interstate, or international, terms. These cases surely establish
that the federal courts have, and must have unless they are to be
uniquely limited, a discretionary power to decline to exercise jurisdiction in some circumstances, for good cause. Just as surely, they do not
support the decision of the Court. Not a single case cited by Mr. Justice
Jackson sustains the discretionary power of a court to dismiss an
action upon considerations relating solely to the convenience, in intrastate terms, of the place of trial as such. Nor has any such case, other
than the Gulf case itself, been found.54
'See the cases cited by Black, J., dissenting in the Gulf case, 330 U.S. 501, 513-14
(1947). Despite language that is sometimes sweeping, such cases hold no more than that
jurisdiction must be exercised in the absence of an adequate reason for abstention.
'There is a dictum in one admiralty decision by a district court, not cited in the
Gulf case, which might have lent some color to the idea that dismissal was proper where
trial would be more convenient in another district. Neptune Steam Nay. Co. v. Sullivan
Timber Co., 37 Fed. 159 (S.D. N.Y., 1888). But the holding was that service of process
should be set aside because the person served was not the defendant's managing agent.
Moreover, there are, in general, no statutory venue provisions for libels in personam in
admiralty. 2 Benedict, Admiralty 79 (6th ed., Knauth, 1940); In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890). Even if the dictum were less isolated and more authoritative, therefore, it would not support the power of a court to dismiss because of the inconvenience of the forum where Congress has exercised its power to determine the
place of trial.
In Summerall v. United Fruit Co. (The Metapan), 1935 A.M.C. 1202 (S.D. N.Y.,
1935), there is talk of discretionary refusal to entertain jurisdiction where another
district court would be more appropriate; but the action was one at law under the Jones
Act, and the simple fact was that the venue was wrongly laid.
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A brief examination of the cases will make the point clear:
(1) The admiralty cases, represented in the Gulf opinion by the
typical Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,55 are cases
in which the problem of place of trial is considered on the international
level.5 6 The question is whether trial anywhere in the United States is
appropriate, as distinguished from trial in a foreign country. In the
Canada Malting case Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "[I]n a suit in admiralty between foreigners it is ordinarily within the discretion of the
District Court to refuse to retain jurisdiction .... Courts of equity and

of law also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise
jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or nonresidents or where
for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted
in a foreign tribunal."5 This is not a holding that a district court may
decline jurisdiction on the ground that trial would be more appropriate
in another district in the United States.
(2) All the cases in which the Supreme Court has held that a state
may, or must, apply the principles of forum non conveniens have con58
cerned the appropriateness of the place of trial on the interstate level.
They do not hold that a state court may or must exercise discretion
with respect to the place of trial within the state.
(3) In cases such as Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,59 the Supreme Court
held that a district court should refrain, with "a sound respect for the
independence of state action,"6 from interjecting its jurisdiction into
"a unified method for the formation of policy and determination of
cases"'" by the Texas Railroad Commission and the Texas courts.
Plainly, the considerations involved had nothing to do with geographrn 2 8 5 U.S. 413 (1932).

' Subject to the qualifications noted in note 54 supra.
-285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932). The parties were all citizens of Canada; the vessels involved in the collision were of Canadian registry; the material witnesses were Canadians;
the lost cargo was shipped under a Canadian bill of lading from one Canadian port to
another; the collision occured in American waters only because the vessels had proceeded there unintentionally. Dismissal was on the ground that the controversy concerned "matters ...properly the subjects of hearing and determination" by the Canadian
courts.

'Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903); Davis v. Farmers Co-operative
Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). To the same effect are the dicta in Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935), and Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n. 5 (1942).
50319 U.S. 315 (1943). The other case cited by Mr. Justice Jackson is Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941).
-319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
Ibid., at 333.
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ical convenience of the place of trial. The action in the Burlord case
was brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, which sits at Austin, the state capital-clearly the most
convenient of all possible locations for the trial. Yet Mr. Justice Jackson referred to these cases as having been decided "on substantially
forum non conveniens grounds." 62 The gentlest reproof would be
phrased in the language of Mr. Justice Reed: such cases "may, at the
expense of analysis, be grouped under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." 63
The other case in this category, Slater v. Mexican National Railroad,"4 is on the international level; but, more important, it does not
deal with geographical convenience of the place of trial. The sole obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction was the supposed lack of power in
the court to afford a remedy appropriate to the foreign cause of action.
If such a case is relevant, then so is every other in which a court has
declined to entertain a foreign cause of action, no matter how remote
the reason may be from considerations which enter into determination
of the fair and convenient geographical location for trial.
(4) The cases involving foreign corporations do involve an element
of geographical convenience, and they do deal with the appropriateness
of the place of trial on the intrastate (intranational) level. But they involve more than geographical convenience. In the beginning they
involved something else predominantly: the power to grant an effective
decree, the feasibility of quasi-administrative supervision outside the
district, the exercise of visitorial powers."' Convenience of location,
originally, was subordinated to such considerations of power and feasibility. While the term forum non conveniens appears in the Rogers
case, 66 the tendency to identify the internal-affairs rule with the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not get under way until the Green
Bay67 case was decided in 1946, and the identification was not complete until the Koster6 case was decided--on the same day as Gulf.
-330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947).
Dissenting in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 534 (1947).
- 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
'Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 144-45 (1933) (dissenting opinion);
Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 918 (1947); The
Development of the "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts, 46 Col. L. Rev. 413
(1946).
"In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933).
'Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 554 et seq. (1946).
'Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1947).

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429 1954-1955

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

It is one thing to suggest that, in enacting a general venue statute,
Congress may not have taken into account the practical complexities
of supervision of corporate activities by a court not located in the state
of the corporate domicile; it is quite another to suggest that, in enacting a general venue statute, Congress did not take into account the
competing interests of plaintiff and defendant with respect to the convenience of the place of trial. If a venue statute does not reflect a consideration and adjustment of such interests, it is nothing.
(5) Every case cited from state and foreign courts, supporting the
power of a court to decline jurisdiction on considerations relating to
convenience of the place of trial, deals with the appropriateness of the
forum on the international level. 9 Not one affirms the power of a court
to exercise its discretion as to the place of trial within a state.
In the light of this analysis, consider two statements made by Mr.
Justice Jackson:
(1) "The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court
may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
0
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.M
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition on its jurisdiction in the absence of an applicable
venue statute-i.e., on the interstate or international level. The reference to "the letter" of the venue statute discloses awareness that such
a statute can be read as applying to the interstate situation only by the
indulgence of literal formalism. A venue statute does not deal with the
'Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't, 1903), 87 N.Y.
Supp. 884 (1st Dep't, 1904); Murnan v. Wabash R. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508
(1927); Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 Atl. 895
(1933); Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E 2d 550 (1944) (internal affairs); Egbert v. Short, [1907] 2 Ch. 205; Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [19061
1 K.B. 141 (stay of proceedings); La Soci&t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Soci6t6 Anonyme
de Navigation "Les Armateurs Franqais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13; Pietraroia v.
New Jersey & H.R. Ry. & F. Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120 (1910); Great Western Ry.
Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305 (1869).
Mr. Justice Jackson might have added a well-knowAi case in which a United States
district court, with the approval of the court of appeals, similarly invoked the doctrine
of forum non conveniens-in an action at law on a contract. Heine v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 50 F. 2d 382 (CA. 9th, 1931), affirming 45 F. 2d 426 (D. Ore., 1930); but there,
too, the decision was that no federal court would be an appropriate forum. He might
also have pointed to the fact that long practice in the District of Columbia supports the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Simons v. Simons, 187 F. 2d 364 (App. D.C., 1951),
and cases cited. But, as a territorial court for the seat of the federal government, the
District Court for the District of Columbia occupies a special status, not unlike that of
a state court. These cases, therefore, are again instances of the application of the doctrine
on the interstate level. See United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 83 F. Supp.
233, 235 (D.C., 1949).
-°330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
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interstate problem; the legislature lacks power to solve that problem
in the complete way that it solves the intrastate problem to which the
venue statute is addressed. When the legislature has power to act comprehensively, the importance of the problem demands a complete solution, "authorizing" suit in the appropriate forum in the interest of
certainty. When such a complete solution is provided, as it is on the
intrastate level, a court which "resist[s] imposition on its, jurisdiction"
resists "imposition" by the legislature.
(2) "[General venue] statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
71
quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy.
Then what does a general venue statute give a plaintiff that he did
not have before? Generally, any person who has a complaint against
another, arising under some ascertainable law, may be quite sure that
somewhere in the world there is a place in which he may pursue his
remedy. The possibilities are limited by concepts of jurisdiction; but
among the remaining possible places, he cannot be sure which is the
appropriate one. If the choice is between nations or independent states,
no power exists to inform him where he may sue and be secure against
dismissal; but where that power does exist-as it does when the choice
is between counties or districts within a single judicial system-the
legislature either tells him in no uncertain terms that there is a specific place in which he may sue and be secure against dismissal, or the
legislature is guilty of dereliction in failing to use its power to resolve
an important problem.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black72 does not criticize the
majority opinion for its disregard of the distinction between the interstate and the intrastate levels. It acquiesces in the treatment of the
problem as the general one of whether a federal court has dis6retion to
decline to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law; and, equating such
discretion with abdication, 73 it explains the cases most troublesome to
that position as exceptional, resting on "reasons peculiar to the special
74
problems of admiralty and to the extraordinary remedies of equity.
But the instances in which federal courts have declined jurisdiction of
actions which could more appropriately be tried in a foreign country
' Ibid. In context, this statement, plainly means that the statute assures the plaintiff
that some one, but not all, of the designated courts will be appropriate.
' Concurred in only by Rutledge, J., although Reed and Burton, 3J., also dissented.
'Ibid., at 513.

SIbid.
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are peculiar to admiralty only in the sense that, because of the definition of federal judicial power, the federal courts are less likely than
state courts to be presented with the forum non conveniens problem in
cases outside the admiralty category. Other heads of federal jurisdiction are so defined as to necessitate the presence of some element tending to make trial in the United States, as distinguished from a foreign
country, appropriate. Even so, cases other than in admiralty may be
imagined, and a few have actually arisen, suggesting that the greater
appropriateness of a foreign tribunal may justify dismissal. 5 The cases
which are distinguished as involving equitable discretion might have
been more effectively distinguished as not involving primarily considerations of convenience of the place of trial.
The severity of the doctrine adopted in the Gulf case should not
be minimized. Dismissal is a harsh penalty to visit upon a plaintiff for
miscalculation or for carrying notions of legitimate strategy a bit too
far. The plaintiff in the Gulf case filed the action in a forum to which
he was invited by the venue statute, as construed. He did so without
any reprehensible purpose to vex, harass, oppress, or gain an unfair
advantage; the insurance lawyers were New Yorkers who, professedly,
feared that the magnitude of the claim would "stagger the imagination"
of a provincial jury, and who anticipated prejudice on account of "local
influences and preconceived notions."7 6 Because their understanding of
the venue privilege was held erroneous and their fears unfounded, the
plaintiff was required to start over from the beginning, more than
three years after the fire. A statement in the dissenting opinion imputes to the majority an almost incredible indifference to the result:
"Whether the statute of limitations has run against the plaintiff, we do
not know."7 7 Perhaps the explanation is that the majority did know;
a reference to the Virginia statute would have given reassurance, confirmed by the failure of counsel to refer to any risk that the action
might be barred.78 Fortunately, the action could be refiled, in good
time, in the district court in Virginia. 79 But the Court could have no
' De Sairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y., 1949). See Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby,
222 U.S. 473, 480 (1912); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 91 F.
Supp. 469 (S.D. N.Y., 1950); Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F. 2d 382 (C.A. 9th,
1931).
7-330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947).

-Ibid., at 516-17.

' Code Va. (1950) § 8-24 provides a five-year statute of limitations, derived from the
1919 Code, for actions for injuries to property.
"' See Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F. 2d 705 (C.A. 4th, 1949). Ironically, the result
of the trial in Virginia confirmed the fears of plaintiff's counsel on the score of local
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assurance that the doctrine would operate as mildly in other cases,
and for that reason it seems unfortunate that there was no reference
to the devices for softening the blow of dismissal which are established
concomitants of the doctrine on the international level. "The doctrine
of forum non conveniens is an instrument of justice."8 0 In the very
cases cited by Mr. Justice Jackson there was ample evidence of power
to attach conditions to the dismissal, or to order a stay instead, thus
scaling the consequence to the proportions of the miscalculation. 8'
Whether the omission of reference to that ameliorating power was significant is not altogether an academic question; the answer may bear
on the administration of the transfer power under Section 1404(a).
It seems clear, then, that the Court's importation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens into the determination of place of trial on the
intranational level, where the venue statutes presumably occupied the
field, was a striking judicial innovation, the more remarkable because
the doctrine on this level was possibly to be less liberal and flexible
than in its native habitat, and because, as the Court certainly knew,
Congress was even then considering the more moderate proposal embodied in Section 1404(a) for relief against abuse of the venue
privilege."2
But when so much has been said, something remains to be added.
No outraged cries of "Usurpation!" greeted the decision. The law reprejudice. Coupled with the statement of plaintiff's counsel that local influences and
preconceived notions might make it difficult to procure a jury having no previous knowledge of the facts [330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947)], the result at least suggests that, under a
comprehensive scheme for regulating the place of trial such as is in force in some states,
the case might well have been remitted for trial to a district other than the Western
District of Virginia.
oCardozo, J., dissenting in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 151 (1933).
' Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 424 (1932) ("The
District Court embodied in the decrees an order that the respondent should appjear and
file security in any action which might be instituted by the petitioners in the admiralty
courts of Canada, so that petitioners would not by dismissal of the libels lose the security gained by the foreign attachment"); Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B.
141 (stay of proceedings); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 149 (1933)
(dissenting opinion). Conditions have been attached to the dismissal of actions at law:
Wendel v. Hoffman, 258 App. Div. 1084, 259 App. Div. 732, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 96, 97 (2d
Dep't, 1940). See also Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods
of Adjustment, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 50-53 (1930).
8' Judge Clark, in the opinion of the court of appeals, had quoted the provisions of
the proposed Section 1404(a). 153 F. 2d 883, 886 (C.A. 2d, 1946). See generally the
history of the Revision in the Collett case, 337 U.S. 55, 65 et seq. (1949), and in Moore,
Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 63 et seq. (1949).
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views approved, or were mildly critical. 3 There were no repercussions
in Congress. Even in Mr. Justice Black's dissent, the language of protest was jurisprudential rather than indignant. He characterized the
grafting of the doctrine of forum non conveniens on the general venue
statutes as "far more than the mere filling in of the interstices of those
statutes." 4 He observed in a footnote that it was not the duty of the
Court to "amend" the venue statute, and in another, quoting Justice
Holmes, he implied that the court was indulging in "molar" rather than
"molecular" motion.85 How can we account for such a quiet reaction
to a decision so vulnerable?
This is a big country. Yet Congress, in enacting the general venue
statutes, has on the whole done little more than imitate, and that not
very selectively, provisions enacted by state legislatures dealing with
the problem on a far smaller scale.8 6 In addition, there is, in a sense, no
venue statute for removal cases.817 Worst of all, Congress failed (until
1948) to emulate the state practice in respect to change of venue, although the need for flexibility was proportionately greater on the national scale. The result was an unparalleled opportunity for abuse by
plaintiffs in selection of the forum. In a realistic sense it may be said
that, although Congress enacted general venue statutes, and thus went
through the motions of balancing competing interests and considerations respecting the place of trial, it never came to grips with the problem posed by a nationwide system of courts, and never achieved an
informed and mature legislative solution to the problem. 8 Similarly, it
may be said that, although in formal analysis the question of the convenient place of trial as between different districts in the federal system is an instance of the problem on the intrastate (intranational)
'The case was noted in 27 B.U.L. Rev. 495 (1947); 47 Col. L. Rev. 853 (1947); 15
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 489 (1947); 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1947); 46 Mich. L. Rev. 102
(1947); 26 Tex. L. Rev. 218 (1947); 21 Tulane L. Rev. 669 (1947); 15 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 332 (1948).
-330 U.S. 501, 515 (1947).
Ibid., at notes 3 and 4.
- See New Limitations on Choice of Federal Forum, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 332 (1948);
Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608 (1954).
'Polizzi

v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345- U.S. 663 (1953).

'Yet, as a matter of history, the worst abuses involved the special venue provisions
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act-an instance in which Congress had, in fact,
made a deliberate choice as to the relevant considerations; and the drive within the
Court for recognition of the doctrine of forum non conveniens had its origin in FELA
cases. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 315. U.S. 698 (1942).
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level, in actuality it presents substantially the same problems that are
encountered on the interstate level. If the maintenance of an action in
the Supreme Court of New York in New York City would be vexatious
or oppressive, it would be equally so in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. It may be that the Court
was weary of the inadequacies of congressional solutions to the problem of place of trial. It may be that the Court was impatient with the
artificiality of conventions which would require it to say: (1) that
Congress had considered the whole problem carefully, and deliberately intended all the ill effects; (2) that, while the Supreme Court of
New York could remit a plaintiff to Virginia, that being as to New
York, a "foreign" state, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York could not remit the same plaintiff to the Western District
of Virginia, that being another unit of the same judicial system. 89 It
may even be that there was a subconscious desire to emphasize, by the
relatively harmless decision in the case before the Court, the need for
favorable action by Congress on the pending proposal for reform embodied in Section 1404(a).
It is doubtful that the decision had any direct influence on the event
in Congress. There is no mention of it in the legislative history of
Section 1404(a). Yet this much may be said with confidence: The
Gulf decision alone, even if there had been nothing else in the judicial
history of the problem of place of trial in the federal system, would
have made a provision like that of Section 1404(a) inevitable. The
decision exposed the inadequacy of the general venue statutes; it introduced uncertainty and delay as preferable to oppressive rigidity; and
it imposed the disproportionately drastic penalty of dismissal for bad
judgment or overreaching by plaintiffs in the selection of the forum.
It cried aloud for legislative attention to the problem; it would have
proved intolerable if relief had not been forthcoming; and relief did
come, with rare celerity. Relief came so swiftly and so aptly that it
appeared to be what it was not: a direct and calculated response to the
very problem created by the decision. And an interesting thing happened. Although the decision is not even mentioned in the legislative
history, it became almost at once the prime source of information as
to what Congress intended when it enacted the section "in accordance
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens." 90 The formal legislative
" With this general interpretation compare Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 18, 22, 27, 31 (1945).
9 See note 41 supra.

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435 1954-1955

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

history of Section 1404(a) is almost obsolete. It was useful primarily
on the question, quickly settled, whether the section accomplished the
one thing it purported specifically to achieve: a change in the law
concerning the special venue provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act and similar special venue provisions. On the basis of
the Reviser's statement that the section was "drafted in accordance
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens," the Gulf decision has become, for other questions of construction, the legislative history. The
extent to which this conception of the relation between the Gulf case
and Section 1404(a) permeated the bench and bar (and thus, perhaps,
influenced Congress indirectly) may be judged by the comments of
Judge Albert B. Maris, as he explained the highlights of the new
Judicial Code in the American Bar Association Journal. He did not
observe that Section 1404(a) would curtail the notorious abuses under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, although that was the most
explicit purpose when the section was drafted. Instead, he spoke of
its effect in terms which unmistakably show that he regarded it as
redressing the ill effects of the Gulf decision: Coupling it with Section
1406 (a), he said: "Both provisions will protect many plaintiffs, whose
cases would otherwise have been dismissed, from having their causes
of action barred by the statute of limitations."'"
In perspective, therefore, the brief career of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens on the intranational level in the federal courts was a
mere episode in the development of the law. The Gulf decision may
be regarded, analytically, as an unsound aberration which had to be,
and was, corrected by congressional action which at the same time
provided a better solution for the underlying problem. Preferably, it
may be regarded as a pragmatically justified protest against the inadequacy and inflexibility of the venue statutes, and as one step in
the process of securing enactment of a statute authorizing change of
venue-a simple and obvious device inexplicably missing from the
federal system. On either view, the result, so far as forum non conveniens is concerned, was episodic. We have moved through two stages
to a third: (1) from protracted submission to the rigidities of statutory
venue and its abuses (2) to a brief period of bold rebellion, employing the crude weapon of dismissal for want of a better, then quickly
(3) to the comfortable situation, which might have been enjoyed all
along, of being empowered to deal with the problem of place of trial
9' Maris, New Federal Judicial Code, 34 A.B.A.J. 863, 963 (1948).
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on the flexible basis of discretion in the individual case, with the
sensible and moderate device of transfer. This entire evolutionary
process has taken place, be it noted, without any effect whatsoever
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens proper. Here is striking confirmation for the thesis that the problem of place of trial on the intrastate level is appropriately dealt with by venue statutes and provisions for discretionary change of venue, while on the interstate
level it is necessarily dealt with by the incomplete and relatively
harsh doctrine of forum non conveniens. Beyond any question at all,
Section 1404(a) has abolished dismissal as the penalty for choice of
an inconvenient federal forum, 92 and substituted transfer-on the intranationallevel. But the problem of place of trial as between nations
still exists, and cannot be solved by transfer. Cases still arise, in
admiralty and in other categories of jurisdiction, which should more
appropriately be tried in a foreign country. For such cases the doctrine of forum non conveniens still exists, as before; and the remedy
is still dismissal, as before. 3 The only possible explanation for the
fact that this doctrine remains unaffected by a statute purporting to
modify it is that, despite all the talk, the doctrine of forum non conveniens had nothing to do at any time with the problem with which
the statute deals, except as a displaced but persuasive forensic argument. A doctrine appropriate only to the international problem was
warped to the uses of intranational judicial reform, with an end result that might have been achieved without the slightest reference to
the doctrine.
But the question remains: Does the role played by the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in the evolutionary process leading to the enactment of Section 1404(a) have implications for the administration of
that section, especially on the question of the law to be applied? If
we take the view that the same result could have been accomplished
without reference to the doctrine, simply by the enactment of a
change-of-venue statute on the model supplied by the states, the in'Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F. 2d 707, 714 (C.A. 3d, 1948); see Burges
v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp., 172 F. 2d 541 (C.A. Sth, 1949). Cf. Hammet v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 176 F. 2d 145 (C.A. 2d, 1949), and the dissenting opinion of
Clark, J., at 152. But the device of staying an action, where that would be an appropriate
implementation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is not superseded. Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F. 2d 301, 303 (C.A. 2d, 1949); and see the dissent of Clark, J., in the
Hammet case, supra.
'De Sairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y., 1949), aff'd 177 F. 2d 515 (1949),
cert. denied 339 U.S. 912 (1950). See also Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F.
Matarazzo, 91 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. N.Y., 1950).
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ference will be that Section 1404(a) is to be regarded simply as a
provision for federal judicial housekeeping, and that the relevant precedents on the effect of transfer are those arising from state practice.
But the same practical considerations, stemming from the peculiar
attributes of a continental federal system, which justified the Court's
rejection of analytical logic in the Gulf case, may very well cause it
to resort again to the doctrine of forum non conveniens for guidance
in determining the effects of transfer.
III. PRELIMINARY APPROACHES TO SOLUTION
Some progress toward a solution of the problem of the effect of
transfer on the applicable law can be made at once by summarily rejecting the first of the three tentative approaches set out in Part I:
that the transferee court should apply the law of the state in which it
sits, just as if the action had been brought in that state. Such a result
could be dictated only by a superficial application of some of the language in which the Erie doctrine has been expressed, and would be
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the policy embodied in
that doctrine. To be sure, the Court has stated the obligation of the
district court under the Erie doctrine as an obligation to follow the
law of the state in which it sits; but when such statements of the
doctrine were formulated, the present problem did not exist. Diversity
cases came before a district court only by virtue of having been originally filed there, or by removal from a court of the state in which
the court sat; never by transfer from a district court in another state.
To apply such formulations of the doctrine literally to a situation
which was not in contemplation when they were made is mechanical
jurisprudence of the crudest sort. Furthermore, such a result, though
contrived in fancied obedience to the Erie mandate, would actually
be in diametric opposition to the Erie doctrine. "The nub of the policy
that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially different result." 4 The
required uniformity is between the district court which decides the
case and the courts of the state in which the action is filed, not between the district court and the courts of some other state; that is,
between the district court in California (in the Headrick case), to
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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which the action may be transferred, and the New Mexico state court
in which the action was filed, and from which it was removed, because
of the "accident" of diversity, to the district court "a block away."
This position may be clarified, and the arguments for and against
it put in perspective, by reference to the leading case of Sampson v.
Channell. There the "transaction" was an automobile collision in
Maine. Because of the "accident" of diversity of citizenship, the action was brought in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, instead of in a state court "a block away." The
question was whether the district court should apply the Massachusetts
rule, that the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence
is on the defendant, or the Maine rule, that the burden is on the plaintiff. In one of the most lucid opinions ever written on the Erie principle, Judge Magruder, for the court of appeals, held that it must apply the Massachusetts rule, because the Massachusetts court would
have done so, consistently with the Constitution, under its choice-oflaw rule. Beyond question, this result was in harmony with the spirit
of the Erie doctrine. Yet the case was of a type which might very well
be transferable to Maine under Section 1404(a). If, upon such a
transfer, the district court in Maine should apply "the law of the state
in which it sits," then the law of the case would be precisely the
opposite of that which the court of appeals held it should be; and, by
hypothesis, the result of the action may be "substantially different"
from what it would have been in the Massachusetts court-and this
solely by virtue of the fact that the accident of diversity of citizenship permitted the case to be maneuvered into Maine, by way of the
Massachusetts district court." Plainly, such a result is not dictated by,
but is subversive of, the Erie policy.
;110 F. 2d 754 (C.A. 1st, 1940), cert. denied 310 U.S. 650 (1940); approved in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 n. 2 (1941).

"*This argument assumes (necessarily, given the conditions of the hypothetical problem) that trial in Maine would not have been the consequence of filing the action in a
Massachusetts state court. That is, it assumes either (1) that Massachusetts would not
have dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, or (2) that, if Massachusetts would
have dismissed, a third forum would have been available in which the plaintiff would
have been secure against such dismissal. If Massachusetts would dismiss, and if no third
forum were available, the result stated in the text would conform to the result in the
state court, agreeably to the Erie doctrine., That outcome, however, would be a resultant
of the application of the law of the transferee state, coinciding with the state law of
forum non conveniens and the facts relating to the third forum. Its appraisal, therefore,
involves the question whether the solution to our problem is conditioned by the state
law of forum non conveniens. But the first tentative solution makes no provision for
taking the state law on that subject into account. The question we must be concerned
with at this point is: Without regard to the state law on forum non conveniens, does
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True it is that, from the viewpoint of an ideal system of conflict
of laws, the result in this precise situation may be thought desirable:
the result is the more complete application of the law which governs
the transaction, the discouragement of forum-shopping, and the general uniformity which are primary aims of a system of conflict of
laws. But the fact remains that the "better result" achieved in this
fashion is available only to those privileged to enjoy diversity of
citizenship; and the same considerations which led the court of appeals to reject it for the district court in Massachusetts demand its
rejection for the district court in Maine, when the action is filed in
Massachusetts. The Erie doctrine we have with us; and not even those
critics who regret especially the loss of power in the federal courts
to make an independent choice of law would recommend recapture
of that power through the medium of Section 1404(a), construed according to the rule of thumb under consideration. For not only would
such a recapture be partial-limited to cases in which transfer is
justifiable for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in which
there is another district in which the action "might have been
brought"; it would, in addition, result in application of the law of a
state which, though providing a convenient place of trial, may have
no such connection with the transaction as to make the application of
its law rational. It is quite conceivable, for example, that such a case
as Sampson v. Channell might be transferred to New Hampshire, or
to Georgia, given appropriate assumptions as to the residence of the
parties and the convenience of witnesses. The coincidence of appropriate law and convenient location upon transfer to Maine would be
quite fortuitous.
Mr. Justice Jackson was right when he said, in his dissent in the
recent Wells case:
Are we then to understand that parties may get a change of law as a bonus for
a change of venue? If the law of the forum in which the case is tried is to be the
sole test of substantive, law, burden of proof, contributory negligence, measure of
the Erie doctrine require application of the law of the state of filing, or the law of the
state to which the action is transferred? There is a degree of artificiality involved in
discussing the ideal of conformity to the state result under such a limitation; yet that
procedure is justified by the fact that strict conformity of result in terms of forum non
conveniens is impossible. Even assuming that the law of the state on forum non conveniens is determinable (as to which see the discussion of the third approach, infra), the
facts as to the availability of a third forum (which would not dismiss) can seldom be
known. Hence the discussion in the text proceeds on the premise that we can almost
never be certain that, had the action been filed in the state court (and not removed), the
result would have been trial in the courts of the transferee state.
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damages, limitations, admission of evidence, conflict of laws and other doctrines,
...then shopping for a favorable law via the forum non conveniens [transfer]
route opens up possibilities of conflict, confusion, and injustice greater than any97

thing Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, ever held.

If it should be established as a rule of thumb that the transferee court

is to apply the law of the state in which it sits, every case in which
there is a difference of law between the original and the transferee
state would become a game of chess, with Section 1404(a) authorizing
a knight's move; and nothing would be certain except that the parties would land on a square of a different color. 8
The second tentative approach is: The transferee court should
apply the law of the state in which the action was originally filed,
just as if it were a district court in that state, but without regard
to the state law on forum non conveniens.
Consideration of this proposition should be undertaken with care.
At the outset, there is this to be said of it: it offers a relatively simple
and workable solution, and one which, on the basis of present indications, the courts are not unlikely to adopt. If we were free to ignore
the history of Section 1404(a), and the philosophy which has been
developed concerning the role of the federal courts in adjudicating
state-created rights, there might be much to commend it. But this
approach, like the other two, purports to offer a solution consistent
with the full purpose of the section and with the requirements of the
'Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953). Mr. justice Jackson was
protesting a decision which required a district court in Pennsylvania to adhere to state
law and apply the local statute of limitations to an action for wrongful death arising
in Alabama. His criticism was directed against a rule which deprives the district court
of freedom to choose the applicable law, and requires it to follow the choice-of-law rule
of the state in which the action is filed and tried. If, however, that rule is accepted as
established law, the chaotic results envisioned by Mr. Justice Jackson can be avoided
only be re-examining and rejecting the assumption that the state law to be applied is
necessarily that of the state in which the action is tried, as distinguished from that in
which it is filed, where the two are different as a result of transfer.
"In Heaton v. Southern Ry. Co., 119 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. S.C., 1954), a plea of res
judicata was interposed to an action transferred from Alabama. The court said: "Since
this is a diversity case the plea of res judicata must be determined in accordance with the
laws and policy of the State of South Carolina." Ibid., at 660. The implication that the
law of the transferee state applies upon transfer is weakened by the fact that Alabama
also would have referred to the law of South Carolina to determine the effect of the former judgment, which was rendered by a South Carolina court.
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 F. 2d 640 (C.A. 7th, 1950), left open
the possibility that transfer to another state might cure a defect of jurisdiction of the
subject matter [the defect stemming from the Illinois statute on foreign wrongful death
actions which was held unconstitutional in First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air
Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952)].
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Erie doctrine. For the rhetorical purposes of this paper, the proposition has been called an "approach" to a solution. Actually, of course,
it is itself a conclusion, purporting to be defensible in terms of existing principles of federal-state relationships; therefore the reasoning
on which it is based must be examined.
The keystone of the structure is the qualifying phrase, "without
regard to the state law on forum non conveniens."0 9 Under the Erie
doctrine, the only state law that can be disregarded is "procedural."
In order to characterize this as a procedural problem, to which the
Erie doctrine does not apply, the focus of the reasoning shifts from
the state law on forum non conveniens to Section 1404(a). On purely
conceptual grounds, colored by the traditional function of state provisions for change of venue, such a characterization is superficially
plausible; but that such grounds are inappropriate for purposes of
the Erie doctrine is too clear for argument. That doctrine puts aside
"abstractions" regarding "substance" and "procedure" and concentrates on the objective: "the outcome of the litigation should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."' 00 Accordingly,
the logic of this approach must be that Section 1404(a) is procedural
because the transfer it authorizes will not substantially affect the
result. Why will it not affect the result? Because, after transfer, the
law to be applied will be that of the state of original filing. Why will
it be that of the state of filing rather than that of some other state?
If the response is that this follows from the fact that Section
1404(a) is a procedural provision, the circularity of the reasoning is
apparent. The fundamental question being what law governs after
transfer, it is plainly inadmissible to characterize the section as procedural because transfer has no substantial effect on the result, and
then to reason from that characterization to the conclusion that no
change takes place in the applicable law. The argument need not, however, be quite so sterile. Under the Gulf decision it was never clear
whether the power of a district court to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds was conditioned by state law or not.' 01 A state court
might react to circumstances stamping the forum as inconvenient by
" Without that qualification, we would be remitted at once to the third approach, which
proceeds on the basis that state law on that subject is relevant.
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
"01330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). The point is discussed in detail in Part IV infra.
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dismissing, or it might retain the case notwithstanding.'0 2 Either course
would be unsatisfactory; and the lack of a uniform practice in the
federal courts would compound the difficulty. Against such a background, it would have been reasonable for Congress to resolve the
question by providing a superior solution, independent of what the
state court would do: to provide that, whether a state court would
dismiss the case or retain it, a federal court should have power to
transfer. This purpose may rationally be attributed to the legislation
although we know that it was not in fact enacted in response to the
Gulf problem. In dealing with the general problem to which the section is addressed, it would be little short of a congressional duty to
take advantage of national power over the federal courts to provide
a preferable solution which is absent from state law only because of a
defect of power. We can thus read in Section 1404(a) a purpose to
substitute transfer for dismissal, clearly evincing recognition of the
fact that dismissal may have undesirable consequences. There can
be no reasonable doubt of the power of Congress to make such a rule
for the federal courts; we may grant, therefore, that the power of a
district court to transfer a case under Section 1404(a) is independent
of state law.
Nevertheless, the argument under discussion must still assume the
answer to a fundamental question. Conceding a legislative purpose to
conserve the beneficial effects of the forum non conveniens doctrine
while avoiding its undesirable ones, the question remains: Which
effects of dismissal were to be retained as desirable, and which obviated
as undesirable? Among the effects of unconditional dismissal were
these: the plaintiff suffered loss of the time invested in the dismissed
action; he was put to the additional expense of refiling; it was necessary for him to perfect service on the defendant again; he lost the
security of any attachment or similar lien that might have accrued;
the limitation period in the appropriate forum might have expired in
the meantime; and he lost the benefit of any advantage that might
have resulted from a difference between the law that would have been
applied by the state of original filing and that which would be applied
by the forum or forums left open to him. Broadly speaking, and for
immediate purposes, it may be assumed that all except the last of
these were effects to be obviated by the substitution of transfer for
" It might dismiss conditionally, but that possibility was not considered in the Gulf
case. The complexities which conditional dismissal injects into any effort to conform the
federal practice to state law are noticed in the discussion of the third approach infra.

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443 1954-1955

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

dismissal. But what about the last? The second approach gives an
unsupported answer: a change in the applicable law is one of the undesirable effects of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, and
is to be obviated by the substitution of transfer. But one of the prime
considerations in forum-shopping has always been the search for a
more favorable law, and one of the grounds for invoking the doctrine
of forum non conveniens has always been that the plaintiff, in the
choice of the forum, sought to obtain an inequitable advantage in
terms of the law which the forum would apply. 103 A legislative purpose to ignore this aspect of the doctrine is not to be lightly assumed.
Moreover, the reasoning underlying the second approach involves
a not very subtle shift in the meaning of terms. When we are told
that the result of the case will not be substantially affected by transfer, because the "law" of the state of original filing will continue to
apply, we must remember that the law here referred to is not the whole
law of that state; the segment of that law dealing with forum non
conveniens has been carved out and set apart as irrelevant. This fact
is obscured by concentration on the conclusion that the power of the
district court to order a transfer is independent of state law; but that
conclusion does not tell us what law is to be applied after transfer,
nor does it avoid the problem of how the state law on forum non conveniens is to be treated for purposes of the Erie doctrine. It is clear
that, under this approach, the result in the federal court, made possible by the accident of diversity of citizenship, will differ from that
which would have been reached in the state court in every case in
which, there being a substantial difference of law between two possible
forums, the state court would have dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. Apart from any particular approach or solution, congruity
between the result in the transferee district and that in the courts of
the state of original filing depends on two factors: the law of that state
on forum non conveniens, and the law applied after transfer. The
permutations may be stated in terms of the Headrick case:
(1) If New Mexico law rejects forum non conveniens, allowing the
plaintiff to maintain the action, and if, upon transfer, the district
' Difference of law was a factor in the Canada Malting case, which was heavily relied
on by the majority in the Gulf decision. 285 U.S. 413, 418, 424 (1932). It was a factor
in the leading case of Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F. 2d 382 (C.A. 9th, 1931).
It is the principal factor in injunctions against prosecutions abroad, which represent the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in its aggressive role. Consult Foster, Place of Trial in
Civil Actionsi 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1242-44 (1930), citing numerous cases. But it was
not among the factors mentioned by justice Jackson in the Gulf case.
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court in California applies the New Mexico statute of limitations, the
result is the same in state and federal courts.
(2) If New Mexico law rejects forum non conveniens, and if the
district court in California applies the California statute of limitations,
the result is different from what it would have been in the state court.
(3) If New Mexico law requires dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds, and if the California district court applies the New Mexico

statute of limitations, the result is different from what it would have
been in the state court.
(4) If New Mexico law requires dismissal, and if the California
district court applies the California statute of limitations, the result
10 4
is the same as it would have been in the state court.
Fidelity to the prevailing interpretation of the Erie doctrine requires attention to the manner in which disregarding state law would

affect the result of the litigation. If the forum non conveniens rule of
the state of filing is disregarded, then, as a matter of pure chance,
a determination to apply the law of the state of filing after transfer

will produce conformity of result in just half of the cases; the same
is true of a determination to apply the law of the transferee state.
Simply in the interest of conformity of result, therefore, there is no
more reason for applying the law of the original state than for applying that of the transferee state.10 5
It should be evident that it is logically impossible to classify Section 1404(a) as "procedural" or "substantive" for purposes of the
Erie doctrine, and then to deduce from that classification the effect
of transfer in terms of the applicable law. Any classification consistent
with the spirit of the Erie doctrine must itself depend upon the effect
of transfer on the outcome of the action. The temptation to slip into

this question-begging argument must be sternly resisted. It will do
1

.This analysis assumes that the defendant was not amenable to process in any other
state in which the action was not barred.
" In Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. N.Y., 1953), the court denied a motion
for transfer to California partly on the ground that, under the New York choice-of-law
rule, New York law governed the transaction, and that the New York courts were more
at home with the law than those in California. In thus assuming that New York law
would continue to apply after transfer, the court seems to have assumed either that the
California choice-of-law rule was the same, or that transfer would not operate to displace the New York rule.
In a second case reported with Rhodes v. Barnett, there is a somewhat confused discussion of the effect which transfer might have on the defendant's claim to contribution
from one not a party to the New York proceeding. Actually, the situation seems to present no real problem as to the effect of transfer on the law governing contribution. See
Strypek v. Schreyer, 118 F. Supp. 918, 919 (S.D. N.Y., 1954).
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no good to invoke state decisions as to the effect of change of venue;
they do not involve choice of law, nor any such problem as that posed
by the Erie doctrine, and the problems of forum non conveniens are
no part of their matrix. They cannot tell us that change of venue
under Section 1404(a) is procedural, because it does not substantially
affect the result of the case; they can tell us only that such a classification and such a result are possible, in the uncomplicated intrastate
situation, and thereby suggest that a like result is attainable in the
federal courts, if that is what is desired. Much the same is true of
early federal cases, arising out of the isolated situations in which
transfer of an action was authorized before Section 1404(a).106
Hardest of all to resist will be the temptation to take certain language of the Supreme Court, classifying Section 1404(a) for other
purposes, as controlling its classification for purposes of the Erie doctrine. In Ex parte Collett the plaintiff contended that his action should
not have been transferred because it was instituted prior to the effective date of the section. Chief Justice Vinson said: "Clearly, Section
1404(a) is a remedial provision applicable to pending actions. And
'No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure ...2 "10o
The case involved no question as to the effect of transfer on the applicable law. In the abstract, lawyers may cite the quoted language
as indicating that the Court must have meant either (1) that no
change in the applicable law resulting from a transfer could amount
to a denial of due process, although the case was pending on the effective date; or (2) that no change in the applicable law could result
from transfer. The second imputation is the more likely, but the two
are equally fantastic. The Court cannot rationally be supposed to have
solved, without discussion, the complex problem of whether transfer
effects a change in the applicable law. The solution that no change
in law occurs as a result of transfer is a possible one; but the rationale
for such a solution has yet to be explained and defended. All that
was decided in the Collett case was that a change of venue for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, no more being involved, deprives
the parties to a pending action of no right protected against retrospective legislation. It does not follow that Section 1404(a) is "procedural" for Erie purposes, so that state law on the convenience of
the forum may be disregarded.
106See note 22 supra.

"337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949).
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The only way out of these logical difficulties is to begin at the
beginning, and to determine, without reference to concepts of "substance" and "procedure," the purpose and effect of Section 1404(a).
If such a determination can be made, we can with some confidence
judge the relevance of state law under the Erie doctrine, and form
an opinion as to what effect a transfer should have on the applicable
law. The assignment is a difficult one. Section 1404(a) is fundamen-

tally ambiguous: viewed in one light, it appears to be no more than
a provision for change of venue for the convenience of parties and
witnesses; in another, it appears to be declaratory of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens-and the implications are quite different. An
attempt to deal with this ambiguity, based on the preceding part of
this paper, will be made in the part which follows. At this point it is
necessary to examine the third tentative approach.
The third approach is: The transferee court will apply the law of
the transferee state if the action was subject to dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens under the law of the state in which
it was originally filed, but will apply the law of the state of filing if it
was not so subject to dismissal. In the light of the foregoing discussion,
this may appear at first glance to be a satisfactory solution. If so, appearances are deceptive. The proposition bristles with difficulties.
This approach deals in an ingenious way with the troublesome question of whether state and federal laws relating to convenience of place
of trial are "substantive" or "procedural" for the purpose of determining, under the Erie doctrine, whether the state law is relevant.
It separates the question of whether there may be a transfer from
that of the effect of transfer. State law is irrelevant on the first question; but it is relevant to the second.' 08 By virtue of this separation,
it seems possible to achieve a strict uniformity (under the facts of
the Headrick case) between the result in the federal court and that in
the courts of the state in which the action was filed, thus apparently
satisfying the demands of the Erie doctrine.
There are these objections to such a solution:
(1) It is impracticable to an intolerable degree. Assume for the
moment that the problem of ascertaining state law on forum non
conveniens is simply that of determining whether the state accepts or
rejects the doctrine-the sort of problem one might hope to solve
by consulting the census compiled by Professor Barrett in 1947.19
x"Section 1404(a) and Transfers of Sub-tantive Law, 60 Yale L.J. 537 (1951).
' Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947).
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At that time, fourteen states could be identified as having rejected
the doctrine, and six as having accepted it. In twenty-eight statesmore than a majority-the status of the doctrine was unknown. In
seven of these, Professor Barrett found indications that the courts
would follow the doctrine if an appropriate case should arise. But in
twenty-one states he could find no basis for even a guess as to what
the law of the state was or would be.
The real problem, of course, is far more complex. As to the fourteen states which have rejected the doctrine, the matter is ended when
they are identified as belonging to Professor Barrett's first category.
But what is the scope and effect of the doctrine in the six states which
have accepted it-not to mention the seven which indicate that they
may accept it if the proper occasion arises, nor the twenty-one which
have given no indication? New York has embraced the doctrine for
as long, and has expounded it as fully, as any state; yet it is uncertain
whether the doctrine as developed in that state would have required
dismissal on the facts of either the Gulf case or the Headrick case.
In New York, the doctrine has no application to contract actions; "it
• . . is said not to apply to cases of a commercial or property nature"; 110 and "it seems in practice restricted to claims for personal
injury and wrongful death."' Does it apply to an action like the
one in the Gulf case, which was one for negligent injury to property
growing out of the performance of a contract? The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which is certainly "at home" with the New
York law, thought there was "a very substantial doubt" that the
New York courts would decline to exercise jurisdiction." 2 Moreover,
there is some ground for questioning the assumption that the doctrine
is one that requires dismissal. The court of appeals in the Gulf case
pointed out that acceptance of jurisdiction in personal-injury actions
between nonresidents "seems not unusual by the trial courts, and
quite acceptable to the appellate courts."-" Thus jurisdiction is accepted where the remedy elsewhere is unduly expensive or inconvenient for the plaintiff, or is barred by the statute of limitations.14
uo Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883, 885 (CA. 2d, 1946).
'Ibid., at 884.
'Ibid., at 885. Consult Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev.
908, 928 (1947).
-1 153 F. 2d 883, 885 (C.A. 2d, 1946). But cf. Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81
N.Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't, 1903), 87 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't, 1904).
11153 F. 2d 883, 885 n. 4 (C.A. 2d, 1946), citing Williamson v. Palmer, 181 Misc. 610,
43 N.Y.S. 2d 532 (S. Ct., 1943), and Randle v. Inecto, Inc., 131 Misc. 261, 226 N.Y. Supp.
686 (S. Ct., 1928), for the statute of limitations point. See Part V infra.
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The assumption, therefore, that the uniformity required by the Erie
doctrine can be achieved in the Headrick situation by applying the
California statute of limitations if New Mexico "accepts the doctrine
of forum non conveniens" turns out to be a glib and dangerous one.
Finally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was never one which,
having been invoked in the exercise of discretion, required outright
dismissal." 5 As an "instrument of justice," it has always appeared in
its best light when administered on an equitable basis. Stay of proceedings may be substituted for dismissal; stipulations may be exacted from the defendant as to the conditions of trial in the foreign
forum; security may be required to protect the plaintiff against loss
of advantages not unfairly gained by resort to the forum; generally,
within the limits of the court's power to affect the foreign proceedings,
an order of dismissal may be on such terms and conditions as seem
just, and the principles of estoppel or waiver may operate in the
foreign forum. Even if the state accepts the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and even if the case seems to be one in which the state
could, and even probably would, decline jurisdiction, how is the
district court to know the form that action would take, or the terms
and conditions which would be attached? The assumption that outright dismissal is the consequence of invoking the doctrine in an appropriate case is a distorting oversimplification.
In Meredith v. Winter Haven,"6 the Supreme Court held that, when
the Erie doctrine requires adherence to state law, the obligation to
decide cannot be avoided because the ascertainment of that law is
burdensome. But, in the problem under discussion, it has not yet been
determined that state law must be followed; and the impracticability
of ascertaining and applying that law should be a weighty factor in
the determination. Moreover, Meredith v. Winter Haven was addressed to a condition which is relatively rare; the progress of litigation in the district courts is not likely to be braked on frequent occasions by frustrating searches for nonexistent state law on decisive
points. But a mandate that state law be observed in passing upon applications for transfer under Section 1404(a) would expose every
diversity case, in every state except those in which the doctrine has
been definitely rejected, to delay and frustration.
(2) The adoption of such a solution would inject unanticipated
elements into pending cases, unreasonably disappointing the expectan' See note 81 supra.
-

3 20

U.S. 228 (1943).
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tions of the parties. Already, the number of cases which have been
transferred runs into the hundreds." 7 In only a few has attention been
directed to a difference of law in the transferee state. It may well be
that the natural disposition of lawyers is to regard Section 1404(a)
as being just what it purports to be: an uncomplicated provision for
change of venue. Certainly, in the overwhelming number of cases,
the question of transfer has been argued and decided as if nothing
more than the choice of a location, in terms of the convenience of
parties and witnesses, were involved. The announcement of such a
solution would be the cue for both parties to every transferred case
pending at the time to comb the law of the transferee state for variances which could give them a windfall. The same criticism applies to
the first tentative solution, as it does to any solution which contemplates the automatic applicability, upon transfer, of the law of a
state other than that of the original filing.
(3) The effect of such a solution would be to create countless pitfalls for the unwary-which, in the realm of conflict of laws, means
practically everybody. The essence of the objection stated in (2),
above, will not be overcome as time goes on. Lawyers will still tend
to take Section 1404(a) at its face value-as a simple provision for
change of venue. The conflict-of-laws aspects of a legal problem are
notoriously-and perhaps naturally-the last to come to mind. There
is a permanent risk that after transfer a difference of law will come to
light which was unknown to-or undisclosed by-the party moving
for transfer, and which was not considered in the argument or the
decision on the motion.
(4) By the same token, such a solution would inject a new element
of uncertainty into diversity cases. Even though both parties may be
fully aware that transfer will entail application of the law of the
transferee state, the significance of that fact for the case in hand can
be determined, in the early stages of litigation when the motion for
transfer is ordinarily made, only by an extraordinarily prescient and
thorough investigation of the law of both states. Some such investigation is no doubt involved whenever there is a choice between forums,
but the burden is magnified in this situation by the opportunity for
maneuvering which is afforded to both parties. The burden would be
especially hard on the plaintiff who has chosen his forum in good faith,
and who cannot effectively oppose a defendant's motion for transfer
until he knows all its implications.
"

See note 31 supra.
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(5) The argument for this solution is infected with the logical fault
of assuming the conclusion to be reached. Just as the second approach,
influenced by the conception of Section 1404(a) as a provision for
change of venue for the convenience of parties and witnesses, assumes
that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of an advantage of law gained by
his choice of forum, so this third approach, influenced by the conception of the section as a codification of the interstate forum non conveniens doctrine, assumes the opposite legislative purpose, at least
where the state of filing "accepts" the doctrine. That may be the true
interpretation, but it cannot be established without argument.
(6) Such a solution ignores entirely the requirement of Section
1404(a) that the district court must find that transfer would be "in
the interest of justice." There are two components of our problem:
(a) What law will apply after transfer? and (b) Assuming that a law
other than that of the original forum will apply, would transfer be in
the interest of justice? The two questions may-indeed, must-be
separated for purposes of analysis; but the second must not be forgotten in any solution that purports to be complete. The way to deal
with overreaching or even vexatious motives on the part of the plaintiff in the choice of forum is to deprive him of the unfair advantage
he has thereby gained-not to deprive him blindly, or on the basis
of chance, of all remedy. The same criticism applies to the first approach, as it does to any which attempts a complete solution simply
on the basis of the mechanical application of a different law after
transfer.
(7) Finally, such a solution, like the first, suffers from the fatal
defect that it calls for the fortuitous application of the law of a state
which may have no such connection with the transaction as to make
the choice of its law rational. Doubtless this error stems from the
fact that in situations like that in the Headrick case the contemplated
transfer is to a state whose substantive law is appropriately applicable
to the transaction. Such, it may be conceded, will be the usual situation. Especially in personal-injury and wrongful-death cases, the convenient place of trial will normally be the place of injury, and on
widely accepted principles the law of that place should govern. But
all that Section 1404(a) says about the transferee district is that
it must be convenient for patties and witnesses, and that it must be a
district in which the action might have been brought. If the other
passengers on Mr. Headrick's bus had been a group of Chicago school
teachers on tour, the convenient forum might well have been the
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Northern District of Illinois; but to apply the Illinois statute of
limitations, or rule on burden of proof, or public policy (or doctrine
of forum non conveniens!) would be capricious to the point of raising
substantial constitutional questions.
Though the error is induced by the assumption that the Headrick
case sets the pattern, it is no mere oversight that can be corrected,
within the framework of the first and third solutions, by substituting
the law of some more appropriate state for that of the transferee
forum. By what rules is the alternate state to be determined? Not
even unanimous agreement among the states and the text writers that
the lex loci delicti should govern will create a "brooding omnipresence"
pointing to California. Nor can any help come from the law of New
Mexico. New Mexico has no rule for determining the appropriate
statute of limitations by sorting out the contacts of various states
with the transaction. Its only rule is that it will apply its own statute,
irrespective of where the transaction occurred, merely because it is
the forum. To designate the law of the place of injury as supplying all
of the law which is appropriate after transfer, and to attribute the
choice to the operation of New Mexico choice-of-law rules, would
be to take refuge in transparent fiction.
Application of the law of the transferee state, merely as such, can
never be justified. Under any solution requiring such a result, the
district court in which the action is filed necessarily makes a choice of
law, wittingly or unwittingly, when it passes on the motion to transfer. If a decision against the motion is actuated by distaste for the
application of the transferee state's law, despite factors favoring transfer,11 the result is a regrettable impairment of the procedural reform
effected by Section 1404(a). If the decision is in favor of the motion,
the choice may be made in the worst possible fashion: by the mechanical, and perhaps blind, application of an irrational choice-of-law
rule. And no third state can be substituted for the transferee state
as the one whose laws should, on rational principles, govern after
transfer, unless the district courts in diversity cases have power to
make an independent choice of law-a power which is denied them
under present doctrine.
None of the three tentative approaches is acceptable as a solution.
The first must be rejected out of hand. The second leads to a solution which is possible, although the logic of the argument does not
HAs in Curry v. States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1954).
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establish that the solution is the proper one. The third is, if anything,
more objectionable than the first.- 9 Even so, the second and third
approaches should serve to promote progress toward an acceptable
solution, if only by challenging exposure of their defects.
IV. A CLOSER

APPROACH TO SOLUTION

The major conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is
that the question, whether transfer under Section 1404(a) entails a
change in the applicable law in any case, can be soundly answered
only by determining whether the ascertainable purposes of the section
contemplate such an effect. Such a determination cannot be made by
classifying the problem of place of trial as procedural, or as substantive, for purposes of the Erie doctrine, and then deducing the answer
in terms of disregarding or applying the law of the state, because the
classification itself must depend on whether the result of the case
will be substantially affected by a change in the place of trial, and
also because in important instances the law of the state is impotent to
indicate the law applicable after transfer.
Nevertheless, it would be helpful to the further consideration of the
problem if we could know how the Supreme Court regarded its intranational doctrine of forum non conveniens for purposes of the Erie
doctrine before Section 1404(a) was enacted. The academic analyst
cannot make his own classification of the problem as "substantive"
or "procedural" and reason from it to the pre-ordained result; but
if the Supreme Court had clearly held either that the district court
must observe the state law of forum non conveniens, or that it need
not do so, we would have an authoritative exposition of the source
of the doctrine and its function in the federal courts, and the basic
ambiguity which harasses all attempts at solution would have been
resolved.
Such help, however, is not available. Three times the Court de'A note in the Harvard Law Review [Limitations on the Transfer of Actions under
the judicial Code, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1347, 1354 et seq. (1951)] (1) rejects the view that
the applicable law is unaffected by transfer; (2) rejects the suggestion that transfers
should be made purely on the basis of convenience, without considering differences in law;
(3) rejects the view that transfer should be to a forum whose law is appropriately applicable; and (4) concludes that the best solution is "not to transfer at all where the
law which would be applied in the transferee forum would be materially different from
that applied by the transferring court." Ibid., at 1355. This, of course, assumes a great
deal as to the effect of transfer; but the decisive objection to it is that it would very
seriously impair the utility of the transfer provision, whether or not a purpose of the provision is to bring about a change of law.
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liberately left open the question whether the Erie case required adherence to state law concerning forum non conveniens and the related
doctrine concerning internal affairs of foreign corporations. 1 0 The
nearest approach to an indication of the way the Court might have
been tending is a footnote appended by Mr. Justice Jackson to the
opinion of the Court in the Koster case:
We are concerned here with the autonomous administration of the federal courts
in the discharge of their own judicial duties, subject of course to the control of
121

Congress.

Extreme caution should attend any effort to build an answer to the
current problem on the basis of such a statement, when the body of
the opinion shows clearly that the application of the Erie doctrine
was not decided. Nor can any very helpful inferences be drawn from
the effect of the Gulf decision itself. Since the consequence of a misguided choice of forum, under that decision, was outright dismissal,
the effect was, of course, to deprive the plaintiff of any advantage he
might have gained by virtue of a difference between the law of the
state in which the action was filed and that of any one of the other
states in which it could be refiled and maintained. Thus the effect
might have been very drastic in terms of change in the applicable
law, or there might have been none at all, depending on the circumstances. The plaintiff was still left with a choice, within the limitations
of jurisdiction and venue; the law to be applied after dismissal was
not designated. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Supreme
Court was using the sanction of dismissal only because it was powerless to transfer; the possibly drastic application of a different law cannot be taken as the preferred effect, from which the nature of the
policy can be inferred. Finally, any inferences drawn from the effect
which dismissal had on the applicable law may be offset by the congressional substitution of transfer.
The problem we must attempt to solve is whether Section 1404(a)
'°Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 559 (1946); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,
529 (1947). See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 927
et seq. (1947), and Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380, 398-99 (1947), both noting the views of lower federal courts. On the question whether
the state law of forum non conveniens is relevant to the administration of Section 1404(a),
judge Wyzanski has been similarly cautious: "And though it 'may be that this state rule
does not govern a federal court sitting in Massachusetts, the policy expressed in State decisions ought not to be regarded as entirely without weight in the exercise of this Court's
discretion." Josephson v. McGuire, 121 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Mass., 1954).
121330 U.S. 518, 520 n. 1 (1947).
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is simply a provision for change of venue, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, suitable to a unitary judicial establishment applying a single body of law; or whether it imports into the federal judicial system the doctrine of forum non conveniens, with the connotations of its interstate and international background. The two ideas
are inextricably mingled in the language and the legislative history
of the section, and are completely confused in the Gulf decision by
the Court's failure to discriminate between the problem of the place
of trial on the interstate and on the intrastate levels.
In Part II it was suggested that the Gulf decision may be regarded
as an analytically unsound aberration; that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was never appropriate to the problem of place of trial within a unitary judicial system; that the problem of place of trial within
such a system is appropriately dealt with by venue statutes, modulated
by provision for discretionary change of venue; and that Section
1404(a) may therefore be interpreted as being simply the long-overdue correction of a defect in the statutory scheme for regulating the
place of trial. In this view, Section 1404(a) is a simple change-ofvenue statute, contemplating no change of law as the result of transfer;
the brief appearance of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in its
legislative history is an episode to be forgotten. If this view were
adopted, it would lead directly to the conclusion that after transfer the
case remains what it was before; an action filed in New Mexico would
continue to be governed by New Mexico law to the same extent as if
it had remained in a district court in that state; the transferee court
would sit as a mere substitute for the district court in New Mexico,
having only a derivative jurisdiction; the convenience of parties and
witnesses would be satisfied, as would the vague "interest of justice,"
and no more would be required. Transfer would never result in a
change in the applicable law.
But it was also suggested that such a view is more formal than realistic. While the federal judicial establishment is a unitary system, it
occupies the territory and applies the law of forty-eight different states.
If Virginia is a "foreign" state from the point of view of New York, is
not the Western District of Virginia similarly foreign to the Southern
District of New York? If the maintenance of an action in the Supreme
Court of New York would be oppressively inconvenient, would it not
be equally so in the Southern District of New York? If a plaintiff, by
choosing to sue in the Supreme Court of New York, obtains an unfair
advantage because of the law which that court will apply, does he not
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obtain an equally unfair advantage if he sues in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York, which will apply the same law?
Why not, then, borrow the doctrine of forum non conveniens, precisely
because one of its characteristic functions is to deprive the plaintiff of
an inequitable advantage in terms of the applicable law? If this view
were adopted, it would lead directly to the conclusion that one of the
consequences of transfer, in appropriate instances, would be a change
in the applicable law.
If we trace the consequences of these two views, we shall see that
neither can be satisfactorily embraced to the exclusion of the other;
and we shall, incidentally, understand why the Supreme Court was
reluctant to define the source and function of its doctrine as long as the
task could possibly be avoided-and why it is fortunate that the Court
did not, by formulating such a definition, prematurely crystallize the
lines of approach to a solution of the current problem.
Under the first, or "change-of-venue," view, the federal courts would
be unable to deal comprehensively with the problem of place of trial
within the federal system. Insofar as the plaintiff's choice of forum
causes inconvenience to parties or witnesses; insofar as it is designed
to vex, harass, or oppress, or to make a fair hearing for the defendant
impracticable, or to force a settlement; insofar as it is calculated to
derive advantage from differences in calendar conditions, or in the supposed dispositions of jurors in a particular locality; insofar as it tends
to a maldistribution of judicial business; in short, insofar as it may be
judged a bad choice in terms of geographic, demographic, and administrative factors-the courts could regulate it effectively by the instrument of transfer. But insofar as the choice is judged bad because it
gains for the plaintiff an advantage by virtue of the law to be applied,
they could not regulate it at all. The device of transfer, borrowed from
unitary systems, is inadequate to the needs of the federal system.
Unitary though it is, the federal judicial system presents the problems
that are encountered on the interstate level, because of the different
bodies of law which are applied. If the problem is to be dealt with
comprehensively, the intrastate device of change of venue is not
enough; there must be something comparable to the interstate device
of forum non conveniens.
Not only would the federal courts be unable to deal comprehensively
with the problem; they would be forced to create a situation wholly
incongruous and almost impossible to justify in terms of the Erie doctrine. In states which reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
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cases which would have remained in the state courts would be whisked
away to another part of the country for trial. This might be explained
on the ground that venue, the place of trial, when nothing more is involved, is purely procedural. But in states which accept the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, cases which probably would be dismissed by the
state court could be filed in the district court; and, while they might
be sent elsewhere for trial, the plaintiff would retain the inequitable advantage in terms of applicable law which the state court would have
denied him. Thus the plaintiff might win a case which never could have
been won but for the fact that, by dipping his brush into the forbidden
pigment of the state's law, he was able to give his claim a favorable
and durable coloration. This he would be enabled to do only by virtue
of the "accident" of diversity. There is nothing "procedural" about
such a result.
The principal objection to the second, or forum non conveniens, view
is that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was an anomaly in the
federal courts, its sanction of dismissal being inappropriate in a unitary
system where place of trial is regulated by statute and where ample
power exists to provide the more moderate sanction of transfer. That
objection has been removed by the enactment of Section 1404(a). But
under the view that the section embraces that doctrine and its incidents, including that which deprives the plaintiff of an advantage
sought in the laws of the chosen forum, the federal courts would encounter serious difficulties arising from established interpretations of
the Erie doctrine. To deprive the plaintiff of an advantage stemming
from the law of the state in which the action is filed would be to reach
a result different from that which would have been reached in the state
court, in those states that reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In the states that accept or may accept the doctrine, it would be nearly
impossible to determine with any assurance what the result in the state
court would be in a particular case, although a good idea might be
formed as to the over-all probabilities. But the most serious problem
would be: By what law are the federal courts to determine whether the
advantage sought by the plaintiff in his choice of forum is an "inequitable" one, and what law is to be substituted for that of the
forum? The first question cannot be answered by reference to the law
of the state of filing, since so many states take the view that all is fair
in forum-shopping. And once we abandon, as we must, the superficial
notion that the law of the transferee state is the proper substitute, if
there is to be one, it becomes clear that no help can be derived from
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the law of the state of filing in determining what law should be substituted for that which, in equity, should not apply. The federal court
cannot deprive the litigants of one law, and substitute another, by
transfer or otherwise, unless it makes a choice of law; it cannot impute
the responsibility for that choice to the law of the state in which it sits.
Therefore, the forum non conveniens view of Section 1404(a) is
illusory and unworkable unless the federal courts may exercise a power
which is now denied them-the power to make an independent choice
of law.
The fact is that the fundamental ambiguity of Section 1404(a) cannot be resolved. It is too deeply rooted in the ideas which gave the section birth: the interstate idea of forum non conveniens and the intrastate idea of change of venue. Each idea is appropriate, and each is inappropriate. The problem of place of trial in the federal system ought
to be dealt with as a problem of change of venue, because the federal
system is a unitary one, so that the problem arises on the intrastate
level; it ought also to be dealt with as a problem of forum non conveniens, because the distances involved and the numerous bodies of
law which are administered make the problem almost indistinguishable
from that which arises on the interstate level. The ambiguity is deeply
rooted in the nature of the federal judicial system, which, even for diversity cases alone, is both a unitary national establishment and an arrangement for special courts in and for the several states. 1 2 We cannot
view the system in either of its two aspects, to the exclusion of the
other, and satisfy all our legitimate desires. For example: the unitary
character of the system, and its nation-wide territorial scope, should
theoretically make it possible for the process of any district court to
reach to the remotest corner of the continent and summon a defendant
to make his plea thousands of miles from home. No territorialist theory
of jurisdiction and due process would stand in the way. Yet if a state
court located in the same district were to attempt the same feat, the
attempt would, in the ordinary case, be pronounced a presumptuous
nullity-not merely because of territorialist conceptions, but because
of elementary considerations of fairness. It is because that which
would be unfair in a state court would also be unfair in the district
court "a block away" that nation-wide service of process has never been
generally authorized by Congress. We do not use an intranational
power because it is too clearly inappropriate to our interstate character.
- Compare Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1949).
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We are quick to take advantage of nation-wide power and the unitary
judicial system, however, whenever the exigencies of national policy
require, and when circumstances make it reasonable to do so.12 The
problem of place of trial within the federal system is both an intrastate and an interstate one; it cannot be satisfactorily dealt with if it is
viewed as exclusively the one or the other.
Section 1404(a) is an unbroken colt, disposed to go in opposite directions at once. We cannot resolve its innate ambivalence any more
than we can change the pedigree of an animal. All we can do is break
it to harness, and require it to do a maximum of useful work despite
its contrary disposition. It is not a simple, uncomplicated provision for
change of the location of trial, merely as such, nor is it merely an importation of the interstate doctrine of forum non conveniens.'24 It is
something of both-as much of both, in fact, as can be usefully adapted
to the ends of justice in our system of federal courts without doing
violence to the proper function of those courts in the federal system.
Paradoxical though this may seem, it leads, I think, to a solution
which is simple, workable, and just, and which, while not entirely consistent with orthodox doctrine as to the function of the federal courts
in diversity cases, is secure against objection on constitutional grounds.
To the extent that clarification or modification of current doctrine is
suggested, it may well be that the change is one which would have been
desirable independently of the present problem; or it may be one which
is a necessary consequence of the enactment of Section 1404 (a) by the
supreme legislative authority. At all events, doctrinal apprehensions
cannot stand in the way of continued search for an adequate solution
when not one that has been suggested is acceptable.
The most perceptive and constructive formulation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is that of Professor Foster:
Assuming that the plaintiff has begun an action in a place which on the whole
does not seem convenient, the question should be not whether he is to be penalized
'See generally Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925); 2 Moore,
Federal Practice 1035-36 (2d ed., 1948) ; Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 951-52 (1953). Compare the provision for registration of a judgment in
any district. 62 Stat. 958 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (1950).
'There is a well-defined tendency to treat the section as authorizing transfer although
the circumstances would not have supported dismissal under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Amalgamated Ass'n of S.E.R. & M.C. Employees v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc.,
172 F. 2d 946 (C.A. 5th, 1949); Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp.
319 (D. Del., 1949); Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N.M.,
1949); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F. 2d 360 (C.A. 4th, 1949).
See note 41 supra.
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by a dismissal, but whether the ends of justice might better be served by trial
125
elsewhere, and on what terms.

Add to this that in the federal system we now have available, as a substitute for dismissal, the more appropriate device of transfer, and the
essential ingredients for administering Section 1404(a) in such a way
as to realize its maximum potentialities for federal jurisprudence are
at hand.
The first principle underlying the proposed solution is: Except to
the extent that it is literally impracticable for the transferee court to
apply foreign law, the law of the state of originalfiling should govern
after transfer, just as if the case had not been transferred,unless the
order granting transfer otherwise provides.
Section 1404(a) appears, on its face, to be a routine provision for
change of venue, entailing no change of law upon transfer. It has been
so regarded in the bulk of the cases which have arisen. Lawyers will
continue so to regard it. When a solution is announced, it should not
have the effect of injecting into transferred cases, pending at that time,
differences of law unanticipated when transfer was argued and ordered.
Nor should future cases be affected after transfer by differences of law
which were not contemplated in the argument or the decision on the
motion. A significant and avoidable change of law should not be a necessary incident of change of venue. In the interest of certainty, and of
the administration of the section "in the interest of justice," all parties
and the court should be fully aware of the extent to which transfer is
intended to work a change of the applicable law. Surprise and the
opportunity for sharp practice should be eliminated.
In some instances, the classification of a rule of law as "procedural"
for interstate conflict-of-laws purposes reflects the fact that it would be
truly impracticable for the court which must try a case to attempt the
application of foreign law.12 6 As between the federal courts in different
states, such instances are reduced to a minimum, since the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide substantial uniformity. If any such
instance remains, 2 7 it concerns the law of evidence. To the extent that
'Foster,

Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,

44 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 50 (1930) (italics supplied).
'Rest.,

Conffict of Laws, Introductory Note to c. 12 (1934).

'In
Aircraft Marine Products, Inc. v. Burndy Eng. Co., 96 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Calif.,
1951), an action for patent infringement, the plaintiff resisted a motion under Section
1404(a) to transfer to the Southern District of New York on the ground, inter alia, of
differences in procedure under the practice of the two courts, asserting that trial in New
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the district court in the transferee state is rightly accustomed, under
Rule 43 (a), to applying the law of the state in which it sits,

28

it would

perhaps be unreasonable to expect it, in ruling on routine objections,
to apply the law of the state from which the action was transferred. 29
Therefore, the principle permits the assumption that, with respect to
such routine matters, and with respect to any other true instance of
impracticability, the law of the transferee state will apply after transfer. Even so, if one or more specific questions as to admissibility or
competency should appear to be particularly significant for the result
of the case, and if it is feasible to limit the invocation of a foreign law
of evidence to those specific questions-as it would be, by pre-trial
procedure in the transferee court or otherwise-the application of the
law of the state of original filing would be no more difficult than that
of any other element of foreign law, and a party who would be adversely affected by the law of the transferee forum should be entitled
to insist that the transfer should not have a result which was not taken
into account in the decision on the motion.
The second principle is: The court to which the motion for transfer
is addressedshould be free to take into account any particularin which
the law of the state of filing differs from that of the state to which
transferis contemplated, or is alleged to give a party an inequitable advantage, or is otherwise relevant to the question whether transfer
would be in the interest of justice; and, if it finds that a law other than
that of the state of filing ought to apply after transfer,it should be free
York "would be likely to prejudice consideration of interlocutory questions." Ibid., at 593.
Counsel for the plaintiff has provided a fuller explanation of the procedural differences
in question: "[They] involved the handling of motions and discovery proceedings. In
New York the District Court operates on a master calendar, that is, a particular Judge
is assigned to the case who handles motions and similar types of preliminary judicial
matters. The Judge who rules on such motions may or may not ultimately be the Judge
who tries the case. In Southern California in the District Court the case is assigned to
an individual Judge upon its filing and any matter pertaining to the case is brought before
that Judge, who tries the case. Many attorneys consider it a disadvantage to present motions to a Judge who is unfamiliar with the litigation." Letter dated March 9, 1954, from
R. Douglas Lyon, Esq., of Lyon & Lyon, Los Angeles, in the University of Chicago Law
School Library. The court held the argument without merit. Aircraft Marine Products,
Inc. v. Burndy Eng. Co., supra, at 593.
'See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 Harv. L. Rev.
197 (1941); Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 Vand. L. Rev. 560 (1952);
Federal Rule 43(a)-A Decadent Decade, 34 Cornell L. Q. 238 (1948).
' It should be noted that this circumstance is also an obstacle, though a minor one,
to the second tentative solution, which contemplates the continued application of the
whole law of the state of original filing upon transfer.
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to determine what that law shall be, by the exercise of independent
judgment in the light of the relevant general jurisprudence.
Section 1404(a) requires two findings as a condition of transfer:
(1) that transfer is necessary for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and (2) that it is in the interest of justice. At least as a matter
of strict interpretation, the question of difference in law may not enter
into the first finding; it does, however, affect the second, if we assume
that a change of law is ever possible as a result of transfer; and a
change of law must be possible in some cases unless an important aspect of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to be excluded in the
application of the section. Suppose the court finds that, for convenience
of parties and witnesses, a case filed in the Southern District of New
York should be transferred to the Western District of Virginia; and
suppose it appears from the record and the argument on the motion
that a provision of Virginia law, applicable if the action had been filed
in the federal court in Virginia, would bar recovery by the plaintiff if
applicable after transfer. If change of venue never entails a change of
law, of course, there is no problem; the "interest of justice" finding is
very nearly subsumed in the finding as to convenience. On the assumption that Virginia law will apply after transfer, the court must determine whether the transfer would be in the interest of justice. It may
conclude: (1) that it would be, because (for one reason or another)
the Virginia law in respect of the particular matter to which the difference relates should govern the transaction, and that the loss of his
remedy is precisely the fate that the plaintiff deserves; or (2) that it
would not be, because (for one reason or another) the New York law
(or the law of some third state) should govern the transaction in that
particular, or, at all events, that the considerations favoring Virginia
as the convenient forum do not justify depriving the plaintiff of his
remedy.
In reaching the first conclusion, the court will, it is clear, be making
a choice of law, and one which it has full power to implement (if we
continue to assume that Virginia law will apply after transfer) simply
by granting the motion. In reaching the second, the court will similarly
be making a choice of law. In that event, does it have the power to
implement its choice? A conceivable answer, based upon a narrow reading of Section 1404(a), is that it has power to do so only at the expense of its first finding, that convenience requires transfer: it could
deny the motion, thus assuring the application of New York law, and
saving the plaintiff's remedy, but thus also assuring the inconvenience
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of the place of trial.13 Such a result is highly undesirable. There is
enough of forum non conveniens in the history of the section to provide abundant justification for the course pursued with respect to the
first conclusion. Why should the court be disabled to deal completely
with the question of the applicable law as it affects the justice of transfer? The answer cannot be that the court is prohibited from determining the applicable law independently of state conflict-of-laws rules; its
determination for purposes of the first conclusion is independent of state
law. If the change-of-law aspects of forum non conveniens are included
in the make-up of Section 1404(a) at all, they should be included in
their best form and with the full benefit of the substitution of transfer
for dismissal: the court should have complete power to determine
where the case should be tried, and on what terms. It should have
power to transfer the case to Virginia for convenience, but only on
condition that with respect to the difference under consideration the
New York law (or the law of another state) shall govern after trans13 1
fer.
The third principle is: The order granting the transfer should never
specify the law of the transferee state, merely as such, as the law to be
applied after transfer.
The reason underlying this principle has been fully stated in Part
III. Briefly restated, it is that the transferee state is, by definition, no
more than a convenient forum, in which the action might have been
brought. It may have no such relation to the transaction as to make
the application of any part of its law rational (except insofar as the
application of any different law would be impracticable-a contingency
provided for in the first principle). In the great majority of cases,
probably, if there is to be a change of law, the law of the transferee
state will be the appropriate substitute; but that will be because of
circumstances which make the law of that state appropriate on conflictof-laws principles, which are not necessarily the same as those which
make it the convenient place for trial or one in which the action might
have been brought.
The fourth principle is: If the court to which the motion is addressed
' Even so, its power is only partial; the court can effect a result which will entail appli-

cation of the law of New York, but not that of a third state.
' If the court depends on consent of the defendant instead of on its power to transfer
on condition, or to designate the applicable law, the result is to give the congressional
policy and the court's judgment into the keeping of an interested litigant. See Curry v.
States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1954); cf. Frechoux v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1953).
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finds that a law other than that of the state of original filing should be
applied after transfer, its order should specify that law; wherever
feasible, it should specify it in terms of content as well as source; and
this determinationshould constitute the law of the case after transfer.
Still assuming that transfer may sometimes result in a change of
law, the orderly administration of the section, "in the interest of justice," imperatively requires that there be no alteration, after transfer,
of the factors entering into the decision on the motion. At the least,
this means that the transferee court should not apply the law of any
state other than that designated in the order as the proper source. It
also means that the court passing on the motion should form a clear
view as to the content of the governing law which it designates, where
the problem involves a specific difference between the law of the state
of filing and some other state, and that the precise effects which were
contemplated should not be altered by the transferee court's assignment of a different content to the law specified as appropriate. This
aspect of the principle may seem out of harmony with the observation
in the Gulf case, that one of the functions of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is to remit ascertainment of the content of the applicable
law to the forum which is "at home" with that law, and thus to avoid
conflict-of-laws problems.3M But that observation assumed the refiling
of the case in a state which was appropriate both as the place of trial
and as the source of the governing law; it was addressed, moreover, to
the whole body of governing law, and not to the relatively rare quirks
which produce disuniformity from state to state and make forumshopping profitable. A judge who understands the specific content of a
foreign law well enough to take it intelligently into account in passing
on the motion to transfer should understand it well enough to settle it
between the parties for other purposes of the same litigation.
These four principles reduce to a solution which can be stated in a
sentence: Normally, and in the absence of a contrary provision in the
order granting transfer, the transferee court will, to the fullest extent
practicable, apply the law that would have been applied if there had
been no change of venue; but the order transferring the action may
specify a different law as applicable, and such a specification will con33
stitute the law of the case.'
- 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). Note that the only one of the tentative solutions which
is at all feasible-the second, requiring the continued application of the law of the state
of original filing-entails habitual resort to foreign law by the transferee forum.
""In the absence of statute the phrase, law of the case, as applied to the effect of
previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely
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Under such a solution, Section 1404(a) would operate, in the great
majority of cases, as a simple change-of-venue provision, entailing no
conflict-of-laws problems. The practical desirability of such a mode of
operation becomes apparent upon a reading of the reported decisions
in which the section has figured: not one in twenty contains any indication that a change of law as a consequence of transfer was contemplated, or taken into account in the decision on the motion. The burden
would be placed upon the party desiring a change of law in conjunction with transfer to bring his design into the open and justify it. On
the other hand, the burden would be upon any party anticipating prejudice as the result of application of some routine, ingrained practice of
the transferee court to make his claim to the law of the state of original
filing at some suitable preliminary stage.
Such a solution means, of course, that, at least for the purposes of
Section 1404(a), there must be developed a federal law of conflict of
laws. In the light of the development of the Erie doctrine, such a consequence may seem startling. It seems less so as the requirements of
the section are analyzed, and as the alternatives are considered.
The area in which the district court would be called upon to make
an independent choice of law is a narrow one. When a motion for transfer is made, and when considerations of the convenience of parties and
witnesses indicate the propriety of transfer, and when the attention of
the court is directed to some particular in which the law to be applied
might be, or should be, affected by transfer, then, and perhaps only
then,'34 will the court be called upon to determine the applicable law;
and the determination need not relate to the law which is to govern the
case in general, but only to that which will govern with respect to the
particular in question. Using Sampson v. Channel'3 5 for illustration,
and assuming that a transfer to Maine is indicated for the convenience
of parties and witnesses, the district court in Massachusetts, upon
being advised of the difference between the laws of the two states reexpresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not
a limit to their power." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). Perhaps all
that need be said, by way of specifying the result sought, is that the transferee court
should not reopen the question of what law applies without also reopening the question
of the propriety of the transfer. For discussion of the doctrine of the law of the case in
connection with Section 1404(a), see Brainard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 87 F. Supp.
921 (D. Kan., 1950); Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Schlumberger Well Sur. Corp., 98 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Del., 1951).
' See Part V infra.
2m 110 F. 2d 754 (C.A. 1st, 1940).
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garding the burden of proof, would not find it necessary to determine
the source of the governing "substantive" law; the Massachusetts rule
referring to the law of Maine would still supply that reference. The
court would be required, in the course of deciding whether a transfer
would be in the interest of justice (or, broadly, of determining where
the case should be tried, and on what terms), to determine what law
should govern on the burden of proof, and what that law is. This, of
course, is just what the district court and the court of appeals did decide in Sampson v. Channell. The fact that the decision was in terms
of the Erie doctrine, and resulted in the choice of Massachusetts rather
than Maine law, does not make it any the less a choice-of-law decision.
The Erie doctrine as interpreted is a choice-of-law rule, and one which
has a rational justification; but it cannot be applied mechanically,
under the new conditions resulting from Section 1404(a), as the only
possible rule for choice of law, and still retain its justification.
For that matter, the Gulf case itself authorized federal courts to
make at least a negative choice of law; and the fact that the Court deliberately and pointedly refrained from subjecting that choice to the
all-encompassing Erie principle is itself significant for the question
whether the choice was to be made independently. On the assumption
that it was to be made in conformity with state law, the Court gave an
impressive demonstration of how cavalierly the obligation to conform
might be discharged. The decision stands for the proposition that a
district court in New York may reject as inappropriate to the transaction any law which would be applied by a New York state court as the
law of the forum. To reject without supplying the alternative is, of
course, to choose, although in incomplete fashion; moreover, when
there is only one alternative forum, the choice is, as a practical matter,
complete.
Any alternative solution also involves an independent federal choice
of law. To the extent that any solution is predicated on the automatic
application of the law of the transferee state after transfer, the district judge will in fact choose the applicable law in the exercise of his
discretion to grant or deny the motion. This is true even if, as suggested by the third tentative approach, he purports to observe the state
law of forum non conveniens; for (1) the disposition which would be
made of the case under the forum non conveniens doctrine, in states
which accept it, is too uncertain to furnish a guide for the district
court's choice; and (2) the state court has no power to make a com-
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plete choice; like the federal courts in the Gulf period, all it can do is
dismiss, thus rejecting as inappropriate the law which it would apply
as the law of the forum, but leaving the alternative to be determined
by the plaintiff's subsequent forum-shopping. 3 6 Thus the federal court
must make a choice, and the choice must be independent of state law.
An unfortunate aspect of the matter is that the choice, under such a
solution, must be a hobbled one, because the possibilities are arbitrarily
limited to the state of filing and the state of transfer; and it is more
unfortunate still that the choice may be made unwittingly.
To the extent that any solution is predicated on the continued
applicability after transfer of the law of the state of filing, the choice
will be in favor of the law of the original forum, no matter how inequitable the advantage thus preserved to the astute forum-shopper.
Choice is not avoided, under the third tentative approach, even though
the state of filing rejects forum non conveniens. True, the choice would
be made authoritatively by the Supreme Court for the district courts,
and it would be dressed in the old clothes of the Erie doctrine; but it
would be nonetheless an independent federal choice of the applicable
law, and one, moreover, quite inconsistent with that part of the aura of
Section 1404(a) which suggests the purpose of Congress, as a matter
of the "autonomous administration" of the federal courts, to invest
them with something of the power, which forum non conveniens gives
to courts at the interstate and international level, to decline to be used
as instruments of inequitable advantage.
The Rules of Decision Act, which is the authoritative source of the
Erie doctrine, provides only that
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the

United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
13 7
where they apply.

Since Section 1404(a) cannot be administered, at least in such a way
as to effectuate its purpose completely, without an independent choice
of law by the federal courts, it seems reasonable to conclude that we
have in that section an act of Congress which requires, although it does
' This overstates the case somewhat, since the state court might, by astute employment of the device of conditional dismissal, determine the forum in which the case is to
be tried, and hence the applicable law. But this circumstance merely serves to emphasize
that an independent choice by the district court is inevitable.
62 Stat. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1950) (italics supplied).
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not expressly provide for, a departure from the general practice of
regarding the laws of the several states as rules of decision. 3 "
There can be little doubt as to the power of Congress to enact a law
requiring or empowering the district courts to make an independent
choice of law, at least for the purposes of Section 1404(a), in diversity cases. 131 In the first place, there can be no possible doubt as to the
power of Congress to enact a provision for change of venue,' in the
exercise of its power to establish federal courts and to regulate the
place of trial therein. If such a provision entails complexities concerning the law to be applied after transfer, the power to deal appropriately with those incidents is surely a necessary concomitant of the primary
power. 40 In the second place, the rule that a district court in a diversity
case must apply state conflict-of-laws rules was not an inevitable
consequence of the Erie decision; it was only a possible one.'-' In the
third place, I take it to be the general understanding that Mr. Justice
Brandeis' invocation of the Constitution as a basis for overruling
Swift v. Tyson 42 was a bit of judicial hyperbole 143 which, having served
' I leave aside arguments based on the phrase "in cases where they apply," as to which
see Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Col. L. Rev. 489, 515 (1954) ;
2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 867, 927
et seq. (1953); Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 I1. L. Rev. 493,
494 (1942).
' Of course there can be no suggestion at all of a lack of power when the problem
arises in connection with federally created causes of action, as in Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N.M., 1949).
o Recall that Congress has three times prescribed the effect of change of venue-twice

in such circumstances as to include diversity cases. Cases cited note 22 supra. The guarded
intimation in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941), that Congress may lack
power to "abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive law of the state" is
significantly limited to the law of the state "where the cause of action arose. . . ." Thus
it can be argued that any constitutional basis the Erie case may have does not extend
to the KIaxon case. Compare Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, c. VI § 3, at 633 et seq. (1953).
'The source of the direction to apply the law of Pennsylvania rather than that of
some other state was not made clear by the opinion in the Erie case, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The question was expressly left open in Ruhlin v, New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202,
208 n. 2 (1938). In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court seems clearly
to have assumed that the choice of the appropriate state law was to be made by the
federal courts independently: "[If the right to be exempt from such an order is one of
substantive law, the Rules of Decision Act required the District Court, though sitting in
flinois, to apply the law of Indiana, the state where the cause of action arose .... " Ibid.,
at 10-11. And it was a conflict between circuits that led to the decision in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
" 16 Pet. 1 (1842), in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 et seq. (1938).
"Macaulay's characterization of "the boldest figure of rhetoric"--"it lies without deceiving"--is incomplete. Hyperbole lies also without intent to deceive.
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its purpose, should not be permitted to mislead even the most literalminded reader. 44 It is difficult to take seriously any objection to a
general power to prescribe rules of decision for the federal courts in the
face of the clear language of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers

vested by this Constitution in145
the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.

The proposed solution, or something basically similar to it, seems
clearly preferable to any of the three alternatives which have been
discussed. It contemplates that the choice of law will be as enlightened
and concordant with the dual congressional purpose as the general
jurisprudence and the capacity of the federal bench can make it. It
does mean that in a substantial number of diversity cases the result
will be significantly different from what it presumably would have been
if the case had been tried in a state court "a block away." But the
accident of diversity will not give a letter of credit to make forumshopping easy. There will be no automatic consequences, no rules of
thumb, no certain advantages to be gained by filing in the federal court
or removing to it. All either party can be sure of is that in the federal
court a just discretion will be exercised on the basis of all factors bearing on the appropriateness of the forum. And when the result is significantly different, it will be so only because the choice of forum entailed
an adventitious application to the case of a law which, in the interest
of justice, should not be applied. If that is the only consequence of
trimming the Erie doctrine to conform it to the requirements of the
new procedural device, the evil does not seem intolerable.
The remaining question is: On what basis, and by what standards,
is the district court to determine what law should be applied in the
interest of justice? The law of the state in which the court sits will not
be controlling. The whole body of general jurisprudence is available.
..See the concurring opinion of Reed, 3., in the Erie case, 304 U.S. 64, 90 (1938);
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J. 267, 273, 278 et seq. (1946) ; Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Ill.
L. Rev. 493, 518, 522 et seq. (1942); 2 Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States c. XXVI (1953) ; Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 935, 937 (1947). Professor Hart, though
acknowledging a constitutional element in the Erie decision, sees no constitutional impediment to the independent determination of choice-of-law questions by the federal courts
in diversity cases. Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 633-36
(1953) ; Hart, op. cit. supra note 138.
'" U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
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From that body there must, of course, be subtracted precedents rejecting the doctrine of forum non conveniens, since Congress has clearly
adopted that doctrine, or at least a substantial part of it, in modified
form for the federal courts. But the question is still not quite answered. The general jurisprudence, thus amended, contains not only a
body of precedents applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but
a greater body of precedents on the whole question of choice of law.
Which of these bodies of law is to supply guidance for decision? A
consideration of this question will be the first business of the section to
follow.
V. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. The statute of limitations. How should the Headrick4 " case be
decided? The accident happened in California. The state court in New
Mexico would apply the substantive law of California, but would apply
its own statute of limitations as "procedural." The district court in
New Mexico, absent a motion for transfer, would do the same. The defendant's motion for transfer is persuasive in terms of convenience of
parties and witnesses. The factor of difference of law is clearly in view.
What determination should the district court make with respect to the
statute of limitations which is to apply after transfer?
Given freedom on the part of the court to make an independent
choice of the law governing time limitations, the premise most likely to
commend itself to modern academic opinion is that the court should
reject the misclassification of statutes of limitation as procedural, and
refer the question to the state which furnishes the governing substantive law.' 47 In so doing, the federal court would foster the ideal of
state-to-state uniformity of result, and contribute to the accumulation
of a superior body of precedents on the conflict of laws. In fact, in the
cases applying the Erie doctrine in the debatable zone, the federal
courts already have available a body of doctrine which might, with
generally beneficial results, be applied to the classification of laws as
substantive or procedural for interstate choice-of-law purposes. There
is appeal in the argument that, if the federal courts are to go into the
"Headrick
supra.

v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 182' F. 2d 305 (C.A. 10th, 1950). See Part I

", Consult Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 147 (2d ed., 1951); Goodrich,
Handbook on the Conflict of Laws 241 (3d ed., 1949); Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws, c. VI (1949). Compare The Statute of Limitations and
the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L. J. 492 (1918). On the other hand, see Ailes, Limitation
of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 474 (1933).

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 470 1954-1955

1955]

CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

471

choice-of-law business for themselves, they should do so on the highest
plane, and do honor to themselves while setting an example for others.
But the matter may not be quite so simple. Thus far, at least, we
have not claimed for the federal courts general power to make an independent choice of law in diversity cases; we have claimed only a limited degree of independence, based upon the necessities of administering Section 1404(a) according to what appears to be its purpose. The
argument has been that, since the section is based upon the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, it contemplates that one consequence of transfer may be to deprive the plaintiff of an advantage which he sought in
the law of the chosen forum, just as dismissal on grounds of forum non
conveniens had that as one of its consequences. The contention may be
made, therefore, that a district court, in the administration of Section
1404 (a), should deprive the plaintiff of an advantage given him by the
law of the state of filing only when warrant can be found in the precedents for treating the advantage as "inequitable."
If we turn to the forum non conveniens precedents, we find that the
courts, so far from treating the benefit of the forum's statute of limitations as an inequitable advantage to the plaintiff, treat the circumstance that the action would be barred upon refiling in the more convenient forum as a reason for refusing to invoke the doctrine. 4 ' The
cases which have been found, however, are not decisive of the question
here. From the facts reported it is not always possible to determine
whether the actions were filed before or after the expiration of the
foreign period of limitations; 49 but the existence in New York of a
borrowing statute' 0 makes it clear that the cases from that jurisdiction
are not instances of attempts by plaintiffs to avoid the bar of the
statute in the convenient forum. 5 ' If we turn to the precedents on in..Randle v. Inecto, Inc., 131 Misc. 261, 226 N.Y. Supp. 686 (S. Ct., 1928) (motion to
dismiss denied, in part because "the cause of action has expired under the Delaware statute
of limitations"); Williamson v. Palmer, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 532, 533 (S. Ct., 1943) (motion to
dismiss denied: "It appears that an action in Connecticut would now be barred by the
statute of limitations . . . so that if this motion should be granted the plaintiffs would
probably be deprived of any remedy. . . ."); Wendel v. Hoffman, 258 App. Div. 1084,
259 App. Div. 732, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 96 (S. Ct., 1940) (motion to dismiss granted on condition that defendants waive the foreign statute) ; Thistle v. Halstead, 95 N.H. 87, 58 A.
2d 503 (1948).
" The significance of the distinction is discussed infra.
'N.Y. Civ. Pract. Act (1941) § 13.
" If the actions had not been filed in New York within the time allowed in the state
where the cause of action arose, they would be barred in New York by Section 13 of the
Civil Practice Act, and there would be no occasion for the plea of forum non conveniens.
Similarly, where the Virginia court declined to enjoin the prosecution in Tennessee of an

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 471 1954-1955

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 22

junctions against the prosecution of actions abroad,152 we find them
inconclusive with respect to whether a purpose to evade the bar of the
statute of limitations in the normal forum is ground for equitable relief.
Two cases hold that it is. In Culp v. Butler, the Appellate Court of
Indiana, finding that the defendant's claim against the plaintiff was
barred in Indiana but not in Illinois, affirmed a judgment enjoining
prosecution of the claim in Illinois, saying: "These facts clearly bring
the parties within the rule ... with reference to enjoining a citizen of
one state from prosecuting an action against another citizen of the
same state in the courts of a foreign state, for the purpose of evading
the law of his own state."' 5 3 In Oates v. Morningside College the Iowa
Supreme Court took a similar position, holding that the prosecution of
a claim against the executor of an Iowa decedent in another state where
ancillary administration was pending, and where the claim might not
be barred, as it was in Iowa, would subject the executor to "irreparable
injury."'15 4 On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court has firmly
refused to enjoin an action in another state against the estate of an
Illinois decedent, where the claim was barred in Illinois:
The fact that the remedy at law is barred here does not give even a legal, much
less an equitable, right to interpose the bar in the action in the foreign State
against the property therein....
No case has been cited, and we are aware of none, holding that it is inequitable
for a party to prosecute a legal demand against another within any forum that
will take legal jurisdiction of the case merely because that forum will afford him
action on an insurance policy, reasoning in part that a new action in Virginia would be
barred by the policy provision limiting the time for filing actions, it is clear that there
was no question of evading a bar which had accrued while the plaintiff slept on his rights.
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Fleenor, 179 Va. 268, 18 S.E. 2d 901 (1942).
" When a defendant moves for transfer and asks an order settling the applicability of a
statute of limitations other than that of the original forum, the situation may be regarded
as analogous to his asking for an injunction against the prosecution of the action in the

forum on the ground that the plaintiff is not equitably entitled to the forum's statute of
limitations. [But an order of transfer is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1) (1952),
Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F. 2d 83 (C.A. 2d, 1951).] There are differences:
the usual feelings of delicacy about interfering with the processes of a foreign court are
absent, since the demand is addressed to the court in which the action to be restrained is
pending; and, by the same token, doubts as to the efficacy of the order are removed.
Alternatively, of course, the situation may be viewed as merely one in which the defendant asks that the law governing limitations be determined on rational principles of
conflict of laws.
69 Ind. App. 668, 674, 122 N.E. 684, 685-86 (1919).
217 Iowa 1059, 1067, 252 N.W. 783, 787, 91 A.L.R. 563, 570 (1934). The force of the
holding is weakened by the co-ordinate ground for the decision-a questionable holding
that the rights of the parties were res judicata by virtue of a previous proceeding in Iowa
in which the executor successfully invoked the bar of the Iowa statute.
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a better remedy than that of his domicile. To, justify equitable interposition in a
case like the present, it must be made to appear that an equitable right will otherwise be denied the party seeking relief. 155

The Indiana view that evasion of the local statute is ground for
equitable relief was promptly condemned by a commentator in the
HarvardLaw Review on the unconvincing ground that the statute bars
only the remedy and not the right, and hence that there can be no
evasion of the home law, "for admittedly there is a good cause of
action."' 5 6 Dean Pound also expressed his disapproval:
In these cases it cannot be said that plaintiff
to be sued at home, nor may he claim a legal
stantive law of his domicile. . . . As between
seeking the tribunal more favorable to him, why
157
to the law?

(in equity) has a legal right only
interest in the procedure or suba plaintiff and a defendant, each
should not equity leave the matter

On the other hand, for what they may be worth, the opinions of two
anonymous annotators support the Indiana-Iowa postion:
Such statutes relate to the remedy, and not to the right of action, but they do
relate to the just rights of the parties, and it would seem that a court should not
permit the assertion of a foreign claim not barred in the forum, but stale everywhere because barred by lapse of time in the jurisdiction where it arose.' 58
[W]e should naturally expect that if in that state its statute of limitations had
operated so as to completely bar all further judicial remedy therein upon a cause
of action, that he would not be permitted to resort to the courts of another state
or country for the purpose of avoiding such bar. It is true that the statutes of
This, however,
limitation... are universally regarded as parts of the lex fori ....
ought by no means to be conclusive of the question we are now considering, for
we have already shown that statutes exempting property from execution are also
regarded as parts of the lex fori, but that creditors may, nevertheless, be enjoined
from proceeding in the courts of another state for the purpose of evading the
force of these laws. 159
I Thorndike v. Thorndike, 142 Ill. 450, 452 (1892).
'Injunctions to Restrain Foreign Proceedings, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 92, 94 (1919).
The Progress of the Law, 1918-19: Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 425-27
'Pound,
(1920).
'Power of Court, in Exercise of Discretion, To Refuse To Entertain Action for Nonstatutory Tort Occurring in Another State or Country, 32 A.L.R. 6, 66 (1924).
' When Transitory Causes of Action May Not Be Prosecuted in a Foreign State or
Country, 59 A.S.R. 869, 878-79, 885 (1898). In Weaver v. Alabama G.S.R. Co., 200 Ala.
432, 434, 76 So. 364, 366 (1917), the annotator is identified as Judge [A.C.]' Freeman.
See also Annotation, 69 A.L.R. 591 (1930); Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of
Equity over Persons To Compel the Doing of Acts outside the Territorial Limits of the
State, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 494, 495 et seq. (1930) ("this difference in laws must be a difference in the substantive laws, and a difference merely in procedural laws will not be
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Thus it is not clear whether a plaintiff's avoidance of the normally
applicable statute of limitations, by filing in a jurisdiction in which the
action is not barred, is regarded as giving him an "inequitable" advantage; still less is it clear how we are to find authoritative or satisfying
criteria for determining the inequitable character of such an advantage.
If I may state a general impression, however, it is that American legal
opinion on the whole adopts an attitude of indulgent tolerance toward
such forum-shopping as is induced by the vagaries of limitations in the
conflict of laws. There is appeal in the argument that cases should be
decided on the merits.
In this connection, we must reckon with the concept of the plaintiff's
"venue privilege."' 60 It is not quite clear just what this privilege implies. Certainly, it is less than the absolute privilege which a plaintiff
normally had, before the Gulf case, to maintain his action in the forum
of his choice so long as he had complied with the venue statute. Just
as certainly, it is something more than the privilege which the venue
statutes gave him, qualified as that privilege was by the decision in the
Gulf case. It has to do primarily with the process of weighing the considerations bearing on the convenience of parties and witnesses. It
means at least that, prima facie, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the
action in the chosen forum, and that the burden is on the defendant to
justify transfer. Probably it means that the process of weighing starts
not with the scales in equilibrium but with a substantial weight already
operating in the plaintiff's favor. 16' Its operation otherwise than on the
balance of conveniences is not so clear. It may be thought to mean that
the plaintiff should not be deprived of certain minimum benefits of
having commenced the action. Thus, the date of the commencement of
the action is fixed for purposes of the statute of limitations, 6 2 and no
new service of process is required. 63 But, since both these effects of
sufficient"); Exercise of the Power of Equity To Enjoin Proceedings in Another State,
22 Col. L. Rev. 360 (1922); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1217, 1242 et seq. (1930).
"6Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329, 331 (C.A. 2d, 1950); Wiren v. Laws, 194
F. 2d 873, 875 (App. D.C., 1951).
'Ford
Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329, 332 (C.A. 2d, 1950) (concurring opinion
of L. Hand, J.).

See Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D. Del., 1949).
" See United States v. Reid, 104 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ark., 1952). Doubts were expressed on this point before the enactment of the statute. Consult The Proposed Revision
of the Federal Judicial Code, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 435-36 (1947) ; compare Braucher,
The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 934 (1947). It seems clear, how'
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the substitution of transfer for dismissal follow equally under Section
1406(a), where the venue has been wrongly laid, it seems clear that
they are not dependent upon any privilege conferred on the plaintiff
by the venue statutes.
In a different context, the Supreme Court has been at some pains to
emphasize that venue statutes and Section 1404(a) "deal with two
separate and distinct problems," and that the section does not effect a
repeal of statutory venue provisions.'6 4 "Section 1404(a) does not
limit or otherwise modify any right granted in Sec. 6 of the Liability
Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may
still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have
been brought previously." 6 Inevitably, this language, coupled with
references to the plaintiff's "venue privilege," will be cited in support
of the proposition that transfer should not deprive the plaintiff of advantages available to him under the law of the original forum. Of
course, nothing in the language of the Court has any reference to the
question as to what law applies after transfer, and it is irrational to
suppose that the Court decided that complex question when it was not
involved and was neither argued nor considered. Such considerations,
however, will not deter a certain type of legal mind from insisting on
an answer to the question, deduced from the Court's statements as to
the nature and operation of the section. But we cannot reason from the
assertion that the plaintiff has a venue privilege to the conclusion that
he is entitled to retain the benefits given him by the law of the chosen
forum. The question is whether retention of those benefits is part of
the privilege. All we know about the privilege is that it consists of
what the venue statutes give him, minus what the doctrine of forum
non conveniens took away, plus what the substitution of transfer for
ever, that the requirement of new process is obviated by the revised Judicial Code even
where the venue is wrongly laid and the transfer is made under Section 1406(a). The
value of this construction is picturesquely illustrated by Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v.
Davenport, 95 F. Supp. 469 (S. D. Iowa, 1951).
'"Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 60 (1949). The question was whether the section applied to cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, with its special venue provisions. The argument was that Congress had evidenced its intention not to repeal those
provisions by omitting them from the list of statutes repealed; that to construe the section as applicable would be to give it effect as an implied repeal of those provisions, contrary to the intent thus expressed. The Court agreed that no repeal was intended. The
quoted language is directed to the point that Section 1404(a) did not effect a repeal by
implication.
" Ibid. Note that, under Section 1406(a), an action may be brought in a district in
which it could not have been brought previously, in conformity with the venue statutes;
and the result will be similar to that which follows a transfer under Section 1404(a).
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dismissal restored. It is difficult to determine whether the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, as it was invoked in the Gulf case, was deliberately designed to have the effect (which it did have) of depriving
the plaintiff of advantages in the forum's law; it is still more difficult
to determine whether Section 1404(a) was designed to restore those
advantages. But we cannot surmount -the difficulties by ignoring the
problem.
The question becomes, then, one of statutory construction. One of
the most significant features of Section 1404(a) is its provision for
transfer as distinguished from dismissal. Clearly enough, that provision
was designed to obviate some of the consequences attendant upon dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine. There can be no
doubt, for example, that, as Judge Marls noted," 6' one purpose of the
provision was to avoid the loss of remedy, resulting from the bar of
the statute of limitations, which was a notable consequence of dismissal. That is, there can be no doubt that this was the purpose at least
in one class of cases.:' But the problem of the statute of limitations is
compound. Two distinct classes of cases are involved:
(1) The action is filed within the period allowed by the state of the
transaction; but, after dismissal from the inconvenient forum, the
time allowed by the other state has expired.
(2) The action is not filed until after the time allowed by the state
of the transaction has expired. (This was the situation in the Headrick
case.)
The first type presents no problem; the policy of avoiding loss of
remedy as a penalty for miscalculation in the choice of forum is clearly
applicable. The plaintiff has not slept on his rights. But for the transfer provision, he could protect himself only by filing both in the forum
of his choice and in the alternate forum or forums. To save the plaintiff here is to do no more than to give an elementary procedural reform
its minimum significance. 68
" New Federal Judicial Code, 34 A.B.A.J. 863, 963 (1948).
" "Dismissal often resulted in leaving a plaintiff without a remedy because of the running of the statute of limitations. No such harsh result would flow from change of venue,
at least where the statute is the same in both forums." Aircraft Marine Products, Inc. v.
Burndy Eng. Co., 96 F. Supp. 588, 593-94 (S.D. Calif., 1951) (italics supplied).
'In 1910 Dean Pound advanced the principle that "Enlo cause, proceeding or appeal
should be dismissed, rejected or thrown out solely because brought in or taken to the
wrong court or wrong venue, but if there is one where it may be brought or prosecuted,
it should be transferred thereto and go on there, all prior proceedings being saved." Pound,
Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 491, 497 (1910). As his references
show, his concern was with the running of the statute while the action was pending in
the wrong forum. Ibid., at 498 n. 56.
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The second class of cases presents a different problem. To save the
plaintiff in such a situation is not merely to withhold a disproportionate
penalty for misjudgment, or to make multiple filing unnecessary; it is
to allow one who may be said to have slept on his rights to retain the
advantage he seeks in the hospitality of a more indulgent lawmakerone having nothing in particular to do with the matter. The substitution of transfer for dismissal may mean only that for purposes of the
applicable statute of limitations the action must be regarded as having
been commenced on the date on which it was in fact commenced,
though in an inappropriate court. On such a construction, the plaintiff
in the second class of case would not be helped.
Section 1406 (a) provides for transfer in cases in which the venue is
wrongly laid. Consistently with the elementary reform principle, this
saves the plaintiff in cases paralleling those in the first class. But it will
hardly be contended that in cases of the second type the plaintiff can
secure the advantage of a longer statute of limitations by filing his action in a forum where venue is improper. No "venue privilege" supports him here; no statute gives him the "right" to resort to this
forum; he can have no possible claim to retain the benefit of its laws.169
' A similar but more forceful point can be made if the courts develop a tendency,
already exhibited, to identify the factors determining whether inconvenience of the forum
warrants dismissal or transfer with the factors determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation comports with due process of law. Prior to the enactment of Section 1404(a) Judge Learned Hand said: "The Court [in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)] did give a new explanation to corporate 'presence,' for it held that in order to determine that question the court must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the action
where it was, outweighed the burden imposed on the defendant; or vice versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of 'forum non conveniens."' Kilpatrick
v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788, 790-91 (C.A. 2d, 1948). A year later he reaffirmed
this position, regarding the Gulf and Koster cases as answering any constitutional objection to dispensing with the "second factor" in corporate "presence"--the second factor
being the "estimate of inconveniences" of the International Shoe case. "[Elven though it
were held that doing any continuous business whatever subjected the corporation to a
judgment in personam ... it could relieve itself of any oppressive prejudice by recourse
to the plea, forum non conveniens." Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo,
175 F. 2d 184, 186 (C.A. 2d, 1949). These statements have been understood by some district courts to mean that actions against corporations, which would formerly have been
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, may now be transferred instead. Magnetic Eng. & Mfg.
Co. v. Dings Mag. Sep. Co., 86 F. Supp. 13, 17 (S.D. N.Y., 1949), appeal dismissed 178
F. 2d 866 (C.A. 2d, 1950); Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F. Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Ohio,
1952); Kendrick v. Seaboard Airline R. Co., 98 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Pa., 1949). See
also Black and Jackson, JJ., dissenting, in Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S.
663, 667, 670-72 (1953). But cf. Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. N.Y., 1949); Smith v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 90 F.
Supp. 189 (S.D. N.Y., 1950). It would be going rather far to assert that the plaintiff has
an interest in the law of the forum of his choice, if the order of transfer was necessary
to remove doubts as to jurisdiction over the defendant in that forum.
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Eldre, clearly, the transfer provision means simply that the action was
commenced when it was commenced, and the "plaintiff is saved only if
the date is within the time allowed by the statute, which the transferee
court will apply. Both sections provide for transfer as distinguished
from dismissal; under Section 1406 (a) transfer does not carry with it
retention of the advantage of the first forum's statute. Consequently it
is impossible to establish, merely on the premise that transfer has been
substituted for dismissal, that transfer under Section 1404(a) carries
with it retention of that advantage. We are remitted to the previous
question, whether such an advantage is "inequitable," if not to the
earlier question, whether the federal courts should not start over from
the beginning, and determine the applicable statute of limitations on
enlightened principles of conflict of laws.
It may be helpful at this point to consider for a moment the
phenomenon of the transitory cause of action. When a court entertains
a suit on a foreign cause of action, as the New Mexico court presumably would have entertained the Headrick case, it undertakes a rather
unwelcome and extraordinary task. It adds to the congestion of its
typically overloaded calendars, to the burden of the local taxpayer,
and to the citizen's burden of jury service. It engages to ascertain and
apply the law of the foreign state-a task recognized by the highest
authority as an irksome one.170 It does all this in the interest of a civilized legal system, in order that the reasonable expectations of parties
will not be frustrated merely because redress in a particular court is
not available. 171 In theory, it applies its own procedural law only for
its own convenience, and because it is impracticable for it to indulge
to the full its desire to have the result conform to that which would
have been reached in the state of the transaction. Suppose that, in
such a situation, the court determines that it need not assume the burden; that there is no need to entertain the case in furtherance of the
objectives stated; that there is another court in which the action
might have been more appropriately brought, and that to bring it here
is an imposition on the court. Would it not be strange if the plaintiff,
on being sent away, were to have the right to take with him the law
which the court would have applied, not for his benefit, but in self"Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
' Compare Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19
Tulane L. Rev. 4, 165 (1944) ; Rest., Conflict of Laws, Introductory Note to c. 12 (1934).
It may do so under compulsion of the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. Art. IV,
§ 1. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 478 1954-1955

1955]

CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

479

defense? Why should a litigant have a vested interest in the practical
difficulties which his chosen forum would experience in extending its
hospitality? If it be suggested that, realistically, the advantages to be
found in the law of the forum are among the inducements offered to
attract out-of-state litigants, and therefore that the plaintiff should be
allowed to keep his quid pro quo, surely the answer is that in Section
1404 (a) Congress has declared a policy which prohibits a district court
from participating in such a bargain.
These reflections, of course, are directed to the interstate or international situation. It may conceivably be suggested in response that on
that level the loss of advantage in the law of the forum is a necessary
incident of unconditional dismissal, and properly so, since no paramount legislature has authorized the choice of forum; but that the
situation is different within the federal system, where Congress has
provided for transfer and has also designated more than one forum in
which the plaintiff has the "right" to sue. The suggestion assumes a
congressional purpose to give the plaintiff not only a choice of forums
but a right to the most favorable law offered by any one of them. I
find it difficult to believe that Congress consciously entertained such a
purpose in framing the venue statutes and followed it consistently
through the years while major changes took place in the law applied in
the federal courts. 7 ' What is more important, the most-favorable-law
privilege which plaintiffs did in fact enjoy was plainly taken from them
by the Supreme Court in the Gulf case, with the unmistakable implication that Congress intended no such extraordinary privilege. The
question now, therefore, is whether, in enacting Section 1404(a), Congress intended to give them, or restore to them, that favored position.
The only candid answer is that we do not know. The mere existence
of the venue statutes does not furnish an answer.173 The fact that the
" No significant changes in the venue scheme can be correlated, for example, with
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842), nor with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, nor with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). And the widest
range of choice was introduced into the general venue scheme not by Congress, but by
the Court. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, author of the Neirbo opinion, was the Court's first strong advocate of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
' Judge Learned Hand, who has attached the greatest importance to the venue privilege [Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329, 332 (C.A. 2d, 1950)], has said, referring

to the reviewability of transfer orders: "We do not believe ... that a suitor has any
legally protected interest in having his action tried in any particular federal court, except
in so far as the transfer may handicap his presentation of the case, or add to the costs
of trial." Magnetic Eng. & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F. 2d 866, 869 (C.A. 2d,
1950).
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section was "drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens" is some indication that the answer should be negative.
The Gulf case contained no recognition of the power of conditional
dismissal. Even if that power is recognized as part of the doctrine, it
would be difficult to justify exercising it in such a way as to secure to
the plaintiff the benefits of the inappropriate forum's statute of limitations in cases of the second class.
Up to now, however, the courts have exhibited a strong disposition
to protect the plaintiff against the bar of the statute upon transfer, even
in the second type of case. There are four cases which deal directly
with the effect of transfer on the applicable law.'7 All four relate to
the statute of limitations; all are of the type in which the action is
barred in the transferee forum at the time of filing; and all agree that
the action is not to be barred upon transfer. Two of the cases'7 5 proceed on the theory that transfer works no change in the applicable law,
although each relies to some extent on waiver or estoppel to insure the
result. In the other two, 7 6 the court made no decision as to the effect
of transfer, simply noting that the parties had taken conflicting positions on the question; but change of venue was granted in the one case
only upon stipulation of the parties that there should be no change in
the applicable statute of limitations, and was denied in the other when
that stipulation was not forthcoming. Thus the underlying theory of
these two cases is that a change of law as a result of transfer is at least
a substantial possibility. But the significant fact for present purposes
is that, whether by interpreting Section 1404(a) as entailing no change
of law, or by treating the defendant's motion for transfer as a waiver
or estoppel, or by exacting consent from the defendant as the price of
transfer, the courts in each case have sought to secure to the plaintiff
the benefit of the forum's statute. A similar tendency appears in the
language of decisions which do not deal directly with the problem. 7
'7Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 182 F. 2d 305 (CA. 10th, 1950); Greve v.
Gibraltar Enterprises, 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N.M., 1949); Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S.
Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1953); Curry v. States Marine Corp.,. 118 F. Supp. 234
(S.D. N.Y., 1954). The first of these was a diversity case; the others were based on
federal law.
' Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 182 F. 2d 305 (CA. 10th, 1950) ; Greve v.
Gibraltar Enterprises, 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N.M., 1949).

'"Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y., 1953); Curry v.
States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D., N.Y., 1954).
"' Under Section 1404(a) a case is not dismissed but merely transferred to the more
convenient forum; under forum non conveniens a case is dismissed and must be instituted
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Perhaps this tendency is to be explained, in part, by the rather general disposition to assume without qualification that the substitution
of transfer for dismissal was intended to obviate the loss of remedy
resulting from the statute of limitations.' Clearly, however, it reflects
the prevalent attitude of indulgence toward this particular kind of
forum-shopping.'

The question is: Does such a tendency presage

acceptance of the conclusion that transfer works no change in the
applicable law?
Any such development is likely to encounter trouble. With surprising frequency, the converse of the situation in these four cases occurs:
the action is barred in the state in which it is filed, but not (at the
time of filing) in that to which transfer is sought. Here it is the plaintiff who seeks transfer, and here the assumption always is that the
effect will be to bring into operation the statute of the transferee
state. 8 0 The right of the plaintiff to a transfer under Section 1404(a)
has not been finally determined. In many of the cases the question of
the effect of transfer on the statute of limitations is academic, since the
anew in the more convenient forum, carrying with it the inherent and jeopardous hazard
of being barred therein by the statute of limitations. The danger of having the action
barred in such a manner was one of the principal reasons for Mr. Justice Black's dissent
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. ..." Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp.
319, 322 (D. Del., 1949). "[O]nly a most unusual case would justify a transfer unless
on the same facts a dismissal could be sustained under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This would seem to be true except where the running of the Statute of Limitations might enter into the conclusion as to dismissal. The new transfer section, of course,
allows of no question as to Limitations." Brown v. Insurograph, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 328,
329 (D. Del., 1949). "No new process need be served when an action is transferred and
there is no question of the statute of limitations." Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F.
Supp. 45, 49 (S.D. N.Y., 1950). On the other hand, in Bruner v. Skibsaktieselskabet Hilda
Knudsen, 123 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Tex., 1954), the court assumed that the statute of the
transferee state applied.
l7 Only one case recognizes the difference between treating transfer as preserving the
efficacy of the original commencement of the action, and treating it as a transfer also of
the original forum's statute of limitations. "Dismissal often resulted, in leaving a plaintiff
without a remedy because of the running of the statute of limitations. No such harsh
result would flow from change of venue, at least where the statute is the same in both
forums." Aircraft Marine Products, Inc. v. Burndy Eng. Co., 96 F. Supp. 588, 593-94
(S.D. Calif., 1951) (italics supplied).
" True, [the plaintiff] may have been forum-shopping, but the law has not, particularly in the case of seamen and others in his category, frowned upon this." Curry v.
States Marine Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234, 235 (S.D. N.Y., 1954).
'McDaniel v. Drotman, 103 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.. Ky., 1952); Wilson v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co., 101 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Mo., 1951); Bolten v. General Motors Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. IIl., 1949); Quinn v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 199 F. 2d 416 (CA.
3d, 1952); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 F. 2d 640 (C.A. 7th, 1950).
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plaintiff has the alternative of filing anew in the other forum.' 8 However, the action may be commenced so near the expiration of the foreign limitation period, as in Riley v. Union Pacific R. Co.,' that refiling after dismissal is not an alternative. If, for the sake of securing
to the plaintiff a trial on the merits in situations of the Headrick type,
the courts should embrace the theory that the law of the state of original filing continues to govern after transfer, the logical consequence
will be to deny a trial on the merits to the plaintiff in situations of the
Riley type. Thus the anomalous result will be that the plaintiff who
has delayed filing his action until it has been barred in the normal
forum will be protected if he can file in a more hospitable state, while
the plaintiff who has filed within the time allowed by the normal
forum, but in one less appropriate, will be barred. Surely the safe and
impartial approach to the problem is to eschew the sentiments and
mechanisms which produce such a result, and to apply the statute of
limitations which should be applied on rational principles.
2. Matters relating to proof. A situation like that in Sampson v.
Channell 83 presents a similar problem. If we suppose that the defendant moves for transfer to the district court in Maine, making a persuasive case for transtr for convenience of parties and witnesses, there
will be, under the proposed solution, no change in the applicable law
after transfer, nothing else appearing. But if the defendant submits
that one of the consequences of transfer ought to be to deprive the
plaintiff of the advantage he sought in the Massachusetts rule on burden of proof, the court will be required to decide on what terms the
transfer shall be ordered with respect to that point. We may be reasonably sure that the defendant will make an issue of the point at this
stage only in critical situations. In the ordinary case, the burden of
going forward is of largely academic interest; it becomes crucial if no
evidence is available on the issue. In the ordinary case, the burden of
persuasion is a verbal formula, a ritual part of the charge to the jury;
it becomes crucial if the minds of the jury are in equilibrium.',, Let us
suppose, therefore, that the motion is made in a case in which both
I In Berk v. Willys-Overland Motors, 107 F. Supp. 643 (D. Del., 1952), the plaintiff's
motion for transfer was denied partly on the ground that no statute of limitations in the
transferee state would bar his action there.
- 177 F. 2d 673 (C.A. 7th, 1949) [plaintiff's motion for transfer under Section 1406(a)
denied because no impropriety in the venue; no' motion under Section 1404(a)].
110 F. 2d 754 (C.A. 1st, 1940), supra Part III.
m Morgan, Choice of Law Govbrning Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 185 (1944).
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parties know that no evidence whatever is available on the issue of
contributory negligence. If the burden of going forward is placed on
the plaintiff, he will lose. If it is placed on the defendant, he will lose. 85
How is the district court to deal with the allocation of the burden in
connection with its ruling on the motion to transfer?
Under the proposed solution, we postulate that the court is freed, for
this purpose, from any obligation to follow the conflict-of-laws rules
of Massachusetts. 6 If the court undertakes to solve the problem on
general conflict-of-laws principles it will find in the authorities: (1)
an inert orthodoxy, according to which such matters as burden of
proof are governed by the law of the forum; 87 (2) a vigorous and
critical dissent:
It is time to abandon both the notion and the expression that matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum. It should be frankly stated that (1)
the law of the locus is to be applied to all matters of substance except where its
application will violate the public policy of the forum; and (2) the law of the
locus is to be applied to all such matters of procedure as are likely to have a
material influence upon the outcome of litigation except where (a) its application
will violate the public policy of the forum or (b) weighty practical considerations
demand the application of the law of the forum.' 88

Only one result is possible here, no matter whidh view the court
accepts. A preference for the law of the forum, or for the law of the
state of the transaction, as governing such a matter as burden of proof
is meaningful only if the case is to be tried in a state other than that of
the transaction. Here the two are the same. Both rules contain references to the law of the forum. A situation like the one under consideration raises, perhaps for the first time, the question: Which forum?
Plainly, the answer must be: the forum in which the case is to be tried,
'Either
way, the outcome will not be based "on the merits"; so that a satisfaction
attainable in the case of the statute of limitations is not attainable here.
'The
problem cannot, of course, be solved by an original, independent policy determination as to which party should bear the burden. Such matters are beyond the competence of the federal courts in diversity cases. The claim advanced in this paper is only
that the federal courts must be free, at least in ordering transfers under Section 1404(a),
to determine what state law is applicable on transfer; not that they may construct independent principles of municipal law.
Except where "the remedial and substantive portions of the foreign law are so bound
together that the application of the usual procedural rule of the forum would seriously
alter the effect of the operative facts under the law of the appropriate foreign state."
Rest., Conflict of Laws § 595 (1934); compare ibid., § 385; Goodrich, Handbook on the
Conflict of Laws § 84 (3d ed., 1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 137 (2d
ed., 1951).
'IMorgan, op. cit. supra note 184, at 195. See also Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, c. VI (1949).
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as distinguished from the one in which it is filed; for the considerations
of convenience and practicability which alone justify rejection of the
foreign rule on burden of proof'8 9 have to do with trial, not with
190
filing.
Both the orthodox position and the dissent rest on the same foundation: certain portions of the law which is acknowledged as governing
the transaction are rejected because the values attained by applying
them are outweighed by the inconvenience which their application
would entail. Certain other portions may be rejected because they conflict with a legitimate policy of the forum. The difference between the
two positions is that the foundation of the orthodox position is obscured by encrustations of doctrine according to which "inconvenience"
has been conventionalized to mean anything that can be described as
procedural, or relating to the remedy, whereas the critics would scrape
away the encrustations and bring the original foundation into view. A
district court, looking for guidance to enlightened principles of conflict of laws, would recognize, first, that no real question of inconvenience or of conflict with local policy is involved in applying a foreign
rule on burden of proof in the critical situations in which that rule
operates. Above all, however, it would recognize that, with respect to
questions pertaining to conduct of the trial after transfer, considerations of convenience have nothing whatever to do with the court from
which the case is transferred, and can never justify the invocation of
that court's law. That court simply drops out of consideration as a
source of the lex fori except with respect to proceedings prior to transfer.' 9 ' If the transfer is to the state whose substantive law governs,
'Rest.,
Conflict of Laws, Introductory Note to c. 12 (1934) ; ibid., S 595, Comment a.
A similar point might be made with respect to the statute of limitations, but for the fact
that application of the foreign statute so obviously has nothing to do with convenience
and practicability in trial processes.
"Note that, according to Professor Morgan's analysis, the second tentative solution
(no change in the applicable law results from transfer) states an absurdity: because the
original forum would have found it burdensomely inconvenient to apply the rule of the
state of the transaction, the transferee court in the state of the transaction is saddled with
the equally burdensome task of applying the rule of a foreign state, having no connection
with either the transaction or the trial, instead of its own rule, which is by hypothesis
preferable.
'The question as to what law governs proceedings after transfer should be kept distinct from the question as to the status in the transferee court of proceedings in the case
prior to transfer. With respect to the latter question, it seems safe enough to borrow from
the precedents on change of venue within a state the concept that "when an action is
transferred, it remains what it was; all further proceedings in it are merely referred to
another tribunal, leaving untouched whatever has been already done." Magnetic Eng. &
Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F. 2d 866, 868 (CA. 2d, 1950). Yet there are expressions
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clearly the rule of that state on burden of proof should also apply. If
the transfer is to a third state, there is room for a choice between the
law of that state and the law of the transaction; but on rational principles, no court would ever hold applicable after transfer any rule of the
state of filing merely because such a rule is part of the "procedural law
of the forum." If any such rule is ever to apply after transfer, it must
12
be on the basis of some other consideration. 0
in the cases indicating the belief that transfer may validate or invalidate prior steps in
the proceedings.
McKeen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 111 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Mo., 1953), assumes that
transfer will obviate objections to the capacity of a foreign personal representative to
maintain the action in the original forum. Mazinski v. Dight, 99 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Pa.,
1951), suggests but does not discuss a similar problem.
Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 116 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. N.C., 1953), is open to misinterpretation as indicating that the law of the transferee state may invalidate a joinder
of parties which was proper under the law of the state of filing. The law of South Carolina, where the action was filed, permitted joinder of the defendant's liability insurer in
actions against common carriers; the law of North Carolina expressly prohibited such
joinder. After transfer the district court in North Carolina dismissed the insurance companies in reliance on North Carolina law; but it is clear that under South Carolina conffict-of-laws rules the same result would have been proper in the absence of transfer, the
accident having occurred in North Carolina. See Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110 F.
Supp. 811 (E.D. S.C., 1953). The case was settled before any appellate court considered
the several interesting problems involved. Letter dated March 12, 1954, from Turner Clayton, Esq., of Leppard & Leppard, Chesterfield, S.C., in the University of Chicago Law
School Library,
Lehman v. Napier, 101 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. Iowa, 1951), assumes that service on a partnership, sued in its common name in Iowa where such procedure is proper, may be invalidated by transfer to Illinois, where the entity concept for partnerships is rejected. There
is some doubt as to whether the Iowa service on a partner in the Illinois firm gave the
Iowa court jurisdiction in the circumstances, but it is not necessary to resolve this questioi for present purposes. The court was satisfied that the requirements of Iowa law,
and presumably of due process, had been met; its doubts as to the efficacy of the service
after transfer to Illinois must therefore stem from a belief that the reference in Rule 17(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the "law of the state in which the district
court is held" is a reference to the law of the transferee state. After transfer, the case was
disposed of on this theory. The action was regarded as one against the partner who had
been served, individually; being unable to amend for the purpose of naming the other
partners as defendants, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed. Letter dated March 1, 1954,
from P. S. Johnson, Esq., of Brundage & Short, Chicago, in the University of Chicago
Law School Library.
On the other hand, Wilson v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 101 F. Supp. 56 (W.D.
Mo., 1951), treats the reference in Rule 4 (f) to the "territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held" as a reference to the state of original filing. Holding that
a district court has no power to transfer an action in which no valid service has been
had on the defendant, the court adds that service can be perfected after removal only by
resort to the process of the court to which the action is removed. Cf. Rhodes v. Barnett,
117 F. Supp. 312, 318 (S.D. N.Y., 1953).
'The
statute of limitations may present a somewhat different problem. Although I am
deeply skeptical of such notions, we may concede for present purposes that a state may
express through such statutes (1) a policy against the prosecution in its courts of claims
that are stale by its standards, though still fresh by the law of their origin; (2) a policy
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Conceivably, the court might seek some such other consideration in
the precedents dealing with forum non conveniens and with injunctions
against the oppressive exportation of litigation, on the theory that, unless the advantage sought in the law of the forum can be characterized
as inequitable, the plaintiff has some sort of right to retain it which
ought not to be impaired merely by the operation of rational principles
of conflict of laws. Of course, the term "right" begs the question.
There may be such a right if the plaintiff can file his action in the state
court and maintain it there; but if the action is filed in, or removable
to, a federal court, and is transferable to a district in another state, the
existence of the right depends on what law will be applied after transfer; and the applicable law cannot be determined by assuming the
right. What is really meant by this assertive talk of "right," of course,
is that a certain amount of forum-shopping is tolerated by our mores,
and that tactical successes scored by the plaintiff, in the jockeying between the parties for position, should not be taken away from him
unless they can be authoritatively stigmatized as unfair. It is necessary,
therefore, to consult the precedents as to the status of this type of
advantage.
The question is whether a plaintiff's resort to a foreign forum, to
take advantage of a difference of law in the general area of rules relating to the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, burden of proof,
presumptions, etc., has been regarded as such an evasion of the appropriately applicable law as to warrant the issuance of an injunction. On
this question the authorities are inconclusive to about the same degree
as on the similar question respecting the statute of limitations. The
strongest support for regarding such forum-shopping as unfair is furnished by the case of Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.,9 3 in

which the Alabama court enjoined a resident from suing in Georgia for
injuries suffered in a grade-crossing accident in Alabama, where Alabama followed the stop, look and listen rule and Georgia would leave
which frowns on the diminution, by any means, of the time it allows a plaintiff to pursue
his claim. The first of these can hardly have any application to a case transferred out of
the state. As for the second, it seems that such a policy could be justified only if the state
has such a relationship with the transaction or with the parties as to warrant the concern
it thus displays for plaintiffs. The mere fact of trial in its courts ought not to be enough.
Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). A fortiori, the fact that the action is
merely filed, and not tried, in its courts should not be enough. But, given a sufficient
interest of the filing state, a choice between that state's policy and the law of the transaction might become necessary. It is peculiarly appropriate for such a choice to be made
by the federal courts.
200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917).
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the question of contributory negligence to the jury. The court characterized its rule as one of substantive law, and did not purport to declare
inequitable any advantages which might flow merely from differences
of procedure in the foreign forum. 19 4 Some commentators, however,
have stated the rule without such a limitation:
[ilt will be sufficient to entitle a citizen of the state to injunction preventing another citizen thereof from prosecuting an action against the former in the courts
of another state to show that the purpose or necessary effect of such action is to
obtain an advantage to which the plaintiff therein is not entitled in the domicile of
the parties .... 195

The Weaver case was criticized by Dean Pound' 9 6 and by another
contemporary commentator. 9 7 The Tennessee court refused relief in
similar circumstances. 9 New York has refused to enjoin a citizen from
suing another in Mississippi where the motive was to take advantage
of a more liberal rule on the admissibility of transactions with deceased
persons. 9 In short, there is sharp disagreement over the answer to
the specific question, not to mention the standards by which such an
advantage is to be judged. Once again, if a general impression may be
hazarded, it is that, except where a plain and legitimate policy of the
home state is involved, the general attitude is that advantages which a
plaintiff may secure by filing in a strange forum are fair game.2 0
It is clear that, if the problem with respect to the statute of limitations and matters relating to proof is approached in terms of conflict'" See also Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Persons To Compel
the Doing of Acts outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 494, 497
(1930); Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922).
'When Transitory Causes of Action May Not Be Prosecuted in a Foreign State or
Country, 59 A.S.R. 869, 880 (1898) ; see also ibid., at 884.
'The Progress of the Law, 1918-19: Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 425 et seq. (1920).
...
Injunctions to Restrain Foreign Proceedings, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 92, 94 (1919): "The
state cannot properly be said to have a vital interest in having litigation between its
citizens determined solely by the common law of the state."
'American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S.W. 1117 (1946).

"Edgell v. Clarke, 45 N.Y. Supp. 979 (App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1897). Cf. the dictum
in the Weaver case [200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917)], to the effect that Alabama would
enjoin suit in Georgia if the latter state disqualified the only witness by whom a defense
could be established.
'See generally the cases collected in the following annotations: 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 267
(1910); 32 A.L.R. 6, 67 et seq. (1924); 69 A.L.R. 591 (1930). See also Wabash Ry.
Co. v. Lindsey, 269 Ill. App. 152 (1933) (fact that verdict may be based on concurrence
of nine jurors in foreign state, as opposed to requirement of unanimity in home forum,
does not warrant injunction); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1217, 1244 (1930).
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of-laws principles, the results will tend to be quite different from those
that will be reached if it is approached in terms of "inequitable" advantage.The question then is: How are the federal courts to choose
between the two techniques? At first blush, it may seem that, since the
whole argument (that a change of venue may entail a change in the
applicable law) is predicated on the origin of Section 1404(a) in the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, no change should operate to deprive
the plaintiff of an advantage unless it can be shown that, under that
doctrine, the advantage was a ground for denying access to the forum.
A major objection to this position is that much of the policy embodied
in the doctrine of forum non conveniens is reflected simply in the results of its application, rather than in express determinations that the
invocation of some rule of law of the forum would lead to inequitable
advantage. In any case in which a court unconditionally dismisses an
action on the basis of the doctrine, although it may consider only
factors bearing on the convenience of parties and witnesses, without
reference to differences of law, the result is that the plaintiff is deprived of any benefit he might have found in the law of the forum. In
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,201 the libelant's
motive for invoking the jurisdiction of the American court was a supposed difference in law. The Court did not even determine whether the
supposed difference actually existed, much less whether the advantage
which the libelant sought therein was inequitable. The result of the
dismissal, however, was to deprive the plaintiff of the advantage if it
existed; and the decision must mean not only that the libelant was not
entitled to the facilities of an American court, but also that, in the
light of all the facts that were shown concerning the parties and the
transaction, the libelant had no entitlement to any rule of law which
the American court might distinctively apply. This means that failure
to find in the lore of forum non conveniens an express denunciation of
a legal advantage as inequitable is inconclusive: the courts may have
considered it inequitable without having had occasion to say so. More
significantly, it means that it is probably erroneous to draw so sharp a
line between the conflict-of-laws approach to the problem and the
forum non conveniens approach, and to state the latter in terms of "inequitable advantage." Is not a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds itself a choice of law on conflict-of-laws principles? May we
not read the Canada Malting case as holding that, where the only cir= 285 U.S. 413, 418 (1932).
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cumstance relating the parties or the transaction to the United States
was the inadvertent presence of the ships in American waters at the
moment of collision, the connection with this country was too slight to
justify the application of any of its laws? The fact that the choice is
negative only does not make it any the less a choice.
The language of inequitable advantage comes, naturally enough,
from the injunction cases. On the interstate level, in the absence of a
paramount authority to determine questions relating to place of trial
and choice of law, the courts dealt with those problems as best they
could. In the doctrine of forum non conveniens the foreign court had a
handy device for dealing-partially, but effectively so far as it was concerned-with both problems; it had only to decline to act. The home
forum, on the other hand, could exercise a degree of control over such
matters only by taking preventive action. For historical and doctrinal
reasons relating to the exercise of equity powers, the instrument of intervention-the injunction-was available only when a very strong
case could be made. 0 2 In addition, such action involved considerations
of deference to the foreign court, and the chancellor's ancient fear of
making himself ridiculous by the issuance of ineffectual orders. Consequently, the courts did not speak of choice of law, but used stronger
terms; and they never issued injunctions except when they were very
strongly convinced that only the local law, and not that of the foreign
forum, was properly applicable. If opinions could reasonably differ,
and especially if the anticipated action by the foreign court was in
line with accepted conflict-of-laws ideas-as, for example, if the anticipated ruling related to procedural matters, traditionally governed by
the law of the forum-ordinarily no injunction issued. But whenever
one did issue on the ground of avoidance of local law or policy, the
court was making, within the limits of its power, a choice of law. Its
action could mean nothing else.
This significance of the injunction against prosecuting claims abroad
is interestingly reflected in the language of Turner, L. J., quoted by
Dean Pound in his criticism of the American injunction cases: 103
If we were to maintain this injunction we should, as it seems to me, be assuming a jurisdiction. in this Court to prescribe the Courts in which parties should
bring their suits, without there being anything to affect the consciences of the
parties, upon the simple ground that the suits were such as; in the opinion of this
Court, ought not to be maintained, and thus we should be bringing under the de'See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 473-74 (1908).
'The Progress of the Law, 1918-19:' Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 428 n. 42 (1920).

HeinOnline -- 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489 1954-1955

490

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 22

cision of this Court the question whether suits in other Courts could be maintained-a question which it is for those Courts, and not for this Court, to decide.
To assume such a jurisdiction would, I think, be to exercise a legislative, and not
20 4
merely-a judicial power.

Note that His Lordship did not conceive of the foreign court's invocation of forum non conveniens as a usurpation of legislative power. He
declined, however, to use the powers of equity to fill the gap where
venue rules would be if there were an international power to prescribe
those rules; and by the same token, he declined to use those powers in
an attempt to resolve conflicting attitudes as to the appropriate law, as
a sovereign lawmaker might do. We are forced to agree that there is
nothing unconscionable about the plaintiff's resort to a court which is
open to him, even though he thereby gains some legal advantage. When
a court does enjoin prosecution of a claim abroad it is in fact determining the proper venue and the applicable law within the limits of its
ability to do so, and is not dealing with matters of equity or conscience
at all, except insofar as venue and choice-of-law rules subsume such
matters. That is why it is so difficult to find in the cases any standard
whereby the inequitable character of an advantage so obtained is to be
judged.
If this interpretation is sound, it offers a powerful reason for rejecting the suggestion that the federal courts might decide questions relating to the effect of transfer by reference to the notion of inequitable
advantage as developed in the forum non conveniens and injunction
cases. Let it be emphasized once again that in the federal courts we
have a unitary system; 215 there is no defect of power to provide a com-

plete solution to these problems. In Section 1404 (a) Congress has provided the effective means for dealing with place of trial, supplanting
the awkward expedient of forum non conveniens. In that section it has
also, I believe, empowered the federal courts, as a necessary incident
of determining the place of trial, to deal completely and effectively
with choice of law. There is no room, in such a system and with such
implementing legislation, for makeshifts and partial solutions, nor for
I Pennell v. Roy, 3 De G. M. & G. 126, 139, 43 Eng. Rep. 50, 55-56 (1853).
'Prior to the enactment of Section 1404(a), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, reversing the decision of a district court in Texas which enjoined the prosecution of an action in a district court in Delaware, said: "State courts have enjoined
parties from litigating in another state in order to evade the laws of the first state;
but federal district courts are within a single judicial system in which the error of one
may be corrected by the ordinary processes of appeal to the United States Supreme
Court." Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 167 F. 2d 155, 156 (CA. 5th,
1948).
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the slogans which were invented to justify them. In the interstate situation, where there is no supreme authority to determine the appropriate
forum or the properly applicable law, defendants may seek to shelter
themselves from suit except in favorable forums, and plaintiffs may
counter by maneuvering actions into forums favorable to them; and
who is to say that success on either hand is inequitable or unconscionable? Courts may invoke the language of chancery to justify their
halting efforts to deal with a problem which they have no power to deal
with directly and comprehensively; but when they are given full power
to deal with the problem, it would be absurd to construct, from the
discarded pieces of the makeshift apparatus, a "right" of the plaintiff
to the law of a forum which he could not formerly have been prevented
from choosing. The question always has been: Where should the case
be tried, and what law should govern? Where there is power to give a
direct answer, a direct answer should be given. An argument which
deduces from the "right" of the plaintiff to file suit in a particular
forum a right to retain the advantages offered by that forum's law can
find support only in a sentimental bias for plaintiffs in the struggle between the parties for position. Aside from the fact that such a bias is
proscribed by Section 1404(a), it is strangely out of place in the context of recent developments which greatly improve the tactical position
of plaintiffs. 0 6 The only unbiased solution is to be found in rational
principles of conflict of Jaws, just as the solution concerning the geographical convenience of the place of trial is found in the exercise of a
just discretion."'°
3. Interpleader.If we consider how Section 1404(a) will operate in
"For a summary which is by no means complete, see Foster, Place of Trial in Civil
Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1220 et seq. (1930). Among the more recent developments which might be added, two which have special relevance are: (1) the 1948 revision of the general venue statute as it relates to corporations, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c)
(1950); and (2) Section 1406(a), which apparently enables a plaintiff, who cannot
serve process in a district where venue is proper, to sue where he can get service, whereupon the case may be transferred to the proper venue for trial.
'In Reynolds v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 185 F. 2d 27 (C.A. 7th, 1950), an action
arising out of a grade-crossing collision in Indiana had been transferred from Illinois
to Indiana. The court of appeals said: "Since federal jurisdiction in this case depends
on diversity of citizenship, we must decide it in accordance with the law of Indiana.
Under that law, "plaintiff as a prerequisite to recovery is required to show that at the
time and place of the accident he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his
own safety, or in other words, that he was free from negligence which contributed to
cause the accident." The implication that the law of the transferee state applies after
transfer is weak, since there is nothing to indicate that the Illinois conflict-of-laws rule
would not similarly have pointed to Indiana law.
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statutory interpleader cases,2 °s we shall put all theories as to the effect
of transfer upon the applicable law to a severe test. In Griffin v. McCoach, 2°9 the administrator of a deceased citizen of Texas sued in a
district court in that state to recover the proceeds of a New York contract of insurance on the life of the decedent. Because of the claims of
the beneficiaries and their assignees, the insurance company countered
with a bill of interpleader, making these adverse claimants parties.
Under the law of Texas, the holder of a life insurance policy could recover only if he had an insurable interest; and the assignees of the
beneficiaries here had no interest in the life of the deceased. The Texas
rule had been elevated by the courts of that state to the level of a
public policy which prohibited recovery, at least where the deceased
was a citizen of Texas, even though the contract of insurance might be
valid according to a foreign law which would otherwise govern. The
Supreme Court's decision was that the district court in Texas must follow the conflict-of-laws rules of that state, so long as they do not
operate unconstitutionally, and that there was nothing unconstitutional
in the application of the Texas policy to this New York contract. The
result was that the administrator recovered the share of the assignees
in the proceeds. 1 0
The decision has been roundly criticized.21 ' The circumstance which
has stimulated the sharpest criticism is the peculiarly fortuitous effect
of the place of trial on the result: the administrator having seized the
initiative by suing in Texas, the company responded by filing its bill
0s28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1335, 1397 (1950).

-313 U.S. 498 (1941), rev'g Griffin v. McCoach, 116 F. 2d 261 (C.A. 5th, 1941).
"1Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. 2d 550 (C.A. 5th, 1941); cert. denied, 316 U.S. 683
(1942).
'Professor Crosskey's criticism [2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 930 et seq. (1953)] is based ultimately on his theory of the
supremacy of the federal courts, which rejects the Erie decision; but he notes that
Griffin does not necessarily result from Erie, nor even from Klaxon. Professor Cook's
position was that Erie, which he did not reject, should not have been extended to
conflict-of-laws rules; he also recognized that the interpleader problem was a special
case. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, c. V (1949). Judge
Clark, no enthusiast for the Erie doctrine, especially regretted the extension of the
doctrine to questions of conflict of laws, and used Griffin to illustrate his point. Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
Yale L. 3. 267, 285 et seq. (1946). Professor Hart, who opposes the extension of Erie
to conflict-of-laws rules [Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Col.
L. Rev. 489 (1954)], appears to agree with Professor Freund [Freund, Chief Justice
Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1236 n. 62 (1946)], that the
interpleader case may be one for independent federal choice of law even if Klaxon is
accepted. Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 636 (1953).
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of interpleader in the same court; if the assignees had sued first, and
in New York, the company presumably would have responded similarly there, and the result would have been in their favor. It is not even
the initiative of the adverse claimants, but the action taken by the company-a presumably disinterested stakeholder-which is determinative; for, of course, the company could have instituted its bill in either
district, in the absence of actions filed by the claimants, or notwithstanding them. 12 Section 1404(a) is certain to revive and strengthen
discontent with such a situation. When there is no help for it, we perforce accept the fact that the law governing the rights of the adverse
claimants among themselves is determined by the heedless, or biased,
or possibly collusive choice of the forum by a third person, having no
interest in the place of trial proper nor in the result. What shall we say,
however, now that Congress has provided that any civil action may be
transferred to any other district in which it might have been brought,
for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of
justice?
On the premise that the law of the transferee forum applies after
transfer, Texas policy would be defeated by transfer to New York,
despite intimations that in the eyes of the Texas courts the policy is
one of safeguarding the lives of Texas citizens. 213 If the action is filed
in New York and transferred to Texas, the consequent submission to
that state's "universal cynic fear1 214 would be harder to suffer than

the well-nigh insufferable submission to it in the actual case.
On the premise that transfer has no effect on the applicable law,
Texas policy would continue to rule the case after transfer to New
York, despite Professor Cook's argument that that policy is, or can
reasonably be, only one of refusing the aid of the courts of Texas in
the enforcement of the contract. 15 Such a result would mean that
Texas policy closes the doors not only of federal courts in Texas but
also of federal courts in New York; and this in the face of the fact that
the assignees not only did not seek the Texas forum, but by hypothesis
have actually succeeded in showing that that forum is inappropriate.
On the other hand, if the action is begun in New York and transferred
-62

Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. S 1335 (1950); 62 Stat. 936 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1397 (1950).
Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. 2d 550, 551 (C.A. 5th, 1941).
" Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1911).

'Cook, op. cit. supra note 211, at 129-30. See also Morgan, The Choice of Law
Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 157 n. 8 (1944).
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to Texas, this premise yields a result which frustrates the minimum
Texas policy, if we accept and apply the principle of Griffin v. McCoach and Angel v. Bullington,216 that such state policies extend to the
federal courts sitting in the state.
The third tentative solution is helpless in this situation. The formula offered by that solution is: Look to the rule of the state of filing on
forum non conveniens; if under that rule the state court would dismiss,
the law of the transferee state will govern; if not, the law of the state
of original filing continues to control. But it may safely be said that no
state would dismiss, on grounds of forum non conveniens, an action
such as might be brought in either of the two states involved by either
of the adverse claimants.2 17 In the end, therefore, the third approach
produces the same results as the second: continued application of the
law of the state of filing. The basic difficulty, however, is that the
desire for scrupulous conformity to the result which the state court
would reach is completely incongruous in the interpleader situation. As
Professor Crosskey has pointed out,"'5 the ideal of conformity to the
state result is illusory, because the interpleader action could not, apart
from unforeseeable accident, be maintained in a state court at all. But
the matter may be put more strongly: the statutory interpleader
scheme unmistakably proclaims a deliberate congressional purpose to
bring about a result different from that which would be reached in the
courts of the states. The purpose was to avoid results like that in New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy,21 9 in which the insurance company suf-

fered double liability in consequence of successful actions by adverse
claimants in the courts of Pennsylvania and California, respectively.
But for the interpleader act, the administrator in the Griffin case would
presumably have recovered in Texas; and the assignees would also have
recovered in New York. Nothing in federal law requires conformity to
that total result; on the contrary, the interpleader act recognizes the
evil and invokes national power to uproot it. Such a result would have
been possible for two reasons: (1) lack of power in the state court to
-6330 U.S. 183 (1947).
2
Of course, a state normally lacks power to provide relief by interpleader when one
of the claimants is a nonresident; so the state law on the application of forum non
conveniens to such an action is likely to be hard to find. But the doctrine would hardly
be applied to any procedural device for the enforcement of a contract claim against an
insurance company doing business in the state, as against the adverse claim of a nonresident.

'2

Crosskey, op. cit. supra note 211, at 931.
241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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bind the nonresident claimant, stemming from limitations on the reach
of its process; and (2) the difference between the law of New York and
that of Texas. 2 0 No one will argue with the obvious proposition that
Congress intended to remove the first condition by making nationwide
process available. One would have supposed that Congress might have
intended, while it was about it, to deal with the problem comprehensively, and to enable the federal courts to determine also the law which
should govern the rights of the claimants. But Griffin v. McCoach tells
us that this was not the case; Congress did no more than the minimum
which was required to avoid double liability, and was content to leave
the applicable law to be determined by the chances of venue. 221 To
many, this has seemed an unsatisfactory interpretation. Now, Congress
has acted again, and has empowered the federal courts to change the
venue for convenience and in the interest of justice. The courts now
have complete power to deal with the problem comprehensively, from
the standpoint of the reach of process and from the standpoint of the
governing law as well. Now that the power exists, can there be any
further excuse for failing to use it in the most intelligent and effective
manner?
Under the solution proposed in this paper, an important question is
whether the federal court's independent choice of the governing law is
to be made on conflict-of-laws principles or in terms of the language of
"inequitable advantage" drawn from forum non conveniens precedents.
The answer in this case is clear. Since the forum is chosen by the
stakeholder, who is disinterested so far as the rights of the claimants
as between themselves are concerned, the concept of a "venue privilege" as giving a preferred position to one of the adversaries loses
whatever meaning it may have in other contexts. There can be no possible basis for determining that one claimant has a better right to the
'In the generalized case, double liability could result without a difference of law, as
where there is a failure of proof in one state. But the difference in law makes double
liability inevitable if the facts are fully proved.
'This
is a somewhat inaccurate way of putting it; but the mode of expression serves
to emphasize the incongruity of the Court's position. Since the Interpleader Act [49
Stat. 1096 (1936)] was passed before the Erie case was decided, Congress presumably
contemplated that questions of general jurisprudence would be determined according to
federal common law. Perhaps it was necessary to hold that this congressional intention
must yield to the supervening logic of the Erie case, for the sake of consistency in
establishing the states as the sources of municipal law. But when the Court went farther,
and deprived the federal courts of the power to determine which" state law should apply,
it disabled them to deal with the second of the two conditions which gave rise to the
act, and thus frustrated what amounted to a comprehensive congressional plan for
dealing with both conditions.
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law of Texas than his opponent has to the law of New York-except
in terms of conflict-of-laws principles. The remaining question, with
which we need not be concerned, is what answer would result from the
application of such principles. It is necessary here only to observe that
the question is whether Texas policy must yield to the law of New
York, which concededly is the proper law apart from the policy question. Nothing would be more appropriate than to have that question
resolved by the federal courts.
Before Section 1404(a) was enacted, Professor Braucher foresaw
that it would force the federal courts to make an independent choice
of law in the interpleader case:
A more sympathetic interpretation of the proposed statute would start with
recognition that one of the legitimate objectives of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to avoid the need to "untangle problems in conflift of laws." Then, when
other factors pointed to the propriety of a transfer, it would be frankly recognized
that "the interest of justice" should be determined by federal standards, which
would include an independent judgment concerning the propriety of defeating one

state's policy and applying another's .... [T]he federal courts might be established
as arbiters of conflicting state interests to an extent that would do much to bring
222
order out of present chaos in the field of conflict of laws.

Essentially, the Supreme Court's position in the Griffin case is one of
aloof detachment: if it so happens, by the choice of one party or another, that the case arises in Texas, the Court will not prevent the
application of Texas law; or, if it happens to arise in New York, the
Court will not prevent the application of New York law. It will not
say affirmatively which should govern. Such an attitude can hardly
survive the impact of Section 1404(a), which makes the federal court
itself the final arbiter of the choice of forum. The question which the
Constitution does not answer as between the two systems of state
courts must be answered when an order of a federal court itself is
among the conditions of the problem. Section 1404(a) will inevitably
force a reconsideration of Griffin v. McCoach, with the probable result
Z'Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 937 (1947).
However, Professor Braucher seems to have assumed that transfer necessarily entails
the application of the transferee state's law, so that the court's determination must be
implemented solely by a decision to transfer or not: "Thus, in our hypothetical case,
the federal court might properly decide that the connection of New York with the
insurance policy in dispute made the application of New York law at least as appropriate as that of Texas law, and hence that the frustration of Texas law was an insuffident reason for refusing to transfer." Ibid. (italics supplied). This explains the otherwise

puzzling reference to avoiding conflict-of-laws problems. Of course, the solution proposed
in this paper will require federal courts to enlarge their contribution to the development
of conflict-of-laws principles.
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that, at least in connection with transfers, the federal courts will determine the applicable law for themselves. Such a development will
not necessarily, of itself, demonstrate the soundness of the general solution advanced in this paper; it could take the form simply of a modification of the Griffin case, leaving the doctrine of Klaxon"2 3 intact for
cases other than interpleader. But the impregnable line of "conformity" will have been breached, and the necessity for similar independence in less dramatic situations will show itself in due course.
4. Change of venue and full faith and credit. The Gulf decision announced a national policy confirming and approving the discretionary
power of a district court to decline jurisdiction of an action which
might more appropriately be brought elsewhere. Section 1404(a) gave
this policy congressional sanction while moderating its effect through
the substitution of transfer for dismissal. During the preceding decade,
the Supreme Court had been diligently building a policy directed to
uniformity of result as between the courts of a state and the federal
courts within the state. Full and effective administration of the new
policy of flexibility with respect to the place of trial involves a degree
of conflict with the older policy; hence the problems which we have
been discussing. The thesis of this paper is that those problems
should be resolved in favor of full and effective administration of the
new policy, with the result that there must be some sacrifice of the
ideal of uniformity within the state. Another characteristic of the setting into which the new policy has been injected is the ideal of uniformity of result from state to state, adumbrated in the full faith and
credit clause, and recently given new recognition by the Supreme
Court. This ideal has been expressed in the specific form of an obligation resting upon the courts of a state, and extending to the federal
courts therein, to entertain certain foreign statutory causes of action
notwithstanding the conviction that the case might be more appropriately brought elsewhere. When all of these elements are brought
together in a single case, conflicts are bound to arise, and the situation
will provide a further critical test for any theory as to the effect of
transfer on the law to be applied.
In October 1947, a United Air Lines plane crashed at Bryce Canyon,
Utah, bringing death to John Louis Nelson, of Chicago. His executor,
a Chicago bank, sued in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (the defendant being a Delaware corpoKlaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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ration with its principal office in Chicago), claiming damages under
the Utah wrongful death statute. An Illinois statute provided
no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to recover damages
for a death occurring outside of the State where a right of action for such death
and service of process
exists under the laws of the place where such death occurred224
in such suit may be had upon the defendant in such place.
...that

United had registered process agents in Utah. The district court held
that the Illinois statute deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeals
affirmed.22 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that its earlier decision in Hughes v. Fetter22 6 was indistinguishable, 227 and that the full
faith and credit clause invalidated the Illinois statute. By force of the
Constitution, Illinois courts must entertain the action, and so, by force
of the implementing statute 228 and the Erie doctrine, must the federal
courts in Illinois.
Now suppose that, upon remand to the district court, the defendant moves under Section 1404(a) for transfer to the district court in
Utah. 229 The problem has many facets, but the one most pertinent
to the present discussion has to do with the implications of this operation of the full faith and credit clause for the question of the law
to be applied after transfer. As we have seen, arguments that the
plaintiff should be permitted to retain advantages found in the law of
the chosen forum, predicated on his "right" to sue in that forum, ordinarily break down because the supposed right turns out to be a mere
self-serving assumption. Here, however, the plaintiff can cite the Supreme Court's decision in support of the proposition that he has a
constitutional right to an Illinois forum. If we assume that the action
is subject to transfer, 8 0 does this mean that the Utah district court
-4Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 70, §2.
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F. 2d 493 (CA. 7th, 1951).
2341 U.S. 609 (1951).

'First National Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
2'828 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1950).

In fact, a motion for transfer had been made on the original appearance of the case
in the district court. It was made by the plaintiff, in reliance on Section 1406(a) ; it was
denied in part because that section applies only where venue is wrongly laid (there being
nothing wrong with the venue in this action), but primarily because lack of power to
transfer was a consequence of the court's holding that it had no jurisdiction. First
National'Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F. 2d 493, 496 (C.A. 7th, 1951).
After the Supreme Court's decision, no motion for transfer was made; the case was
settled. Letter dated August 20, 1954, from Charles M. Rush, Esq., of Kirkland, Fleming,
Green, Martin & Ellis, Chicago, in the University of Chicago Law School Library.
oConceivably, this collision of policies might be avoided by a decision that such a
case is not transferable. Thig could take the form of a holding that the case would not
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must apply the law which would have been applied by the district
court in Illinois? That would be an absurdly incongruous result. The
very basis of the United Air Lines decision is "the strong unifying
principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward
maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states....
Can a national policy designed to make the result in Illinois conform as nearly
as may be to that which would be reached in Utah become an instrument for changing the result which Utah would reach, even when the
action is tried in Utah?
Yet it is reasonable to ask whether a transfer to Utah, on such
have been an appropriate one for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
and hence is not within the scope of Section 1404(a). In Hughes v. Fetter the Court,
expressly noncommittal about the effect of its decision on the doctrine, held that the
facts of that case did not bring it within the doctrine. 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1951).
The doctrine was not mentioned in the United Air Lines case; but it may be conceded
that the contacts with fllinois made that somewhat less than a typical case for dismissal
under the general doctrine. However, a limitation of Section 1404(a) to cases to which
the doctrine would have been applicable would strip the new procedure of much of its
usefulness; and the cases cited in note 124 supra give promise that no such narrow
interpretation will be adopted.
On the other hand, such a decision might take the form of a holding that no case
is transferable if, under the rule of the Hughes and United Air Lines cases, the state
of filing must provide a forum. Such a holding would require that Section 1404(a) be
qualified where it speaks with emphatic generality. Cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55
(1949). The scope of full faith and credit to foreign causes of action being spectacularly
unsettled, the resulting problems of interpretation would throw administration of the
section into hopeless confusion. If the question were of constitutional proportions,
those problems could not be avoided. But the obligation of a federal court to extend
faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of another state
stems not from the Constitution but from the act of Congress [62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1950); see Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938); Moore & Oglebay,
The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 Va. L. Rev. 557, 561 et seq. (1943)];
moreover, Congress has power to prescribe the effect of recognition. U. S. Const. Art.
IV, § 1. The problem, therefore, is at most one of conflict between Section 1404(a) and
Section 1738 of the Judicial Code. That conflict should be resolved by giving Section
1404(a) its unrestricted meaning, thus preserving its intended generality and avoiding
quagmires in its administration.
"'Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951). A thorny problem lurks here, witnessed
by the tenth footnote to the majority opinion, which disclaims any purpose on the
part of the Court to inject itself into problems of choice of law. See Reese, Full Faith
and Credit to Statutes, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 339, 345 (1952). But how can Illinois
give full faith and credit to the public acts of Utah if it refuses to apply them? "The
requirement of full faith and credit to 'public acts,' i.e., statutes, means full faith and
credit to private rights arising from them." Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of
Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1953). That the command of the full faith and credit
clause is a command to apply the law of the foreign state, at least where there is no
legitimate basis for a claim that some other law should control, is implicit in Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), holding that the command does not extend
to parts of the foreign law which have been traditionally treated as "procedural,"
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terms that Utah law would thereafter govern in all respects, would
not take away from the plaintiff the victory he won in United Air
Lines. If such a transfer is possible, what is the meaning of the holding that Illinois, and the district court in Illinois, may not disclaim
jurisdiction? The direct answer is that Section 1404(a) was not before
the court in this context, and its interaction with the principle of full
faith and credit was not considered. The judgment reversed was a
judgment of dismissal, not an order of transfer. But when the question is squarely presented, the answer must be, I think, that the obligation of the district court in Illinois to entertain the action, established by Section 1738 of the Judicial Code, is modified by Section
1404(a) of the same Code. Even so, the principle of full faith and
credit enunciated in the United Air Lines case remains meaningful.
It means:
(1) That a state court may not refuse to take jurisdiction, but must
provide a forum;
(2) That a United States district court may not refuse to take jurisdiction; but it need not provide a forum for trial, if transfer to another
district is appropriate.
The result, in cases which are filed in the state court and are not
removed, is that the plaintiff is not only protected against the harsh
consequences of a wrong choice of forum, but is secured in the advantages he sought by filing there-including advantages of location and
incidental benefits afforded by the lex fori. In the district court, the
plaintiff is also protected against the consequences of a wrong choice
of forum-a substantial consideration, in.view of the differences between dismissal and transfer-but the appropriate place of trial will
be determined by a consideration of all the factors rather than by
his initiative, and the applicable law will be determined by reference
to basic principles rather than by supposed necessities of the initial
forum.
If this analysis is sound, it inexorably supports the view that Section 1404(a) cannot be administered on the principle of securing uniformity between the result in the district court and that which would
have been reached in the courts of the state of filing. 3 2 The contem' Thus, if the action in the Wells case, barred in Pennsylvania, were transferred to
Alabama, the locus delicti, it would not be barred. The fact that this result differs from
that which a state court in Pennsylvania would reach does not impair its soundness.
[Whether a plaintiff may move for transfer under Section 1404(a) is a question beyond
the scope of this paper; but see Quinn v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 199 F. 2d 416 (C.A.

3d, 1952).]
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plated result in the district court satisfies the policy of full faith and
credit, and at the same time serves the further policies of locating the
place of trial most conveniently and of applying the most appropriate
law, free from aberrations introduced by supposed exigencies of the
initial forum. Such an arrangement might well satisfy also the requirements of full faith and credit as applied to state courts, but for the
lack of power in those courts to transfer to another state. So long
as that jurisdictional difference exists, conformity of result can be
achieved only by yoking the courts with power to effect procedural
reforms to those which lack the necessary power.
5. Conclusion. There remains to be considered a problem which
has, with some difficulty, been suppressed until this point. The argument has been that problems relating to the law which will apply after
transfer require that the federal courts exercise an independent judgment according to conflict-of-laws principles in ordering a transfer.
Are these courts to have no control over choice of law where the motion to transfer is denied? It is not easy to argue that Section 1404(a)
"Crequires" rejection of the state law as a rule of decision in such a
case. That section comes into operation only when the court can make
two distinct findings: (1) that a transfer is necessary for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and (2) that it is in the interest of
justice.2 33 If the conditions for transfer do not exist, the question of
its effect hardly arises. The argument for independent federal determination of the governing law rests largely on the necessity of finding
a workable solution to the question of what law should apply after
transfer, especially in view of the necessity to determine that transfer
would be in the interest of justice. When there is to be no transfer,
such questions do not, in strict logic, arise.
Situations may arise, however, which will subject such logic to great
stress. Suppose a case in which the geographical elements of forum
non conveniens are almost nonexistent, but in which the element of
"inequitable" advantage in the law of the forum is very strong.
Proceedings brought in order to evade the exemption laws of the
debtor's domicile furnish a convenient illustration. Such proceedings
are brought, ordinarily, at no great distance; the forum closest to
home is, in fact, the preferable one, so long as a state line intervenes.
At the same time, they constitute the most universally condemned
kind of shopping for legal advantage. Injunction will usually issue to
'

Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.C.A. S 1404 (1950).
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restrain the creditor, and his maintenance of the proceedings may
subject him to liability for damages.23 4 We are to assume, on the basis
of the foregoing argument, that if such proceedings were brought at a
sufficient distance, the district court in which they were pending could
transfer them to the home forum or elsewhere, on terms which would
frustrate the inequitable purpose, irrespective of whether the local
state courts would entertain the action. But what if the court in which
the action is pending is just across a river from the home district?
Already there are decisions holding that Section 1404(a) does not
authorize transfers between points so located that the place of trial,
2
from the standpoint of convenience, is a matter of indifference.

35

If

the federal courts develop a body of law and practice which deprives
the plaintiff of an unconscionable advantage when the action is brought
at such a distance as to warrant transfer, will they be content to let
him keep that advantage when he sues conveniently close to home?
If it is established that it is possible to avoid the result of Griffin v.
McCoack in conjunction with a change of venue, will they be content
to let that result stand merely because the place of trial is not geographically inconvenient? At the least, one may suspect that the courts
will be tempted to search for an improbable burden on parties and
witnesses in such situations, in order to justify the transfer by which
alone they could effect the desired change of law.

Surely, if we do go so far as to concede to the federal courts power
to make an independent choice of law in conjunction with transfer,
it would be. desirable to have that power extend to the case in which
the motion to transfer is denied-and, indeed, to the case in which no
motion for transfer is made. In short, this consideration of the problems of administering Section 1404(a) foreshadows the possibility that
the rule of the Klaxon case may not survive, and that the federal
courts will be freed of compulsion to follow state rules of conflict of
laws.23 6 The results might well be salutary beyond any expectations
' Sweeney v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363 (1891). See also Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S.
107 (1890); Annotation, 122 A.S.R. 451 (1908); Pound, The Progress of the Law, 191819: Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 426-27 (1920).
'Jenkins v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 104 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. N.Y., 1952);
Sherman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 122 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Pa., 1954). Cf. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Southern Bus Lines, 172 F. 2d 946 (C.A. 5th, 1949); Banachowski v.
Atlantic Ref. Co.,' 84 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. N.Y., 1949); Petition of Backman, 122 F. Supp.
896 (D. Del., 1954). No question of difference of law was apparent in these cases.
Such a development would enable us to regard as merely transitional a cumbersome
mechanical feature of the solution proposed in Part IV of this paper-the requirement
that the judge passing on the motion determine the law which is to be applied after
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arising from a modest provision for change of venue. There would be,
in the view of some of the most thoughtful students of the subject, no
violence done to the essential values of the Erie doctrine." 7 Some disuniformity would be produced as between the district courts and the
courts of the states in which they sit; but this would be compensated
for by increased uniformity from state to state. And, in the end, the
disparity of result within the state may be reduced to minor proportions, as the development of choice-of-law rules on federal principles
tends to "a further constitutionalizing of conflict of laws doctrines." 3 s
It is undoubtedly true that in the field of conflict of laws we are "hardly ready for a set of precepts imposed in the process of Supreme Court
'
decision as fixed canons of constitutional law."239
However, the possibilities which are opened, quite surprisingly, by the implications of
Section 1404 (a) provide an opportunity for gradual development; and,
if the federal judiciary, in fulfillment of our reasonable expectations,
does gradually evolve more enlightened rules for choice of law, the
prospect that those rules may attain constitutional status gives promise that progress toward the objectives of a rational system of conflict
of laws will be given its maximum effect.
transfer. That provision is thought to be necessary, against the present background of
the Klaxon rule, in order to prevent surprise resulting from unanticipated changes of
law resulting from transfer, in order to enable the judge to determine whether transfer
would be "in the interest of justice," and in order to enable the judge to know what
the issues will be-for otherwise he cannot intelligently make a determination as to
convenience of parties and witnesses. But against the background of a federal law of
conflict of laws, these matters would diminish in importance, and the applicable law
could be determined at the most appropriate stage of the litigation.
Professor Barrett has recently suggested that the exigencies of administering Section
1404(a) will require statutory abrogation of the Klaxon rule. Venue and Service of
Process in the Federal Courts, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 632 (1954).
'Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Col.
L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1945); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
c. V (1949); Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Col. L. Rev. 489,
513 (1954).
' Hart, op. cit. supra note 237, at 541-42.
'Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1236
(1946).
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